Abstract
Philosophical activity encompasses an immense subject matter, a content so wide that it is impossible to determine its boundaries with precision. There are texts, considered as philosophical, which on many respects could be viewed as mystical literature, and others which could, quite safely, be classified as scientific. Nevertheless among these innumerable aspects of philosophical activity there are two spheres which belong to the central bulk of philosophical thought: the creation of theories and the criticism of theories. Since the very beginning of philosophy, we find philosophers who have tried to develop theories able to grasp the most profound and general traits of reality; and we have also found philosophers who, in a way or another, have criticized these theories.
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Notes
The Platonic theory of ideas is found in many of the dialogues (Philebus, Timaeus,etc.). But it acquires it systematic form in the Republic.
For a good version of modern Platonism in the realm of meta-mathematics and mathematical philosophy, see Fraenkel, Bar-Hillel and Levy, Foundations of Set Theory (North-Holland, Amsterdam, London, 1973 ).
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is, among other important things, an admirable effort to account for the necessecity of causal relation, that was a fundamental principle of classical newtonian physics. As a consequence of Hume’s criticism of causality the rational foundation of scientific knowledge seemed gravely endangered. And the only way to supersede that criticism was to consider causal necessity as imposed by a rational a priori principle. Kant could not suspect, nor anybody in his time, that necessity as rational justification of physical knowledge, was not necessary. It was not, concerning the connection of phaenomena, although it is unavoidable in the deductive process that enables the explanation and prediction of physical facts.
Locke, `An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil-Government’, Encyclopaedia Britannica (London 1952 ).
It is usual to speak about modern myths; for instance, the myth of National Socialism, the myth of progress, the myth of the superiority of scientific knowledge, etc. But if the word `myth’ is properly understood it cannot be applied to modern Western civilization because something, to be a myth, must be embedded in a mythical culture. In a culture everything is imbricated in a system of relationships that determine the way of thinking and the uncritical beliefs of the community. For a culture to be mythical means that its members must have a very special conception of space, time, causality, destiny, etc. For instance space is not, as it is for modern man, a kind of inert receptacle, nor is time a calculable monotonic sequence; causation is not a necessary relationship between cause and effect; in some mythical genealogies a father can be engendered by his son, and a being can be masculine and feminine, etc. This cultural pattern is incompatible with modern Western scientific Weltanschauung.
However, there are aspects of modem civilization that have some similarities with mythological entities and stories. One of this is the absolute belief in the existence or the value of something or some person, for instance, absolute uncritical admiration for a political leader, or the unflinching belief in the supremacy of a race or nation. I think that what many philosophers and social scientists call, nowadays, a `myth’ could be called, more properly, `mythoid’. Contemporary political movements based on charismatic leadership, in the adoration of the State or in the superiority of a race, are founded on mythoids.
It is difficult to know whether the belief in the divine right of kings to rule during the XVII and XVIII centuries is a myth or a mythoid. It is clear that when a mythical culture begins to disappear under the effects of critical philosophical reasoning (and, of course, of other cultural, political, economical and other processes) there is a time in which some beliefs preserve their mythical character a longer time than others. I think that the belief in the divine right of kings has been one of the myths that have presented a greater resistance against the inexorable erosion produced by critical rationality.
As it always happens in cultural dynamics, the confrontation of rational with mythical attitude is not a clear cut process. There is no doubt that some myths represent a philosophical interest in human and cosmological problems and that, in this respect, some important philosophical insights have emerged as a rational development of these myths. But in all cases, there is an irreducible difference: whereas mythical narration is absolutely uncritical, philosophical argumentation is critical, and the criticism is made through rational criteria. It is clear that when myth begins to be submitted to rational criticism philosophy has been born.
Concerning the relationship between myth and philosophy, see, Hyland, The Origins of Philosophy, its Rise in Myth and the Presocratics (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1973 ). On the confrontation of myth and philosophy, see, Ortega y Gasset, Origen y eepilogo de la filosofia, Obras Completas, Tomo IX (Biblioteca de Occidente, 1962 ).
Some philosophers reject the necessity of logical coherence, claiming that logic pertains to a superficial level that loses meaning when thought descends to the awesome depths of true being. When a philosopher thinks this way, there are two unavoidable conclusions: 1) why other philosophers, whose fame is as great as his own, think completely different things about the awesome depths of being? And 2) if he does not care about the contradiction principle, then we can say exactly the contrary of what he is saying and nobody has any basis to say we are wrong.
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© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Quesada, F.M. (1995). Knowledge and Destiny. In: Kuçuradi, I., Cohen, R.S. (eds) The Concept of Knowledge. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 170. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3263-5_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3263-5_17
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