Inferential Traps in an Escalation Process

  • Raymond Dacey
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 320)


The social sciences are quite distinct from the physical sciences. In particular, the objects of study in the social sciences are capable of understanding and using theories about human behavior.


Decision Maker Strategic Behavior American Political Science Review Complete Ordering Payoff Table 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Raymond Dacey
    • 1
  1. 1.College of Business and EconomicsUniversity of IdahoMoscowUSA

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