Abstract
The problematic of this chapter involves the search for a criterion of the identity of sense of expressions and for the very ‘nature’ of the sense of expressions. In a sense the first question is subordinate to the second; for, if the sense of every expression in a language were clearly given and able to be determined, there could be no doubt as to the identity or nonidentity of the sense of two expressions. It would be immediately evident whether or not two expressions were synonymous in the way that we understand identity of sense here (not as mere identity of reference). But, at least in the natural languages, we do not find this to be the case. In fact, the situation is so discouraging that one is tempted to drop the second question for a while and deal with the first question by itself. This is possible. Just as two mathematicians can agree that two expressions designate the same number without agreeing as to what a number ‘really is’, so two semanticists can agree on a concept of synonymity without being in agreement on the ‘essence’ of sense.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
“6: 3” is reproduced by Frege as “the number which, multiplied by 3, gives 6” (FuB,5). The example of intersection is in SuB, 26 (cf. p. 86f. above).
Rivetti Barbb, F., Il “Senso e Significato”di Frege, Milan 1962.
Whence it is clear that our author understands ‘reference’ here in the sense of Frege’s second doctrine on judgement, even though she is aware that it is undifferentiated in this context. In what follows we assume that this conforms to Frege’s intentions in the Foundations and is better than rendering the questionable expression as ‘sense’ in the terminology of the second doctrine on judgement. This has the advantage of corresponding with Frege’s later requirement that one always ask after the sense of the whole sentence. That there it is precisely a question of ‘sense’ in the sense of the second doctrine on judgement and not of sentential reference (truth-value), is so clear that it does not need Frege’s indirect confirmation which is to be found in his epistolary indications to Husserl on the change of ‘sense’ and ‘reference’. In any case, the problem of context for sense and of context for reference are so much the same that we will be able to simplify what follows by not paying any attention to it — which we can do without danger.
Frege non ha rilevato, a quanto pare, l’indispensabilità del contesto della frase vera ai fine delle dimostrazione della differenza del ‘significato’ dal ‘senso’ dei nomi” (op. cit., 7).
See the refutation of the misunderstanding by M. Dummett, ‘Nominalism’, Philosophical Review 65 (1956), 491–505. But Dummett says that he is unable to refute the view that Frege later gave up his rejection of definitions in use (contextual definitions). On the basis of statements in later, unpublished texts, one can show that Frege, in fact, had not changed his mind on this point. For example: “The fact that one uses a sign in one or more sentences, the rest of the components of which are known, does not yet constitute its sense” (LM, 35).
And on every explication of natural language since I can arbitrarily submit my use thereof to certain rules without undertaking a formalization.
Schröter, K., ‘Was ist eine mathematische Theorie?’ [What is a Mathematical Theory?], JDMV 53 (1943), 69–82 (79).
Carnap, R., Meaning and Necessity, Chicago 1956, 124.
Scholz, H., Review of MaN (previous note), Zentralblatt für Mathematik 34 (1950), 1–3.
Bierich, op. cit.,2.
In the sense of Gg.,I, 44. Cf. the definition in Gg.,I 55b.
Gg.,I, x; BuG, 198. Cf. letter to Husserl of May 24,1891.
Bierich’s statement that for Frege “two judgements, in which the same expressions occur in the same sequence, also have the same judgemental content” (op. cit.,26) is trivial; Frege himself, of course, does not refer to it. The formulation only helps Bierich to suggest equality of structure of sentences as a necessary condition of the equality of judgemental content. Frege certainly did not intend such a strict condition. We cannot agree with Bierich when he asserts: “Therefore, two judgements, in which the same words follow each other in different sequences or in which there are different words, always [!] have differing judgemental contents” (loc. cit.). This objection is also valid for P.D. Wienpahl’s ‘Frege’s “Sinn and Bedeutung”‘, Mind 59 (1950), 483–494.
Bierich, op. cit.,Ch. 3, Sect. I (40ff.), where one should replace the terminological hybrid ‘conceptually judgemental content’ by Frege’s ‘conceptual content’ since conceptual contents are eo ipso judgemental in Frege’s Begrifsschrift.
In the quotation below (p. 131) from the letter to Husserl of Dec. 9, 1906, Frege calls thought the “content… (of a sentence), in as far as it is able to be judged true or false” or that “which in the contents… can be judged true or false”. Comparison with the criterion of the Begriffsschrift shows what we want to show.
Bartlett, op. cit.,19–20.
There is an interesting comparison to be made with Carnap’s earlier work, The Logical Structure of the World (Leipzig 1928; reprint: Hamburg 1961): “By sense of a sign we understand what is common to the intentional objects of those ideas, thoughts, etc., the evocation of which is the object of the sign: 7 and VII have the same sense, i.e., the number 7 as ideational or cognitive content; 5+2 has another sense.… While ‘der Abendstern’ is the same as ‘the evening-star’, ‘der Morgenstern’ is something else” (61).
Frege, G., Logische Untersuchungen [Logical Investigations], Part 3: ‘Thought-Structures’, Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus 3 (1923–26), 36–51.
Daß ‘B und A’ denselben Sinn hat wie ‘A und B’,sieht man ein ohne Beweis nur dadurch, daß man sich des Sinnes bewußt wird. Wir haben hier einen Fall, daß sprachlich verschiedenen Ausdrücken derselbe Sinn entspricht. Diese Abweichung des ausdrückenden Zeichens von dem ausgedrückten Gedanken ist eine unvermeidliche Folge der Verschiedenheit des in Raum und Zeit Erscheinenden von der Welt der Gedanken.”
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1968 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Thiel, C. (1968). Synonymity and Sentential Context. In: Sense and Reference in Frege’s Logic. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2981-9_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2981-9_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8333-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2981-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive