Abstract
Wittgenstein’s remarks about religion are neither systematic, complete nor wholly transparent. Nevertheless, they interestingly illuminate a number of central philosophical issues relating to the religious domain and to education in religion.
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Notes
cf. Wittgenstein’s remarks about Father O’Hara, who claimed that religious beliefs could be made reasonable: LA, pp. 58–59. See also LA, pp. 60–63.
For assessment and criticism of non-realism and religion and some of its proponents see Cowdell, 1988; Hebblethwaithe, 1988; Runzo, 1993; Ward, 1982; White, 1994. For Phillips’ reaction to this general position see his papers in Runzo, 1993.
On such basic beliefs see Gardner, 1988; McLaughlin, 1990. For arguments that religious doctrines are not on the same level as ‘epistemically primordial’ or ‘river-bed’ propositions see Kazepides, 1991b.
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McLaughlin, T.H. (1995). Wittgenstein, Education and Religion. In: Smeyers, P., Marshall, J.D. (eds) Philosophy and Education: Accepting Wittgenstein’s Challenge. Philosophy and Education, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2616-0_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2616-0_11
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