Abstract
It was E. Durkheim who put the problem of social self-regulation on the agenda of sociology when he wrote his Division of Social Labor Though mostly not read from this perspective, Durkheim’s model of the relation between social differentiation and individualization can be seen as a breakthrough toward a better understanding of self-organization as a process that has self-regulating effect.2Whereas in Durkheim’s writing the problem of self-regulation is not clearly distinguished from his notion of social solidarity, a reformulation of the problem within the conceptual frame of self-organization3 seems to provide a new conceptual solution.
The theoretical model presented here resulted from and owes much to continuous discussions I have had over recent years with G. Roth, A. Barsch, S.J. Schmidt, and many colleagues from different disciplines. Yet, without the patient help of R. Hunt, whom I have the pleasure to thank particularly, it would have been very difficult to produce this text.
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Notes and References
P.M. Hejl, Durkheim und das Thema der Selbstorganisation, LUMIS - Publication No. 18, University Siegen, 1988.
See for more details and for the relation of the approach to traditional system theory or to holism, P.M. Hejl, Self-Regulation in Social Systems: Explaining the Process of Research, LUMIS - Publication, in print, University Siegen, 1989.
See for more details P.M. Hejl, Towards a Theory of Social Systems: Self-Organization and Self-Maintenance, Self-Reference and Syn-Reference , in H. Ulrich, G.J.B. Probst (eds.), Self-Organization and Management of Social Systems, Insights, Promises, Doubts, and Questions,Berlin, Heidelberg, New York: Springer, 1984, p. 60–78; op. cit,1988, note 2.
See on the used understanding of constructivism E.v. Glasersfeld, The Concepts of Adaptation and Viability in a Radical Constructivist Theory of Knowledge , in I Siegel, R. Golinkoff, D. Brodzinski (eds.), New Directions in Piagetian Theory and their Application to Education, Hillsdale, New Jersey: Erlbaum, 1980, p. 87–95; An Interpretation of Piaget’s Constructivism , Revue Internationale de Philosophie 36 4 (1982), 612–635.
This definition of the properties of members or components of a system is in no way trivial as a comparison with the influential definition of A.D. Hall, R.E. Fagen, Definitions of Systems , General Systems 1 (1956), 18–25 demonstrates. They defined components through properties and interactions, establishing a distinction that unavoidably leads to confusion.
See for instance N. Luhmann, Lob der Routine, in N. Luhmann, Soziologische Aufklärung. Aufsätze zur Theorie sozialer Systeme, Vol. 1, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1970, p. 113–142; Funktion und Folgen fonnaler Organisation, Berlin: Schriftenreihe der Hochschule Speyer, Vol. 20, 1972.
There is the possibility that minor causes might produce effects that seem to be out of proportion. Effects of this kind are normally observed when the system reaches, for whatever reason, an unstable state, allowing some modification in the behavior of a member or some unexpected result etc. to trigger a whole series of modifications.
See for a more detailed explanation of the concept of self-organization to be developed in this part Hejl, op. cit,1988, note 1.
See D. Crane, Invisible Colleges. Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.
In fact we must distinguish two extreme cases. If there are only very few members who change their relevant cognitive constructs, the system will be affected only in a negligible way. If, on the contrary, an overwhelming majority undergoes changes, there might be cases where the existing organization remains invariant even though the defining reality constructs and action programs have evolved.
This definition takes into account the fact that no explanation can avoid the use of unexplained assumptions. For this reason and because the explanation would go beyond the aim of this contribution, the question of the source of events that lead to self-organizing processes is left open. For the present purpose it may suffice to point at the implication that the definition does not exclude successful external influences on the system, even if it must be thought as operationally closed to the extent that it is self-organizing and self-regulating.
In system theoretical terms, coercion might be understood here as an unacceptable gap between the dynamics of components and the inputs they continue to receive from the social system to which they belong.
The formation of hierarchical static systems such as classificatory or norm systems are good examples. From the point of view of systems theory, cognitive hierarchies are situated at the level of components.
See N. Luhmann, Politische Planung, in N. Luhmann, Politische Planung. Aufsätze zur Soziologie von Politik und Verwaltung, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1971, p. 69.
W.R. Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics, London: Methuen, Routledge Chapman and Hall, 1965, p. 207.
R.C. Conant, W.R. Ashby, Every Good Regulator of a System Must Be a Model of That System, International Journal of Systems Science 1, 2 (1970), 89–97.
In technical contexts it is less problematic because regulators are constructed to meet the requirements of predefined events. If the engineer speaks of self-regulation , using the term not merely as a facon de parler , he refers to environments and hence possible events of either limited variety, or it is understood that there are limits to regulation beyond which breakdowns might happen.
The logical theorem of transitivity establishes a linear order of preferences. Applied to a set of for example, three choices (A, B, and C), it stipulates that if A is preferred to B and B to C, A is also preferred to C.
Of course one might think of hierarchically organized social systems, in which modifications of the system’s behavior are brought about through decisions from top of the hierarchy, that allow intransitivity as well. This case, which is not taken into account at the level of the general discussion of this contribution, can be understood as a historically produced combination of both types of hierarchical regulation discussed here.
Of course social hierarchical organizations are often, if not mostly, designed to assure a specific output as results of a preselected sequence of activities of the components of the particular system. Nevertheless, as a type of organization, hierarchies and their functioning are independent of the activities they structure as well as of considerations of which particular component should participate in which way.
And to avoid any mystification, it should be underlined that the organization does nothing . The only active agents in a system are in fact the components, the role of the organization being precisely that of a social pattern of interactions, which for this very reason is not at the disposal of singular individuals who participate as components in the system’s activities.
W.S. McCulloch, A Heterarchy of Values Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets, in W.S. McCulloch, Embodiments of Mind, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 1965, p. 40–45.
It has to be stressed that we are concerned with ideal types. Clearly enough, observable systems normally present characters which make them for good reasons partly hierarchical and partly heterarchical. See below, section 2. 4.
The minimal case being the hierarchical ranking of decision and nondecision !
Not surprisingly, heterogeneous membership in a research group is associated with its superior performance. See C.G. Smith, Scientific Performance and the Composition of Research Teams, in Administrative Science Quarterly 16 (1971), 486–495.
An attitude that may easily turn out to be in practice one way to establish a hierarchy: see below the discussion of factors leading to the formation of temporary hierarchies.
As a result, events that do not belong to the so-defined environment of the system are normally not taken into account, or, if they are, are considered to be merely individual problems of the members of the system.
See C.G. Smith, Consultation and Decision Processes in a Research and Development Laboratory , in Administrative Science Quarterly 15 (1970), 203–215, who gives evidence of this organizational mix in relation to the type of problems to be dealt with on the basis of an analysis of Decision Processes in a R. and D. laboratory. Smith of course uses the traditional opposition, hierarchical vs. decentralized organization , and hence decision, which could not answer the question of how decentralization was coupled to the overall unit. See as well T. Shinn, Scientific Disciplines and Organizational Specificity: The Social and Cognitive Configuration of Laboratory Activities , in N. Elias, H. Martins, R. Whitley (eds.), Scientific Establishments and Hierarchies,(Sociology of the Sciences. Yearbook VI), Dordrecht, London: Reidel, 1982, p. 239–264, for a demonstration of a specific relation between task specificity and type of organization.
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Hejl, P.M. (1990). Self-Regulation in Social Systems. In: Krohn, W., Küppers, G., Nowotny, H. (eds) Selforganization. Sociology of the Sciences, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2975-8_7
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