Conclusion

Abstract

As was stated in chapter 1, the central purpose of this monograph is to argue that a fruitful synthesis of game theory and deontic logic is possible. To do so we posed six research questions. Firstly, we asked whether the results of deontic logic can be used to provide a foundation for the game-theoretic analysis of individual and collective rights. We then proceeded to answer this question in two steps. The first was the construction of a formal language which contains expressions about the permissions and obligations of individuals and collectives with respect to the performance of actions. The expressions of such languages of deontic logics of action can, as is shown in the literature on this topic, be used to formulate individual and collective rights. Next, we developed a game-theoretic semantics of this language. That is to say, a game-theoretic model was used to establish the truth value of the expressions of the formal language. Since rights can be formulated in terms of expressions of the language, viz., those describing the permissions and obligations of agents to perform actions, the semantic machinery can also be viewed as a game-theoretic model of individual and collective rights. Thus, the desired foundation of the game-theoretic analysis of rights is reached through a connection with logic, specifically with a deontic logic of action.