Abstract
The Analytic Psychology of Carl Jung has received little serious attention from philosophers in general and phenomenologists in particular. This has been most unfortunate, especially when it comes to philosophical appraisals of the epistemological, ontological, and for that matter, phenomenological and hermeneutical status of the “unconscious.” The almost exclusive focus of philosophers on Freud’s notion of the unconscious has, in my view, eclipsed from philosophical discussion a formulation of the problematic of the unconscious that, apart from its many purely psychological advantages over Freud’s formulation, is also far less epistemologically naïve.
“We do not have too much intellect and too little soul, but too little precision in matters of the soul”—Robert Musil
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Reference
Inasmuch as all claims about the contents of the unconscious are recognized by Jung to be mediated through the references or indications manifest in contents that are conscious, all references to unconscious “contents” will be placed in quotation marks in order to serve as a reminder of this cognitive peculiarity.
C.C. Jung, Memories, Dreams and Reflections, trans. Richard and Clara Winston ( New York: Vantage Books, 1963 ), p. 150.
Jung, the superiority and inferiority of a conscious function refers to their degree of conscious differentiation and not to any kind of valuative judg ment, moral or otherwise. Thus the higher the degree of introspective acuity with respect to a given function, the greater its “superiority” will be vis-à-vis those functions for which such acuity is of a lessor degree.
C. G. Jung, On the Nature of the Psyche, trans. R.F.C. Hull ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 114.
C.G. Jung, Analytical Psychology: Its Theory and Practice ( New York: Vintage Books, 1970 ), p. 66.
Ibid., pp. 66–67.
C.G. Jung, Letters, trans. R.F.C. Hull (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975 ), vol. I, p. 331.
Stephanie De Voogd, “C.C. Jung: Psychologist of the Future ‘Philosopher’ of the Past,” Spring (1977): 176.
C.G. Jung, Letters, op. cit., pp. 330–31.
Ibid., p. 333.
I have extensively treated these issues in my Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger. The Problem of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology ( Kluwer: Dordrecht, 1993 ).
Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, trans. David Carr ( Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970 ), p. 184.
See his postponement of this task in §69b of Sein und Zeit.
I have tried to work this out in some detail in my “Phenomenological Self-Critique of its Descriptive Method,” Husserl Studies 8 (1991): 129–150.
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Hopkins, B.C. (1998). The Subject in Phenomenology and Analytic (Jungian) Psychology. In: Hopkins, B.C. (eds) Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2610-8_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2610-8_4
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