Abstract
In the previous chapter it was argued that Realism provides us with the best explanation of novel success under diverse conditions of the Intentional. Although we have not, so far, attempted to determine which actual sentences ought to be regarded as true independently of the Intentional, an account has been sketched of what sort of empirical evidence would be required to establish Realism with respect to a particular claim.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Wright, J. (1997). The Arguments Against Realism. In: Realism and Explanatory Priority. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2844-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2844-7_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4823-3
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2844-7
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