Abstract
The major shift in recent years in the literatures about science is from the view of science as the knowledge that an individual possesses, to the view of science as a social institution. Different social philosophies judge science as a social phenomenon differently. In particular, the social philosophy that deems society a mere collection of individuals — reductionist individualism or psychologism — will make the least of the recent shift, whereas the social philosophy that deems people mere members of society — reductionist sociologism or organicism or holism — will make the most of it. Without elaborating on this, we may note that both of these extremes play down interpersonal interaction. The various interactionist schools should make the most of it, but one need not be a member of any of these schools to appreciate interpersonal interaction. Indeed, Popper has stressed this as early as in 1935. How does the recognition of the presence and importance of scientific interaction alter our view of science?
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Notes
For the philosophy of Malinowski and his egalitarian impact, see I. C. Jarvie, The Revolution of Anthropology (1964). A school of thought, if they merit this honorific title, called the Strong Programme, claims for science the status of both an ideology and the truth. This, of course, is a part of every ideology. So it does not count. All of their output and all the many debates around it have almost no value at all, especially since their writings are often so obscure that it is hard to fathom their meanings.
See the concluding remarks in Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,trans. Joseph Ward Swain (1947). See also my Towards A Rational Philosophical Anthropology (1977), for a discussion and a lengthy criticism of both individualist and collectivist reductionism, Ernest Gellner, The Legitimation of Belief (1974) and Cause and Meaning in the Social Science: ed. I. C. Jarvie and Joseph Agassi (1973), and Mario Bunge, Social Science Under Debate: A Philosophical Perspective (1998).
See J. W. N. Watkins, “Ideal Type and Historical Explanation,” reprinted in an expanded version in Readings in the Philosophy of Science,ed. Herbert Feigl and May Brodbeck (1951, 723–43). He identifies two Weberian ideal-type theories, individualist, and collectivist. The two cannot merge. See my “Bye-Bye Weber”, Phil. Soc. Sci.,21, 1991, 102–9.
See Michael Polanyi, Knowing and being (1969),149.
Michael Polanyi, op. cit.,Ch. 6. For more details and a critical examination see Chapter 15 of my Science and Society (1981), a volume dedicated to his memory.
Lord Acton’s celebrated dictum, “Power corrupts; absolute power corrupts absolutely,” refers to the power of the papacy. He was a committed liberal, and an ardent but critical Roman Catholic.
Bernard Shaw said, every bandwagon attracts some rabble and mixed multitude. See, for example, the end of his preface to Androcles and the Lion (Selected Plays, 1:848–49). More important, successful movements alter as they succeed. Science militant speaks more of curiosity and science triumphant speaks more of achievement. Science triumphant is an unavoidable social nuisance, yet it has the same appeal as other successful movements. See, far example, George Orwell’s comments on the appeal that Stalinism had for intellectuals and Damon Runyon’s discussion of the underworld complex. (Sheldon Richmond aptly refers to all this as “pistol envy”.) Polanyi’s view of science as a tradition enables him to observe the negative in science. Regrettably, he dismissed it, saying that imperfection is unavoidable. Popper also observes it, but he could not possibly ascribe it to science in the first place. On the whole, Popper’s transition from the monism of his Logik der Forschung (1935) to the pluralism of his Conjectures and Refutations (1961–63) is not clear-cut; he died before he finished his task. Clearly, his view of science as a tradition could make him notice the undesirable aspects of science — especially the triumphant accent on successful prediction. I have discussed all this in my Science in Flux (1975), a volume dedicated to Popper, which includes a detailed, sympathetic, but critical examination of his contributions. It is a constant source of regret to me that he chose to ignore my writings altogether.
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© 2003 Joseph Agassi
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Agassi, J. (2003). Science and the Interpersonal. In: Science and Culture. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 231. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2946-8_10
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