Abstract
This paper analyses1 the claim that legal reasoning is defeasible, which is indeed a hallmark of some major contributions to the theory of legal reasoning in recent times. Before addressing the question of what kind of logical tools are needed to formalize defeasible reasoning, it must be explained why legal reasoning is supposed to be defeasible in the first place. Some arguments to this effect are taken into account (having to do with the allocation of burdens of proof in legal procedures. reasoning with incomplete information and the proper way of individuating norms), but it is held that none of them really proves that legal reasoning cannot be reconstructed as a deductive inference. The strongest argument to justify the claim that legal reasoning is defeasible seems then to be that all legal norms turn out to be defeasible: but here this argument is disputed, trying to show that it would lead us to embrace either wholesale indeterminacy or ‘legal particularism’, which is criticised as an untenable form of conceiving legal justification. Finally, it is suggested that there is indeed some limited sense in which it could be said that legal reasoning is defeasible (having to do with the idea that justification in law is a matter of coherence), but it is not grounded on the possibility that legal norms themselves be defeasible as well, and especially it does not call in question the subsumptive character of legal justification.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Alchourrôn, C.E., “Philosophical Foundations of Deontic Logic and the Logic of Defeasible Conditionals”, in J.J. Meyer and R.J. Wieringa (eds.), Deontic Logic in Computer Sciences. Normative System Specifications ( New York: Wiley & Sons, 1993 ), 43–84
Alexy, R., Theorie der Grundrechte (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, [19851, 1986 ) ( First published in Baden-Baden: Nomos )
Atienza, M. and J. Ruiz Manero, “Rules and Principles Revisited”, Associations 4 (2000), 147–156
Bankowski, Z., I. White and U. Hahn, “Introduction”, in Z. Bankowski et al. (eds.), informatics and the Foundations gfLegal Reasoning. I-71 ( Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer, 1995 )
Blackburn, S., Ruling Passions. A Theory of Practical Reasoning ( Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1998 ).
Brewka, G., Nonmonotonic Reasoning. Logical Foundations of Commonsense, ( Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. 1991 )
Burton, S., “Particularism, Discretion and the Rule of Law”, in I. Shapiro (ed.), The Rule of Law. Nomos,VtXl’1, ( New York/London: New York University Press, 1994 ), 178–201
Chisholm, R.,. Theory of Knowledge, 3rd. edition, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hal1,1989 (1966)). Dancy, J., Moral Reasons ( Oxford: Blackwell. 1993 )
Fletcher, G., Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 ) Hage, J.C., Reasoning with Rules. An Essay on Legal Reasoning and Its Underlying Logic ( Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer. 1997 )
Hage, J.C. and A. Peczenik, “Law, Morals and Defeasibility”. Ratio Juris 13 (2000) 305–325. Hampshire, S., “Public and Private Morality”, in S. Hampshire et al., Public and Private Morality, ( Cambridge/London: Cambridge University Press, 1978 ) 23–53
Harris, J.W., Law and Legal Science. An Inquiry into the Concepts Legal Rule and Legal System ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 )
Han, H.L.A., “The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights”, in A. Flew (ed.), Logic und language, I st. series (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960) 145–166 (first published in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 49(1948–49) 171–194.
Hart. H.L.A., Punishment and Responsibility ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968 )
Hart, H.L.A., The Concept of Lair, 2nd. edition with a Postscript’ ed. by P. Bulloch and J. Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) (1961).
Honoré, A.M., “Real Laws”, in P.M.S. Hacker and J. Raz (eds.), Law, Morality and Society. Essays in Honour of H.L.A. 1/art ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977 ) 99–118
Little, M.O., “Moral Generalities Revisited”, in B. Hooker and M.O. Little (eds.), Moral Particularism ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000 ) 276–304
MacCormick, N., Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory. 2nd. edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) (1978).
MacCormick, N., ‘Defeasibility in Law and Logic’, in Z. Bankowski et al. (eds.), Informatics and the Foundations ofL.egal Reasoning (Dordrecht/Boston/ London: Kluwer, 1995 ) 99–117
Marmor, A., Interpretation and Legal Theory ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992 )
Marmor, A., “The Separation Thesis and the Limits of Interpretation”, Canadian Journal of Lau and Jurisprudence 12 (1999) 135–150
McDowell, J., “Non-cognitivism and Rule-following”, in J. McDowell, Mind. Value, and Reality (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) 198–218 (first published in S. Holtzman and C.Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow u Rule ( London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981 ) 141–162
McNaughton, D., Moral Vision ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1988 )
Moreso, J.J., “Conflictos entre principios constitucionales”, unpublished manuscript (2000)
Peczenik, A., “Jumps and Logic in the Law. What Can One Expect from Logical Models of Legal Argumentation?”, in H. Prakken and G. Sartor (eds.), Logical Models of Legal Argumentation (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1997) 141–173 (first published in Artificial Intelligence and Law 4. 297–329 )
Pollock, J.L., “Defeasible Reasoning”, Cognitive Science 11 (1987) 481–518.
Pollock, J.L. and J. Cruz, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd. edition ( Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999 )
Prakken, H., Logical Tools for Modelling Legal Argument. A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law ( Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1997 )
Prakken, H. and G. Sartor, “A Dialectical Model of Assessing Conflicting Arguments in Legal Reasoning”, in H. Prakken and G. Sartor (eds.), Logical Models of Legal Argumentation (Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1997) 175–212 (first published in Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (1996) 331–368.
Raz, J., The Concept of a Legal System. An Introduction to the Theory of Legal System, 2nd. edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980 ) (1970).
Rôdenas, A., “Entre la transparencia y la opacidad. Anhlisis del papel de las reglas en el razonamiento judicial”, Doxa 21 /1 (1998) 99–121.
Rodriguez, J., “La derrotabilidad de las normas jurldicas”, Isonomia 6 (1997) 149–167.
Rodriguez, J., “Axiological Gaps and Normative Relevance”. Archiv, ftir Rechts-und Socialphilosophie 86 (2000) 151–167.
Rodriguez, J. and G. Sucar, “Las trampas de la derrotabilidad. Niveles de anâlisis de la indeterminaciôn del derecho”, in P. Comanducci and R. Guastini (eds.), Analisi e Diritto 1998 ( Torino: Giappichelli, 1998 ) 277–305
Sartor, G., “Defeasibility in Legal Reasoning”, in Z. Bankowski et al. (eds.), Informatics and the Foundations of Legal Reasoning, (Kluwer. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer, 1995 ) 119–157
Schauer, F., Playing by the Rules. A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life ( Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991 )
Schauer, F., “On the Supposed Defeasibility of Legal Rules”, in M.D.A. Freeman (ed.), Current Legal Problems, vol. 51. Legal Theory at the End of the Millennium ( Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998 ) 223–240
Sunstein, C., Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press,1996) Susskind, R., Experts Systems in Law. A Jurisprudential Inquiry (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987 ). Toulmin, S., The Uses of Argument ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958 )
Twining, W. and D. Miers, flow To Do Things with Rules. A Primer of Interpretation, 2nd. Edition (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1982 ) (1976).
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2001 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Carlos, J.B. (2001). Why is Legal Reasoning Defeasible?. In: Soeteman, A. (eds) Pluralism and Law. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2702-0_17
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2702-0_17
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5722-8
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2702-0
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive