On the Theory of Cognitive Processes

Abstract

Within a number of disciplines ranging from psychology to computer science, the subject of cognitive processes is now being given a great deal of attention and discussion. Many of the problems and viewpoints expressed about cognitive processes have a very old ring in philosophy, and clearly have a very respectable ancestry in the history of philosophy. It is not too difficult to cite a number of definitions of what cognitive processes are taken to be. Even the man in the street may often have a fairly ready answer, namely, that talk about cognitive processes is just a fancy way of talking about thinking. This man-in-the-street answer is not a bad one. It makes quite clear that the central problem of a theory of cognitive processes must be to develop the theory of how we think. Philosophers and psychologists have had almost as much to say about thinking as they have about perception, and consequently, it might be assumed that we can rapidly move to consideration of current systematic theories of thinking, and consider their various strengths and weaknesses.

This paper has not been previously published. It was given as an Arnold Isenberg Memorial Lecture at Michigan State University, December 9, 1966.