Abstract
There have been many scholarly works as well as critical investigations of Wittgenstein’s so-called “logical atomism” from various points of view. These works have made it clear that his celebrated notions of “states of affairs” and “picture-theory,” his concepts of language, logic and world have their peculiar meanings in the context of his Tractatus.
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A. Kenny and D. Pears are the initiators of this innovative interpretation of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. See A. Kenny, Wittgenstein (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1973) p. 127, D. Pears, Ludwig Wittgenstein (London: Collins, 1971),. 100ff., G. Frongia and B. McGuiness, Wittgenstein, A Bibliographical Guide (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), p. 33f., S. Kripke, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982), pp. 120–1. Kripke also suggests that the discussion of other minds“ in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations is continuous with the Tractatus.
Pears, op. cit., p. 81.
Ibid., p. 97.
Kenny, op. cit., p. 74.
L. Wittgenstein, Tracta tus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. D. Pears and B. McGuiness (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 2.0121. (Hereafter cited as
Tracta tus.)
E. Stenius, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus—A Critical Exposition of its Main Lines of Thought ( Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1981 ).
Ibid., p. 50.
Ibid.
J. Hintikka, “The Intentions of Intentionality” in his Intentions of Intentionality and Other New Models for Modalities ( Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975 ), pp. 215–8.
See D.W. Smith and R. McIntyre, Husserl and Intentionality (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1982 ), Chapter VII.
See B. McGuinness, ed., Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, trans. J. Schelte and B. McGuiness (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1979), pp. 76, 80. (Hereafter cited as WVC.)
Ibid., pp. 67, 88.
Stenius, Op. cit., p. 200. L. Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein’s Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics—Cambridge„ 1939, ed., C. Diamond ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976 ), p. 232.
Stenius, op. cit., pp. 202–3.
lbid., p. 202.
Ibid., p. 196.
Ibid., p. 47.
The kind of relationship Stenius establishes between the many-valued dimensions and the so-called “color space” is not clear to me. If he takes values to be individual colors that are determined with respect to each coordinate, the dimensions would not correspond to elementary sentences but to a set of elementary sentences of the same syntactical form. Thus in any case this could not be proposed in favor of the Tractatus but of WVC, pp. 73–4.
N. Malcom, Nothing is Hidden (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986 ), p. 61.
Ibid., pp. 60–1.
Tractatus, 6.124.
E. Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970), 2 vols, vol. 2, pp. 522, 527.
See especially Stenius’s discussion on the logic of names in language (Stenius, op. cit., pp. 197–203), and Pears, op. cit., Chapter 7. Also see T. Sueki, Studies on Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus I ( Tokyo: Koronsha, 1977 ), p. 72.
N.F. Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (New York: State University of New York Press, 1981), p. 107. Gier describes with remarkable erudition precisely how Wittgenstein’s later philosophy developed in a broad context. See W. Brenner, “Wittgenstein’s Color-Grammar,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy, XX, (3): 289–298.
Taactatus, 2.0131.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Remarks, ed. R. Rhees, trans. R. Hargreaves and R. White (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), §221. (Hereafter cited as PR.)
PR, §39.
Ibid., §82.
Kenny, op. cit., p. 127.
PR, §83.
Pears, op. cit., pp. 95–6.
PR, §154.
Ibid., §158.
PR, §43, WVC, p. 88.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, ed. R. Rhees, trans. A. Kenny (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974), §102. (Hereafter cited as PG.)
PG, I, §104.
Ibid.
PG, I, §§133–34.
PG, Appendix, pp. 210–211.
G.B. Balser and P.M.S. Hacker, An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations ( Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983 ), p. 197.
See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968), §§94, 97, 107. (Hereafter cited as PI.)
PG, pp. 211–2.
Ibid.
WVC, p. 81.
J. Hintikka, Investigating Wittgenstein (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 131. We must also note that this “holistic view” is different from the “context principle” employed by the early Wittgenstein. Leibniz’s theory of language might well furnish us with a new point of view about this principle in comparing Husserl and Wittgenstein. But at present I will leave this discussion aside. See H. Ishiguro, Leibniz s Philosophy of Logic and Language ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990 ), p. 18.
Pears., op. cit., p. 98.
Ibid., p. 103.
PI, §97.
Ibid., §107.
L. Wittgenstein, Zettel, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univesity of California Press, 1967), §590. (Hereafter cited as Z.)
L. Wittgentstein, On Certainty, ed. G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe and D. Paul (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), §318. (Hereafter cited as OC).
Jbid., §319.
PI, §69.
PI, §71. In this section Wittgenstein criticizes Fregé s comparison of concept with an area that has a distinct boundary.
OC, §§97–99.
Ibid.,S
Ibid., §501.
Ibid., §110.
E. Husserl, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. D. Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), §36. (Hereafter, cited as Crisis.)
Ibid., §46.
Gier, op. cit., pp. 118–9.
Prof. H. Ishiguro suggested this point to me, though the terms and its expression are on my responsibility.
E. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague: Martinus
Nijhoff, 1960), p. 135. “Ibid., p. 137.
E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1969). 65Ibid., p. 149.
Ibid., p. 269.
Crisis, p. 135.
E. Husserl, Ideas, General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans.
W.R. Boyce Gibson (London: Humanities Press, 1969). ( Hereafter cited as Ideas.) “Crisis, p. xli.
Ibid. See David Carr, Interpreting Husserl (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987), pp. 87, 214–5, 243–4.
Crisis, p. 76. 72Ibid., pp. 76, 103.
Ibid., pp. 127–8.
Ibid., p. 133.
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 131, Also see Carr’s introduction, p. xli.
Ibid., p. 138.
Carr, op. cit., p. 12. “Ibid., p. 18.
Gier, op. cit., p. 200. “’Carr, op. cit., p. 244. R2Crisis, pp. 161–3. 83Carr, op. cit., p. 19.
Crisis, p. 358. BsIbid., p. 278. “Ibid., p. 286. R7Ibid., pp. 293–6.
This subtitle addresses those who refuse the possibility of comparing Wittgenstein as a relativist with Husserl. See for example, J. M. Hems, “Husserl and/or Wittgenstein,” in Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, ed. H.A. Durfee ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976 ), pp. 55–86.
C. Van Peursen, “Edmund Husserl and Ludwig Wittgenstein,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 20 (1959): 181–98;
W. Kuroda, “Phenomenology and Grammar,” AH, 8 (1979): 89–107.
N.F. Gier, Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981 );
S. Cunningham, “Husserl and Private Languages,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Researach 44 (1983): 103–11;
H. Reeder, Language and Experience(London: University Press of America, 1984 );
P. Hutcheson, “Husserl’s alleged Private Language,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (1986): 133–6.
PI, §90.
Gier, “Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology Revisited,” Philosophy Today 39 (1990): 283.
Carr, op. cit., p. 243.
Reeder, op. cit., pp. 7–8, 93–7.
Ibid., p. 47. Reeder points out that private experiences may play some role in language-use. But, it seems, the point Wittgenstein wants to make does not
weaken their role but exposes the failure of just such an account of meaning by ostensive definition.
ldeas, §§97–98. See also my “Noema and Grammar,” in the proceedings of “1992 American/Japanese Phenomenology Conference,” at the University of Tokyo, 1992, pp. 337–347.
Churchill, “Wittgenstein: The Certainty of World Pictures,” Philosophical Investigations 11: 1 (1988): 47.
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Okamoto, Y. (1998). Is Logical Space an A Priori Framework of the Life-World?. In: Hopkins, B.C. (eds) Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2610-8_2
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