Abstract
The effective enforcement of environmental laws and regulations is crucial for proper environmental management. As emphasized in Canada’s Green Plan (Government of Canada, 1990, p. 156), “Legislation and regulation are only as good as their enforcement.” This paper contains a detailed literature survey covering verification and enforcement theory and its applications, plus summaries of current environmental enforcement policies in Canada and the United States. In addition, the applicability of verification theory to environmental enforcement policies is assessed. Finally, some conclusions are drawn.
Keywords
- American Political Science Review
- Economic Instrument
- Control Order
- Regulatory Enforcement
- Verification Theory
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Fang, L., Hipel, K.W., Kilgour, D.M. (1994). Enforcement of Environmental Laws and Regulations: A Literature Review. In: Hipel, K.W., Fang, L. (eds) Stochastic and Statistical Methods in Hydrology and Environmental Engineering. Water Science and Technology Library, vol 10/2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-3081-5_1
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