Abstract
Beginning with the next chapter, I shall try to find criteria which can be used appropriately to evaluate Reasons Theories such as the Inclusive Data View. I would like to find criteria which do not rely on the authority of a particular tradition. This wish, however, will seem hopelessly naive to those who are impressed with the importance of particular traditions in developing criteria of rationality and in making them intelligible. In this chapter, I shall answer some of the arguments that purport to expose the naivety of my wish. In the first section, I shall consider arguments for the view that it is futile to seek a way of evaluating Reasons Theories that does not rely on the authority of some tradition. In the second section, I shall defend the Inclusive Data View against objections that seek to tie it to a particular tradition. In the third section, I shall argue against the view that the selection of a Reasons Theory should depend on the tradition of the selector.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. The term Reasons Theory’ is my own.
This is shown by Julia Aimas in “Maclntyre on Traditions,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 18 (1989): 388–404. In particular, MacIntyre fails to give a defensible sense in which a tradition is embodied in a historical form of social life.
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice ( Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971 ), p. 19.
Recall that Rawls says that “[o]nce the whole framework is worked out, definitions have no distinct status and stand or fall with the theory itself.” (p. 51)
To some it would not seem futile even then. Charles Larmore has contended, in his review of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, that disputes among those who pursue the optimistic enterprise are no more intractable than disputes among those who accept the authority of some (other) tradition. (The Journal of Philosophy 86 [1989]: 437–442 @ 442.) It has even seemed to some that disputes about the principles of practical rationality are no less tractable than disputes about matters of fact. See Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere ( New York: Oxford University Press, 1986 ), p. 148.
He modifies this position somewhat in allowing that it is possible to learn the language of a rival tradition as a second first language (i.e. to acquire it naturally the way a child does, rather than by translation to another language.) Nevertheless, he holds, people who learn the language of a rival tradition in this way possess its concepts “without being able to employ them in the first person, except as dramatic impersonators.” (p. 395)
For example, I cannot say that it is false that the O’Neill’s authority is legitimate, for to call someone the O’Neill is to presuppose the legitimacy of his authority. (p. 378)
I am not in a position to refute this premise of MacIntyre’y applied to traditional Reasons Theories, because I don’t know any traditional languages. I am, however, skeptical of the premise. Consider two examples of English locutions whose history and context may seem to commit the speaker to certain background beliefs shared by the community: If I speak of Christmas, it may seem that I am committed to the proposition that Jesus is Christ, and if I politely address a priest as Father,’ I may seem to imply that I stand in a filial relationship to him or ascribe to him some wisdom or some authority over me. Yet I can surely speak understandably of Christmas and understandably address priests as Father’ without those commitments.
Perhaps someone might say that if the meanings of key terms differ across theories, then any principle of evaluation must itself use the equivocal key terms in some determinate way, thereby begging the question against theories that use the key terms in a different way. I see no reason, however, to assume that a principle of evaluation must use key terms of the theories that are to be evaluated. For example, I do not see why principles of elegance or robustness must themselves use terms whose meanings are derived from the theories to be evaluated for their elegance or robustness. Nor do I see why the meanings of those terms should be thought necessarily to differ when applied to different theories.
As we noted in Chapter 1, however, Nagel himself states that it is incoherent to think that we could “act from a standpoint completely outside ourselves, choosing everything about ourselves, including all our principles of choice—creating ourselves from nothing, so to speak.” (p. 118) Furthermore, it would be misleading to characterize any remotely Nagelian view simply as an Ideal Observer View, since Nagel holds that the valuations of non-ideal, socially embodied individuals who take the subjective standpoint are also relevant to values, and that interested reasons may even outweigh disinterested reasons.
Thus we could not say in advance that Darwall had to fail to derive his non-meager result from his tradition-independent criterion that principles that define reasons for action must be able to function as the ultimate justification for self-critical rational agents. To show that Darwall has failed to establish his result, one must consider his actual argument, as we did in Chapter 3.
Others have also noted that translation is not necessary for understanding. See George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), p. 311. Maclntyre himself, however, may have some difficulty in holding this view. It has been suggested that he would be hard put to furnish a consistent explanation of “how adherents of rival traditions are able to learn the other’s language as a second first language given that concepts and meaning are tradition-informed.” Alicia Juarrero Roque, “Language Competence and Tradition-constituted Rationality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1991): 611–617 @ 613.
John Hardwig, “Epistemic Dependence,” The Journal of Philosophy 82 (1985): 335–349.
It is not clear that Maclntyre himself would be in a position to charge the Inclusive Data View with being tied to the liberal tradition. As noted earlier, he states that liberal ideas of the market and individualist politics bring it about that statements like I want it to be the case that such and such’ are transformed “without further qualification, into statements of a reason for action, into premises for practical reasoning.” (p. 338) If he means that a liberal Reasons Theory must accept this transformation as appropriate, then the Inclusive Data View joins the Ideal Desires View, etc., in being excluded from liberalism according to Maclntyre. But someone else could, of course, still charge that the Inclusive Data View is tied to the liberal tradition.
But compare Maclntyre’s statement that from the standpoint of any particular tradition, the only reason for rejecting it is its failure by its own lights to survive an epistemological crisis. (p. 367)
Maclntyre elsewhere gives the impression that he thinks it is impossible actually to dispense with traditions and that those who think they have dispensed with traditions are actually adhering to the liberal tradition.
This move would obviously be inconsistent with the “non-starter” argument considered early in the chapter.
I don’t know any traditional languages as a second first language, thus I don’t know from first-hand experience that Maclntyre is wrong. Nevertheless, Maclntyre seems to ignore the fact that it is possible to employ the concepts of language as a reformer rather than an impersonator. No impersonation need have been involved, for example, when speakers of English first advocated removing all stigma from illegitimate children.
This scenario may remind some readers of the discussion in Chapter 3 of MIA and ACRA. Note, however, that MIA and ACRA need not embrace conflicting Reasons Theories or traditions of rationality. MIA and ACRA may agree that MIA rationally ought to act on one particular principle and ACRA rationally ought to act on a different particular principle. In contrast, Al and Betty in the above scenario do disagree about the principles on which they rationally ought to act. Al thinks that everyone (including Betty) rationally ought to adopt a universal rule of eye for eye and tooth for tooth; Betty disagrees, holding that everyone (including Al) rationally ought to forgive both others and oneself for all trespasses.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Postow, B.C. (1999). Are We Limited to a Particular Tradition?. In: Reasons for Action. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 4. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2850-8_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2850-8_5
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5219-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2850-8
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive