Abstract
Current debates over scientific realism have two suspicious traits: they are about entire domains of modern experimental science and they propose to determine the epistemic status of these domains on the basis of philosophical arguments. The goal of this paper is to show that these assumptions are indeed suspicious and in the process to defend an alternative view — call it contextualist realism — that is not committed to either claim.
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Kincaid, H. (2002). Scientific Realism and the Empirical Nature of Methodology: Bayesians, Error Statisticians and Statistical Inference. In: Clarke, S., Lyons, T.D. (eds) Recent Themes in the Philosophy of Science. Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol 17. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2862-1_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2862-1_3
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