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Peirce and Scepticism

  • Alejandro Herrera Ibáñez
Chapter
Part of the International Archives of the History of Ideas / Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Idées book series (ARCH, volume 145)

Abstract

In this essay I will show that Peirce’s views of truth as an ideal limit, and of inquiry as an endless approximation to truth are based on three of his doctrines: (1) the doctrine of the self-corrigibility of science, (2) the doctrine of fallibilism, and (3) the doctrine of synechism. Although Peirce’s reflection on these topics seems mainly to be aimed at scientific truth and inquiry, some considerations will show that what Peirce says in this regard, hold also for philosophical truth and inquiry. I will examine some objections and, finally, I will see in what sense Peirce can be called a sceptic.

Keywords

Scientific Theory Continuous Approximation Absolute Certainty Ideal Limit Scientific Belief 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

  1. 1.
    All numerical citations (volume, page) are to Charles S. Peirce, Collected Papers,8 vols., eds. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur Burks (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1958).Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Nicholas Rescher, Peirce’s Philosophy of Science ( Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1978 ), p. 3.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
  4. 4.
    Ibid., pp. 4–6.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    Ibid., pp. 6ff.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Israel Scheffler,Four Pragmatists (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 72.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object ( Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960 ), p. 23.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Hilary Putnam, “What is ‘Realism’?” ASP1975–1976. Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Christopher Chemiak, Minimal Rationality(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986), pp. 107–108.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Rescher, Peirce’s Philosophy, p. 97, n. 31.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    Peirce tells us that he took the word from the Greek word synechismós, which comes from synechés, continuous (7.565).Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Letter to Lady Welby, quoted in Hjalmar Wennerberg,The Pragmatism of C. S. Peirce(Lund/Copenhagen: CWK Gleerup/Ejnar Munskgaard, 1962), p. 179.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alejandro Herrera Ibáñez

There are no affiliations available

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