Abstract
In recent years a number of prominent philosophers have argued that there is a deep sense in which the way the world is depends at least in part upon the human mind. For example, Hilary Putnam has written:
I shall advance a view in which the mind does not simply ‘copy’ a world which admits of description by One True Theory. But my view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world, either... If one must use metaphorical language, then let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and the world.1
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Notes
H. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History,Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.xi.
Nelson Goodman, ‘On Starmaking’, in Synthese 45 (1980), pp.21I-215 especially p.213.
See Richard Boyd ‘On the Current Status of the Issue of Scientific Realism’ in Erkenntnis 19 pp.45–90, especially p.57.
See Thomas Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago University Press, 1970), p.150.
See Dummen, ‘Truth’ in Truth and Other Enigmas,p.18.
This definition comes from R. Farrell ‘Blanket Skolemism’ (unpublished manuscript).
In the terminology to be introduced in Chapter III, it must be a truth-constitutive explanation.
I do not wish to imply by these remarks that the Realism which is the subject matter of this book is the same as the Realism that was denied by Idealists such as Berkeley. It will be argued in the next chapter that they are different issues. This example is only used as an illustration of how appeals to the need to explain our empirical observations can seem irrelevant to philosophical disputes.
I am indebted to Mr John Atkins for emphasising this type of objection to the approach adopted here.
Actually, this is a slight oversimplification because it is only certain special kinds of success that require Realism for their explanation. An account of these special kinds of success is given in chapter seven. This type of success does not presuppose the truth of Realism in the way it is defined.
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© 1997 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Wright, J. (1997). Introductory Remarks. In: Realism and Explanatory Priority. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 71. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2844-7_1
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