Abstract
Interest in epistemological questions is not limited to philosophy today. Numerous empirical sciences have, in the normal course of their research, been forced to proceed from the immediate object of their research to questions involving cognition. Quantum physics is perhaps the best-known example, but it is no exception. In linguistics the question is raised today of what problems arise from the fact that research into language has to make use of language. Cognitive instruments have to be aquired via the object investigated by means of these very instruments and not, for example, through reflection of consciousness upon itself.1 Brain research has shown that the brain is not able to maintain any contact with the outer world on the level of its own operations, but — from the perspective of information — operates closed in upon itself. This is obviously also true for the brains of those engaged in brain research. How does one come, then, from one brain to another? Or to take a further example: the sociology of knowledge had demonstrated at least the influence of social factors on all knowledge, if not their role as sole determinants. This is also true, then, for this statement itself since no justification for an exception can be found, in the sense, say, of Mannheim’s »free-floating intelligence«. What conclusion is to be drawn from this? It was thought that one would have to found all knowledge on »convention«2 or that knowledge was the result of a kind of »negotiation«.3 But these attempts only wound up designating an ancient problem — that of the unity of knowledge and reality — by means of a new concept. Not without reason have these attempts been criticized for epistemological naiveté4, since one either learns nothing about the relationship to reality or the connection is only made over theoretically unacceptable »both/and« concessions. There is little more to be gained by calling such »constructivism«, as has recently been done, »radical«5 since what is identified here as »constructivism« hardly at first seems unfamiliar. It might be that the theory of knowledge — at least in some of its traditional variants — will be confirmed rather than caught unaware. Science is apparently reacting here to its own power of resolution. This can already be found in Plato who reduces everyday experience to mere opinion and raises the question of what reality lies behind it. As a result, these philosophic reflections were termed, at first, »idealism«. As we come to modern times the emergence of modern science led more and more to the conclusion that this »underlying« reality was knowledge itself. This altered the meaning of the concept of the subject, while it is only in our century that the name »idealism« has been replaced by »constructivism«. There was a shift in emphasis in the conflict between realism and idealism, but it is not easy to discover in this a new theory. There is an external world, which results from the fact that cognition, as a self-operated operation, can be carried out at all, but we have no direct contact with it. Without knowing, cognition could not reach the external world. In other words, knowing is only a self-referential process. Knowledge can only know itself, although it can — as if out of the corner of its eye — determine that this is only possible if there is more than only cognition. Cognition deals with an external world that remains unknown and has to, as a result, come to see that it cannot see what it cannot see.
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Notes and References
As a typical solution the distinguishing of several levels of language or of cognition has been suggested, with the possibility of »autologic« relationships on the higher level. See L. Lofgren, »Towards System: From Computation to the Phenomenon of Language«, in M.E. Carvallo (ed.), Nature, Cognition and System: Current Systems - Scientific Research on Natural and Cognitive Systems,Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988,p. 129–55. But this is a transparent stopgap solution, since a level derives its identity only from the fact that there are other levels that can be reached from it.
See D. Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge,London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983, esp. p. 119ff. This »conventionalism« going back to Poincaré, has become a tradition, it meets with little opposition today as it has become almost reflex.
See D. Bloor, Wittgenstein: A Social Theory of Knowledge,London: Allen & Unwin, 1979, passim., for example, p. 95.
This can be found in the recent publication by A. Chalmers, »The Sociology of Knowledge and the Epistemological Status of Science«, Thesis Eleven 21 (1988), 81–102: The argument presented, however, shows no progress.
See P. Watzlawick (ed.) Die erfundene Wirklichkei4 Munich: Piper, 1981; H. Gumin/A. Mohler (eds.), Einführung in den Konstruktivismus, Munich: Oldenbourg, 1985; S.J. Schmidt (ed.), Der Diskurs des radikalen Konstruktivismus, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987; E. v. Glasersfeld, Wissen, Sprache und Wirklichkeit: Arbeiten zum radikalen Konstruktivismus, Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1987.
See Plato, Theaetetus, 208 C.
See, for example, C. Buffler, Cours de sciences sur des principes nouveaux et simples, Paris 1732, reprint Genf: Slatkine 1971, p. 800ff. where this concept dealt with at length in the »Traite des vérités de conséquences« (not in the »Traité des première vérités«).
See in this regard, as well as for the limiting cases of universal distinction (nothing is excluded) and elementary distinction (nothing is included), R. Glanville/F.J. Varela, »Your Inside Is Out and Your Outside Is In« (Beatles 1968 ), in G.E. Lasker (ed.), Applied Systems and Cybernetics, Vol. II, New York: Pergamon Press 1981, p. 638–641. Following S. Brown, the authors distinguish inclusion and exclusion by using the concept of form in order to distinguish the act of distinguishing. Their argument corresponds, moreover, exactly to the idea Nicolas Cusanus used to found the coincidentia oppositorum and upon it bis concept of God beyond all distinctions.
See, for example, the »object-psychological« epistemology of A. Naess, Erkenntnis und wissenschaftliches Verhalten, Oslo: Dybverd, 1936, in particular p. 103ff., where the author demands that all epistemology should be limited to description »of the process in the internal functional space« of an organism. See also p. 105: »The common distinction between situation and behavior is, viewed psychologically, a distinction between two kinds of behavior«.
See H.R. Maturana, Erkennen: Die Organisation und Verkörperung von Wirklichkeit, Braunschweig: Vieweg, 1982, esp. p. 32ff. (German translation from the English); H. R. Maturana/F.J. Varela, Der Baum der Erkenntnis: die biologischen Wurzeln des menschlichen Erkennens, Bern: Scherz, 1987, esp. p. 31ff. See the critical discussion precisely this connection between biological systems theory and epistemology, in G. Roth, »Autopoiese und Kognition: Die Theorie H.R. Maturana und die Notwendigkeit ihrer Weiterentwicklung«, in Schmidt, op. cit., 1987, note 5, p. 256–286.
See G. Roth, »Die Entwicklung kognitiver Selbstreferentialität im menschlichen Gehirn«, in D. Baecker, et.al. (eds.), Theorie als Passion,Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987, p. 394–422 (419f).
See the contributions of H. v. Foerster, Sicht und Einsicht: Ausgewählte Arbeiten zu einer operativen Erkenntnistheorie, Braunschweig Vieweg, 1985. See also F.J. Varela, »Living Ways of Sense-Making: A Middle Path for Neuroscience«, in P. Livingston (ed.), Disorder and Order: Proceedings of the Stanford International Symposium (Sept. 14–16, 1981), Saratoga, California: Anma Libri 1984, p. 208–223; G. Roth, »Selbstorganisation-Selbsterhakung-Selbstreferentialität: Prinzipien der Organisation der Lebewesenund ihre Folgen für die Beziehungen zwischen Organismus und Umwelt«, in A. Dress, et al. (eds.), Selbst-organisation: Die Entstehung von Ordnung in Natur und Gesellschaft, Munich: Piper, 1986, p. 149–180, esp. 168ff.; G. Roth, »Erkenntnis und Realität: Das reale Gehirn und seine Wirklichkeit«, in Schmidt, op. cit., 1987, note 5, p. 229–255.
»The natural world has a small or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge«, is claimed, e.g., by H. Collins, »Stages in the Empirical Programme of Relativism«, Social Studies of Science, 11 (1981), 3–10 (3). See also, H. Collins, Changing Order,London: Sage Publications, 1985. There would be far less controversy if one read the latter work in conjunction with works on brain research and not as an alternative to them. The question isn’t whether brains or language construct the world; the claim is that if it’s brains, then it must be language, and vice versa.
See, for example, D.T. Campell, »Descriptive Epistemology, Psychological, Sociological and Evolutionary«, William James Lectures at Harvard University, 1977; noted from an unpublished manuscript.
M. Serres, »Dream«, in Livingston (ed.), op. cit.,1984, note 12, p. 225–239 (238).
See with regard to this systems-theoretic use of the concept of redundancy: H. Atlan, Entre le cristal et la fumée, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1979; or, H. Atlan, »Disorder, Complexity and Meaning«, in Livingston, op.cit., 1984, note 5, p. 109–128.
On closure as »enclosure« see H. v. Foerster, »Entdecken oder Erfinden. Wie läßt sich Verstehen verstehen?«, in Gumin, Mohler, op. cit., 1985, note 5, p. 27–68.
Subtle analyses of this question are to be found in F.H. Tenbruck, Geschichte und Gesellschaft,Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 1986, resp. p. 175ff.
A. Schütz, Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt: Eine Einleitung in die verstehende Soziologie, Vienna: J. Springer, 1932, p. 111f.
J.J. Rousseau, Les rêveries du promeneur solitaire, Cinquième promenade, quoted from Oeuvres complètes (Ed. de la Pléiade), Vol. 1, Paris: Gallimard, 1959, p. 1040ff (1045).
Of course, these are always the statements of an observation that itself sees more time from the observed system does. An extensive analysis of these questions can be found in R. Rosen, Anticipatory Systems. Philosophical, Mathematical and Methodological Foundations, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985.
The same is true for language and this similarity points to a close evolutionary and even neuro-physiological association. See on this question H.J. Jerrison, Evolution of the Brain and Intelligence,New York: Verlag?, esp. p. 426f.
For greater detail see N. Luhmann, Soziale Systeme: Grundriß einer allgemeinen Theorie,Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 111f.
This is the formulation of Glasersfeld, op. cit.,1987, note 5, in his presentation of»radial constructivism«. Maturana also uses such formulations to explain his constructivist position.
See H. v. Foerster, »What is Memory that it May Have Hindsight and Foresight as Well?«, in S. Bogoch (ed.), The Future of the Brain Sciences, New York: Plenum Press, 1969, p. 19–64.
See v. Foerster, op. cit.,1985, note 12, esp. p. 205ff.
In Maturana’s theory the corresponding concept is »Conservation of Adaption«. See Maturana/Varela, op. cit.,1987, note 10, p. 113f. or, in greater detail, H.R. Maturana, Evolution: Phylogenetic Drift through the Conservation of Adaptation,Ms. 1986. It is crucial that adaptation can only be preserved, not improved. A system is adapted for the processing of its autopoiesis in its environment or it isn’t, and is destroyed. There is no more or less in this regard, just as the operations of the system either can take place or can’t take place. Every other judgement is the affair of an observer and can only be observed in an observer.
S. Donald, T. Campbell, »Natural Selection as an Epistemological Model «, in R. Navoll/R. Cohen (eds.), A Handbook of Method in Cultural Anthropology, Garden City, New York: The National History Press, 1970, p. 51–85.
And has been given up today. See, for example, B. Barnes, Scientific Knowledge and Sociological Theory, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974; D. Bloor, Knowledge and Social Imagary, London: Routlege & Kegan Paul, 1976.
Quite consistently, Marxists learn about the critique of political economy from Marx; they don’t turn to political economy for this. But the result is that the common views of the political economy of Marx’ day are discussed with reference to Marx works, that Marx himself seems like a political economist (not completed without this being his own fault) and that changes in the critique that have occurred over the best 150 years are not sufficiently taken into account.
See J.L. MacKie, Truth, Probability and Paradox: Studies in Philosophical Logic,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973, ch. 6 in association with ch. 2.
J.L. MacKie, op. cit.,1973, note 31, p. 273.
As case studies in this question of N. Luhmann, »The Third Question: The Creative Use of the Paradoxes in Law and Legal Theory«, Law and Society Review 15 (1988), 153–165.
See R. Glanville, »Distinguished and Exact Lies«, in R. Trappl (ed.), Cybernetics and Systems Research 2, Amsterdam: North-Holland Publications, 1984, p. 655–662.
N. Rescher expresses this perspective on perspectivity: »Perspectives are diaphanous, and one tends not to see them as such«, in his The Strife of Systems: An Essay on the Grounds and Implications of Philosophical Diversity, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1985, p. 187.
See F.J. Varela, »A Calculus for Self-Reference«, International Journal of General Systems 2 (1975), 524.
See in this regard N. Luhmann, »Die Autopoiesis des Bewußtseins«, in A. Hahn/V. Kapp (eds.), Selbstthematisientngund Selbstzeugnis: Bekenntnis und Geständnis, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987, p. 25–94.
Furthermore, what is offered as epistemology in the context of the cognitive sciences is inconceivable without computers - both from the theoretical aspect. See F.J. Varela, The Sciences and Technology of Cognition: Emerging Trends, Ms., Paris, 1986. This is also true of logical theories and their truth procedures.
This is also held by strict constructivists. See, for example, E. v. Glasersfeld, »Konstruktion der Wirklichkeit und des Begriffs der Objektivität«, in Gumin, Mohler, op. cit.,1985, note 5, p. 1–26 (20f).
See Maturana, op. cit.,1982, note 10, p. 52ff. The literature that follows uses »parallelion« or »parallelizing«, instead of »analogy«. See, for example, P.M. Hejl, »Konstruktion der sozialen Konstruktion: Grundlinien einer konstruktivistischen Sozialtheorie«, in Schmidt, op. cit.,1987, note 5, p. 303–339.
Related to this, but nonetheless to be distinguished from it, are the well-known attempts of… to use the process of learning a language for the elucidation of epistemological questions. See, for example, W. v. O. Quine, Word and Object, New York: Wiley, 1960. See also the less well known ideas of D.T. Campbell, »Ostensive Instances and Entita…. in Language Learning«, in W. Gray/N.D. Rizzo (eds.), Unity Through Diversity, A Festschrift for Ludwig von Bertelanffy,New York: Gordon and Breach, 1973, Vol. II p. 1043–1057. The question dealt with here is the claim that the learning of language is not possible without reference to things of the external world, which means that language can never completely construct reality out of itself.
See Luhmann, op. cit.,1984, note 23, p. 191ff.
See here also N. Luhmann, »Intersubjektivität oder Kommunikation: Unterschiedliche Ausgangspunkte soziologischer Theoriebildung», Archivio di Filosofia 54 (1986), p. 41–60.
See, for example, Campbell, op. cit.,1970, note 28, p. 51–85.
See E. Husserl, »Die Krisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie«, Husserliana, Vol. VI, Den Haag: Nighoff, 1954. See also A.N. Whitehead, Science and the Modem World (Lowell Lectures 1925), quoted from the edition New York: Free Press, 1954.
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Luhmann, N. (1990). The Cognitive Program of Constructivism and a Reality that Remains Unknown. In: Krohn, W., Küppers, G., Nowotny, H. (eds) Selforganization. Sociology of the Sciences, vol 14. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2975-8_5
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