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Possible Worlds Semantics and the Liar

Reflections on a Problem Posed by Kaplan
  • Sten Lindström
Chapter
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 320)

Abstract

In this paper I discuss a paradox, due to David Kaplan, that in his view threatens the use of possible worlds semantics as a model-theoretic framework for intensional logic.1 Kaplan’s paradox starts out from an intuitively reasonable principle that I refer to as the Principle of Plenitude. From this principle he derives a contradiction in what he calls Naive Possible World Theory. Kaplan’s metatheoretic argument can be restated in the modal object language as an intensional version of the Liar paradox.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sten Lindström
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy and LinguisticsUmeå UniversitySweden

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