Actuality and Possibility
The problems connected with the logical analysis of sentences that contain some reference to “actual objects” together with expressions in the scope of a modal (usually possibility) “operator” attract the attention of many philosophical logicians. In the present paper I intend to show that Tichÿ’s transparent intensional logic (TIL) makes it possible to solve these problems in another way than a) Hintikka (where TIL’s solution can be construed as an alternative — perhaps a better one — to Hintikka’s solution), and b) Kripke and Dummett (where it is shown that their solution is unacceptable under some most intuitive assumptions).
KeywordsCzech Republic Semantic Analysis Actual World Logical Analysis Actual Object
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