Skip to main content

Minimal Criteria for Intellectual Progress

  • Chapter
Book cover Science and Culture

Part of the book series: Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science ((BSPS,volume 231))

  • 237 Accesses

Abstract

For logical reasons, progress in the dispute about the choice of a criterion of progress seems impossible, as it renders any move question begging. Our criterion of progress may limit critics by permitting them only criticisms that accord with it. Openness to criticism thus becomes a criterion that on a few counts is necessary but insufficient, especially for science, where progress is most pronounced. The need for criteria for progress is the need not to fall for mockprogress. This renders criteria for progress proper unnecessary; it is enough to have criteria for possible progress. Instituting such criteria might enable the now so scarce encouragement of the young. Since much pseudo-progress is due to the confusion of a program with its execution, this change will also prevent much pretense. But the chief aim here is to reduce the harm that current practice of acknowledgment causes.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 1962. For extended discussions of his views, see my Science and Society, 1981 and my The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics, 1988.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Kuhn’s pragmatism is a meta-criterion. He ignores this. He both asserts and denies that he is a relativist. The description here of the rift between the two schools, accords with Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory,1956. Concerning conversion in science and Kuhn’s approval of it, see I. Bernard Cohen, Revolutions in Science,1987, and my review of it in my The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics,1988, 123–130, esp. 128.

    Google Scholar 

  3. For Bacon’s doctrine of prejudice, see my “The Riddle of Bacon”, Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, 2, 1988, 103–36. See also my The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics, op. cit.

    Google Scholar 

  4. See my “Duhem versus Galileo”, republished in my The Gentle Art of Philosophical Polemics, op. cit.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Among those who demand to limit criticism to constructive criticism are C. G. Hempel, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Imre Lakatos. See my “Kuhn’s Way”, Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 32, 2002, 394–430, 411.

    Google Scholar 

  6. See Gilbert Ryle, “Dialectic in the Academy”, in Renford Bamborough, editor, New Essays on Plato and Aristotle, 39–68. See also his contribution to Proceedings of the 3rd Symposium on Aristotle, 1968, 69–79.

    Google Scholar 

  7. See K. R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1959, Chapter 5, and my “Sensationalism”, reprinted in my Science in Flux, 1975.

    Google Scholar 

  8. See my “The Confusion between Science and Technology in Standard Philosophy of Science” reprinted in my Science in Flux and my Technology: Philosophical and Social Aspects,1985.

    Google Scholar 

  9. See Chapter 1.6 and Chapter 2.5 for more details about superstition; see Chapters 4.2 and 4.6 for more details about progress in art.

    Google Scholar 

  10. See my Faraday as a Natural Philosopher,1971. See also the essay on him in the virtual Encyclopedia Britannica,which derides this book.

    Google Scholar 

  11. See Owsei Temkin, The Double Face of Janus,1977. See also my Faraday as a Natural Philosopher.

    Google Scholar 

  12. See my Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology,1977. See also my A Philosopher’s Apprentice: In Karl Popper’s Workshop,1993.

    Google Scholar 

  13. For Duhem’s continuity theory see my Towards an Historiography of Science, History and Theory, Beiheft 2, 1963, 1967, Chapter 9.

    Google Scholar 

  14. See my “Sociologism in the Philosophy of Science”, reprinted in my Science and Society,1981.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2003 Joseph Agassi

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Agassi, J. (2003). Minimal Criteria for Intellectual Progress. In: Science and Culture. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 231. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2946-8_15

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2946-8_15

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-6234-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2946-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics