Abstract
The sixth chapter of Spinoza’s Tractatus theologico-politicus (TTP)1 is devoted wholly to a discussion of the nature and possibility of miracles, but it is a text which has attracted little attention in contemporary Spinoza scholarship,2 and even less in the more extended debate on the concept of the miraculous in contemporary philosophy.3 Parkinson proposes a cause for such benign neglect: “...recent criticisms of miracles tend to follow Hume rather than Spinoza; the line of attack is not that miraculous events are impossible, but that it is impossible to have adequate evidence for a miracle.”4 In this he follows Flew’s reading,5 which sees Hume’s argument as primarily epistemic in nature; whereas, according to Parkinson, Spinoza’s attack is directed fundamentally at the possibility of miracles rather than at the possibility of our knowledge of them.
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References
Thanks for comments on earlier drafts of this paper are due to Samuel Shirley (England), William Innis (Milwaukee), and Steven Barbone (San Diego). Translations from the text of Spinoza, where given, are my own; though I have also made use of the excellent translation of the TTP by Samuel Shirley (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998). References to the Ethica and other works of Spinoza are the standard internal abbreviations. Akkerman reviews the Latin textual variants and several of the translation-interpretations, including the partial English version of Wernham: see “Etablissement du texte du Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,” Groupe de Recherches Spinozistes, L’Écriture sainte au temps de Spinoza et dans le système Spinoziste (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1992).
Only G.H.R. Parkinson and A. Fox provide extensive analysis of the chapter: see Parkinson, “Spinoza on Miracles and Natural Law,” Revue internationale de philosophie 8 (1977):35–55; and Fox, Faith and Philosophy: Spinoza and Religion (Nedlands: University of Western Australia Press, 1990) especially pp. 132–55. References to Chapter 6 are scant and passing in the more general treatments of the TTP such as Leo Strauss’s “Comment lire le Traité théologico politique,” Le testament de Spinoza: écrits de Léo Strauss sur Spinoza et le judaïsme, eds. G. Almaleh, A. Baraquin, M. Depadt-Ejchenbaum (Paris: Cerf, 1991). Gilbert Boss offers a brief comparative analysis of the positions of Hume and Spinoza: see La différence des philosophies: Hume et Spinoza, 2 vols. (Zürich: Editions du Grand Midi, 1982) 2:817–30.
For example, no mention of Spinoza’s analysis is made by R.M. Burns, The Great Debate on Miracles: From Joseph Glanville to David Hume (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1981); R. Hambourger, “Belief in Miracles and Hume’s Essay,” Nous 14 (1977):587–604; or R. Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (New York: Macmillan, 1970) and “Violation of the Law of Nature,” Miracles, ed. R. Swinburne (New York: Macmillan, 1989) pp. 75–84.
“Spinoza on Miracles and Natural Law,” p. 157.
See, for example, A. Flew, “Hume’s Check,” The Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1959):1–18 and “Fogelin on Hume on Miracles,” Hume Studies 16 (1990): 141–44. The latter essay is a reply to R. Fogelin’s “What Hume Actually Said about Miracles,” Hume Studies 16 (1990):81–86.
“… namely, that in here discussing miracles, I have adopted a method very different from the one employed when dealing with prophecy. In the matter of prophecy, I made no assertion which I could not infer from grounds revealed in Holy Scripture, whereas in this chapter I have drawn my principal conclusions from basic principles known by natural reason…” (G3:95/S85).
But here, concerning miracles, since the subject of our inquiry — namely, whether we can admit that something can happen in nature contrary to its laws or which could be contrary to them — is plainly of a philosophical character, and I required no such procedure“ (G3:94–95/S85).
Nevertheless, though I say that this is Scripture’s teaching, I do not thereby understand that Scripture enjoins this teaching as something necessary for salvation…“ (G3:96/S85). For the sense of `salvation’ here being employed, and the documenta which are necessary to it, see my ”Faith, Obedience, and Salvation in Spinoza,“ Lyceum 6 (1994):1–20.
This methodology (a logical account of truth juxtaposed to a psychological account of error) is adumbrated in the preface to E3.
“For the common people (vulgus) think that God’s power and providence are most clearly displayed when some unusual event occurs in nature, contrary to their habitual beliefs, especially if such an event is to their profit or advantage” (G3:81/S72).
“This is one aspect of Spinoza’s interpretation of the `election’ of the Jews, which he considered ”une manière de parler de la réussite temporelle momentanée.“ See G. Brykman, ”L’élection et l’insoumission des Hébreux selon Spinoza,“ Spinoza: science et religion, ed. Renée Bouveresse (Paris: Vrin, 1988) p. 142.
A good example is God’s sending Saul to Samuel, related in 1 Sam. 9. The manner by which Saul came to Samuel was perfectly ordinary, but it served a providential purpose: see Chapter 6 (G3:89/S80).
Spinoza’s historico-cultural approach to biblical exegesis often permits him to conclude only to what Scripture does not imply, rather than to any positive interpretation. On that point, see Pierre-François Moreau, “La méthode d’interprétation de l’Écriture sainte: détermintaions et limites,” Spinoza: science et religion, pp. 109–14; and “Les principes de la lecture de l’Écriture sainte de le T.T.P.,” L’Écriture sainte au temps de Spinoza et dans le système Spinoziste; also see J.D. Jimenez `B. Spinoza (1632–1677): la religion en el Tractatus theologicopoliticus (1670),“ Estudios Filosoficas 42 (1993):503–27.
This notion has found such favor with humankind that they have not ceased to this day to invent miracles with a view to convincing people that they are more loved by God than others, and are the fmal cause of God’s creation and continuous direction“ (G3:82/S73).
’’… for the common people (vulgus) are not satisfied that they understand something until they regard it without awe“ (G3:84/S75).
Nothing can occur contrary to nature, which preserves an eternal, fixed, and immutable order“ (G3:84–85/S73).
This can be understood in two ways: either that it does have natural causes which the human intellect cannot ascertain, or that it has no cause but God or God’s will“ (G3:85/S76).
The argument is valid. If we let `n’ mean that `the event has natural causes’, `g’ that it has God only as cause, and `k’ that its causes are knowable, we have: [(nand—k)u(—nandg)]
“Spinoza on Miracles and Natural Law,” pp. 151–52.
‘David Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902 [2nd edition]).
It does not follow from the statement that events are described teleologically, pace Bennett, that Spinoza is a closet teleologist; but rather simply that teleological descriptions (which are never explanations) are eliminable in favor of causal ones. See my “Spinoza, Bennett, and Teleology,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1985):241–53.
“For my part, I do not see how people can live — that is, deal with their environment —without some conception, however dim, of the regularity ofNature. No doubt this vague expectation of regularity had developed into something more like the `nomothetic framework of science’ in Spinoza’s time. But, given the difference of cultural environment, I do not see that the gulf between the two conceptual attitudes is as great as you depict.”
See E.M. Curley, Spinoza’s Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969) pp. 50–55. This model is often referenced as the `causal model’. I would argue that Hempel provides necessary, but not sufficient, conditions to meet Spinoza’s requirement that explanation be causal. In agreeing with Curley that the model is Hempelian, I am not agreeing with his particular reading of Spinoza’s `attributes’ as cover-laws: see Spinoza ‘s Metaphysics, pp. 55–60. For details of Hempel’s analysis, see his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Company, 1948) pp. 135–75. For the argument against Hempel’s analysis providing sufficient conditions, see Baruch Brody “Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Scientific Explanation,” Philosophy of Science 39 (1972):20–31.
“Spinoza on Miracles and Natural Law,” pp. 154–57.
Ibid., p. 157.
See M. Walther, “Spinoza’s Critique of Miracles: A Miracle of Criticism?” Spinoza: The Enduring Questions, ed. Graeme Hunter (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) p.107: “For, if for some event no determinate cause can be given, that event is unexplained. To trace it back to a direct act of God does not change its status, for that in no way increases our understanding of the event’s constitutive conditions.”
“For because a miracle is an event of limited nature, expressing a power which is never other than fixed and limited, we could not possibly conclude from such an effect the existence of a cause whose power is infinite” (G3:86/S79).
A more detailed analysis of Spinoza’s argument that belief in miracles leads logically to atheism is given by Walther, see “Spinoza’s Critique of Miracles: A Miracle of Criticism?” p. 107.
Bennett and others have claimed that there is a teleology at work in Spinoza. I disagree with this analysis; but, even if it were true, it would not be relevant to the kind of divine purpose supposedly at work in the miraculous (which Spinoza clearly does reject in the Ethics and other writings, including the TTP). For more details, see my “Spinoza, Bennett, and Teleology.”
See Epistle 42, The Letters, trans. Samuel Shirley with introduction and notes by Steven Barbone, Lee C. Rice, and Jacob Adler (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett, 1995) p. 225–236, especially p. 229. Van Velthuysen’s understanding of Spinoza’s analysis of miracles differs structurally from the analysis which I have offered. See our notes to Epistle 42; and also further information on van Velthuysen (The Letters, pp. 33–39). Spinoza’s attitude toward non-petitionary prayer is less negative. See Epistle 21, where he writes to Blijenbergh: “I do not deny the utility of prayer to us, for my intellect is too small to determine all the means by which God leads men to the love of him, that is, to salvation” (The Letters,pp. 151–58; and see our notes on pp. 22–25). On the reactions of Spinoza’s contemporaries to these elements of his interpretation of Christianity, see M. Revault d’Allones, “Spinoza et le `crise’ du Théologicopolitique,” Le religieux dans le politique: le genre humain (Paris: Seuil, 1991); M. Benitez, “Du bon usage du Tractatus Theologico-Politicus: la religion du Chrétien,” ed. O. Bloch, Spinoza au XVlle siècle (Paris, Méridiens Klinksieck, 1990); C. Hubert, Les premières réfutations de Spinoza: Aubert de Vérse, Wittich,Lamy. Groupe de recherches Spinozistes: travaux et documents 5 (Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 1995); and R. Popkin, “The First Published Discussion of a Central Theme in Spinoza’s Tractatus,” Philosophia 17 (1987):101–109.
In fact, Curley argues that the TTP itself constitutes an introduction to the Ethics and its more detailed metaphysical exposition, see “Notes on a Neglected Masterpiece II: The Theologico-Political Treatise as a Prolegemenon to the Ethics,” Central Themes in Early Modern Philosophy, eds. J. Cover and M. Kulstad (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1990) pp. 109–59.
See E.E. Harris’s “Is There an Esoteric Doctrine in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus?” Mededelingen Vanwege het Spinozahuis 38 (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978), which directs its critique at the text of Strauss. A more detailed presentation of the methodological flaws in Strauss is provided by J. Moutaux, “Exotérisme et philosophie: Léo Strauss et l’interprétation du Traité théologicopolitique,” Spinoza au XXe siècle, ed. O. Bloch (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1993).
See S. Zac, Spinoza et l’interprétation de l’Écriture (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965), which offers a structural analysis of the TTP,but deals only in passing with Chapter 6. Zac’s negative evaluation of Strauss is found on pp. 222–30.
See Strauss’s “Comment lire le Traité théologico-politique de Spinoza,” pp. 192–200. The only French interpreter who appears reliant on Strauss’s structural analysis is Tosel, though Tosel’s Marxist interpretation differs in many details from Strauss. For a general statement of methodology, see especially A. Tosel, Du matérialisme de Spinoza (Paris: Editions Kimé, 1994) pp. 17–36. That study and another by Tosel, Spinoza ou le crépuscule de la servitude (Paris: Aubier, 1984), are developed from his doctoral dissertation, Religion, politique,philosophie chez Spinoza (unpublished), Université de Paris I-Sorbonne, 20 March 1982. Tosel, like Strauss, devotes little attention to Chapter 6 of the TTP.
D. Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902) p. 110. It is to this edition of the Enquiries that further references will be made.
R.J. Fogelin, “What Hume Actually Said about Miracles,” p. 82.
The emphasis is taken from Fogelin (ibid., p. 82). I am indebted to an unpublished paper by William Innis in my discussion of the dispute between Fogelin and Flew.
Indeed, the ontological version of the argument in Hume is more rationalistic than in Spinoza. See J-M. Gabaude, “Critique rationaliste de la religion dans le Tractatus theologico-politicus,” Le dialogue humaniste, ed. Y. Gauthier (Montréal: Les Presses de l’Université de Montréal, 1993).
Flew, “Fogelin on Hume on Miracles,” p. 141.
Ibid., pp. 141–42.
Boss, La différence des philosophies: Hume et Spinoza, 1:284.
’Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle, p. 8.
It is just this aspect of Hume’s virtually stipulative definition of the miraculous upon which B.F. Armstrong centers in concluding that Hume’s argument is ultimately question-begging: see “Hume on Miracles:Begging-the-Question Against Believers,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1992):319–28.
See Walther, “Spinoza’s Critique of Miracles: A Miracle of Criticism?” pp. 110–11.
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Rice, L.C. (2000). Spinoza’s Account of Miracles. In: Bagley, P.J. (eds) Piety, Peace, and the Freedom to Philosophize. The New Synthese Historical Library, vol 47. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2672-6_2
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