Abstract
As will be shown in this study, the Deductive Model constitutes the formal basis upon which both the logical empiricist and Popperian conceptions of science and scientific progress are built. It is here introduced in its most familiar form: as a model of explanation and prediction.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Popper (1934), pp. 59f.
Cf. Popper (1934), p. 76.
Cf. An. Pr. 26a 24–27: “Let all B be A and some C be B. Then if ‘predicated of all’ means [that no instance of the subject can be found of which B cannot be asserted], it is necessary that some C is A. ... So there will be a perfect syllogism.”
Concerning the Stoic origin of syllogisms having this form, see Bochenski (1961), p. 232 &n.
Cf. e.g. Hempel (1962), pp. 118–119.
For a similar criticism, see Scriven (1962), p. 203; concerning the applicability of the Deductive Model to the case of laws being explained by higher-level theories, see Chapter 4 below.
The present reconstruction of the Empiricist and Popperian conceptions in terms of the Deductive Model may be seen as a presentation of what has recently come to be called ‘the statement view’. Cf. e.g. Stegmüller (1973), p. 2, and Feyerabend (1977), p. 351.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1986 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Dilworth, G. (1986). Chapter 1 The Deductive Model. In: Scientific Progress. Synthese Library, vol 153. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2966-6_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2966-6_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-94-017-2968-0
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2966-6
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive