Abstract
In “Les avatars de l’interprétation de l’Ecriture chez Spinoza”1 Sylvain Zac returns to a question already raised in his book Spinoza et l’interprétation de l’Ecriture: Spinoza’s refutation of the allegorical method of Scriptural interpretation proposed by Maimonides. This refutation is set forth in Chapter XV of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, which also contains the critique of another allegorical interpretation, that of Rabbi Alpakhar. Dismissing on equal terms those who deny reason any role at all in Scriptural interpretation and those who accord it full authority, Spinoza undertakes to show in this chapter that “theology is not subservient to reason, nor reason to theology.’2 In the preamble to this chapter Spinoza reverts to one of the classic topics in the history of philosophy since the doxographers and, in particular, Sextus Empiricus: the distinction between sceptics and dogmatists. He applies it to the way we conceive the adaptive relationship (accmodari) between reason and theology or, to be more precise, between reason and the meaning of Scripture (sensus Scripturae). Those whom Spinoza qualifies here as sceptics, those who deny the certitude of reason, hold that reason must adapt itself to Scripture, while th ”dogmatics“ maintain that the meaning of Scripture must be accommodated to reason.
This paper was translated from the French by Helen Sebba. with the collaboration of R.H. Popkin. A first copy of this text was first published in French in Nature. croyance, raison, Mélanges offerts à S. Zac. ENS Fontenay, juin 1992.
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Notes
This text (written in 1962) constitutes the third essay in Essais spino:istes (Vrin, 1985).
TTP, in R.H.M. Elwes (trans.), The Chief Works of Benedict de Spino:a 2 vols. (New York: Dover, 1951), hereafter referred to as “Elwes”, p. 190: Carl Gerhardt, Spino:a Opera 4 vols., (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925), Vol. 111, p. 180, hereafter referred to as “Gebhardt”.
In Pvrrhonian Hypotyposes, Vol. I, p. 1, Sextus draws a distinction between the seekers of truth: those who believe they have found it and are called dogmatists (e.g., Aristotle, Epicurus, the Stoics); those who assert that it is impossible to grasp the truth (Clitomachus, Cameades and some other Academicians); and those who persevere in their search: the sceptics.
“Astronomical error” is a free though literal translation of the Spinozist metaphor: “toto coelo errare”.
“Chwr(133)adeo uterque hic scilicet sine ratione, ille vero cum ratione insaniet,” TTP, Elwes, p. 190; Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 180.
Common as to genus; different as to species.
“Lac, op. cit. (note I), 29/63.
See, in Chap. VII, the rigorous parallel between the method of interpreting nature and the method of interpreting Scripture; also our study “Les deux livres de la nature et de l’Ecriture”, l’Ecriture Sainte au temps de Spinoza et dons le système Spinoziste, PU Paris Sorbonne, 1992–4, and Chap. XV “Sed tam hos quam illos toto coelo errare er,jam dictis constat” (my italics). Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 180.
pinoza, Letter LXIX, in A. Wolf (ed.), The Correspondence of Spinoza (New York: Dial Press, n.d.), pp. 335–36; Gebhardt; Vol. IV, p. 360.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 36; Elwes, p. 33.
See Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding and Leibniz, Nouveaux Essais, IV, Chap. XIX.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 187: Elwes, p. 198.
Although the Religio rationalis is posterior (1676–78) to the TTP, it defends the very same arguments that Spinoza criticizes in Chapter XV.
Jacob Ostens in Spinoza, Letter XLII, Wolf, p. 243, Gebhardt, Vol. IV, p. 210.
See, for example, the refutation of Renier de Mansvelt.
Spinoza, Letter XLIII, Wolf, p. 258; Gebhardt, IV, p. 226.
An argument which presupposes that a book has no value except in so far as it proclaims truths, that there is no truth over than that of a speculative order, and that God, being the source of all truth and the author of the Bible, necessarily expressed those speculative truths in the Bible but in an implicit form which human reason, as it becomes more knowledgeable and more learned, makes explicit.
Language unworthy of God (as opposed to théoprépös) may mean anthropomorphic language or speaking of God as corporeal.
With the exception of those illuminati who claim that the Bible is wholly inspired, even as to the literality of all these passages, and who are not taken into account here.
This distinction between sceptics and dogmatists also occurs in Meyer, in the preamble to the Interpres, where it is applied to the “theologians of this century.” But with a difference: for Meyer the dogmatists are all the theologians who claim to derive a true and evident knowledge from Holy Scripture but who split into rival sects because they differ as to the content of what they hold to be certain and evident. By sceptics he means the Catholic theologians who affirm that “the truths of religion can only be based plausibly on Holy Scripture” and who therefore submit their theological arguments to the superior judgment of another person. This supreme judge in theological matters means the Pope or the councils, who are themselves drawn from the class of dogmatists.
Spinoza, Cogita metaphvsica, Vol II, p. viii.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 182; Elwes, p. 192.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 181; Elwes, p. 191.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 187; Elwes, p. 197.
Louis Meyer. Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres (Amsterdam. 1666), Chap. XI, Sec. 9, p. 129; and p. 174 of the French translation, Jacqueline Lagrée and Pierre-Francois Moreau (trans.), La Philosophie interprète de I Ecriture Sainte, (Paris: Intertextes éditeur, 1988).
TTP, XV, Gebhardt. Vol. III, p. 181; Elwes, p. 191.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 184; Elwes, p. 194.
Notably on the question of providence, the freedom of man and election for eternity, as is shown by the Short Treatise as well as by the dual formulation of certain problems (e.g., the problem of transgression and evil) in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus (ad captum doctorum) and in the Ethics (acaptura sapientiun?) On this point see Jacqueline Laggrée. “Les notions communes religieuses, antécédents et enjeux du credo minimum” in Dio, l’uomo,la lihertà: Studi sul “breve trattato” di Spinoza, a cura di Filippo Mignini, Japadre, L’Aquila-Roma. 1990, p. 457 ff.
“Insinare cum ratione”,TTP, Chap. XV. Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 180: Elwes, p. 190.
“Incerta haec si postules/ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas/quam si des operam, ut cum ratione insanias.” Terence. The Eunuch, lines 61–63. As Proietti has shown, the TTP is full of crypto-quotations from Terence, particularly from The Eunuch
“Dicentes enim se esse sapientes, stulti facti sunt.” (Rom. 1:22).
“Verbum Dei verbi syngraphum”. TTP, Gebhardt. Ill. p. 182; Elwes, p. 192.
TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 185: Elwes, p. 195.
TTP. Gebhardt. Vol. III, p. 187: Elwes. p. 197.
Interpres,Epilogue, p. 248 of French translation by Lagrée and Moreau.
Cf. the concluding lines of Chap. XV of the TTP.
“And we shall see the publication of authoritative pages on God. the rational soul, the supreme happiness of man, and the means of attaining eternal life.” Interpres Epilogue. p. 249 in the French translation.
Short Treatise, TTP, Ethics, as well as certain letters.
Scriptural interpretation based on different sorts of reading but also interpretation of individual practices (e.g., those of the prophets or the faithful) or collective practices (e.g., the Hebrew nation’s demand for a king such as other nations had).
“For it is as impossible to dissolve the love which such bear one another, since it is founded on the love which each has for the knowledge of truth, as it is to refuse to embrace the truth once it has been grasped.” Spinoza. Letter XIX, Wolf, p. 146; Gebhardt, Vol. IV, p. 87.
Spinoza, Letter XLIII. Wolf, p. 259; Gebhardt, Vol. IV, p. 226.
Spinoza. Letter XLII. Wolf, p. 254: Gebhardt. Vol. IV, p. 218.
See Grotius (Meletius and DGP). Wissowatty (Religio rationalis), D’Huisseau (Réunion du christianisme) and Jacqueline Lagrée. Lu raison ardente, (Paris, Vrin, 1991).
“Who, unless he were desperate or mad, would wish to bid an incontinent farewell to reason, or to despise the arts and sciences. or to deny reason’s certitude?” TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III. p. 187: Elwes, p. 197.
Given, in fact, in the Ethics. On this point see A. Matheron, Le Christ et le salut des ignorants Che: Spino:a Aubier. Paris 1971.
“Propterea omnibus universalis est.” TTP, Gebhardt, Vol. III, p. 185; Elwes, p. 195.
Zac, op. cit. (note 1), 29/63.
Ibid
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Lagrée, J. (1994). Irrationality with or without Reason. In: Force, J.E., Popkin, R.H. (eds) The Books of Nature and Scripture: Recent Essays on Natural Philosophy, Theology and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of Spinoza’s Time and the British Isles of Newton’s Time. International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales D’Histoire des Idées, vol 139. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3249-9_3
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