Skip to main content

Part of the book series: Contributions to Phenomenology ((CTPH,volume 36))

  • 126 Accesses

Abstract

This paper will address the issue of the scope and legitimacy of the view “that Husserl’s philosophy throughout its different stages and phases is informed by his belief in language as calculus.”2 Toward the end of investigating this issue, the conception of language as calculus is contrasted with the conception of language as a universal medium. This opposition was originally proposed by Jean van Heijenoort in his 1967 paper, “Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus,” in order to classify two main streams of contemporary logic. Not long afterwards Jaako Hintikka extended its application from logic in the strict sense to language in general.3

I wish to thank Dr. Potter for his kind help in the linguistic formulation of this paper.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as EPUB and PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Reference

  1. M. Kusch, Language as Calculus vs. Language as Universal Medium ( Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989 ), p. 9.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Jean van Heijenoort, “Logic as Language and Logic as Calculus,” Synthese, 17 (1967): 324–330. Jaako Hintikka, The Intentions of Intentionality and other New Models for Modalities (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), pp. 192–222, 223–251; “On the Development of the Modeltheoretical Tradition in Logical Theory,” Synthese, 77 (1988): 1–36.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  3. Heijenoort, op. cit., p. 325..

    Google Scholar 

  4. Hintikka, “On the Development of the Modeltheoretical tradition,” op. cit., p. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  5. According to Kusch there are eight points of departure between the two conceptions of language, but these are not important for our present purposes.

    Google Scholar 

  6. As opposed to Frege’s criticism of Hilbert’s program of the axiomatic method because of its belief in real space as the only domain to which geometry is to be applied, Husserl writes: “Frege does not understand the meaning of the Hilbertian ‘axiomatic’ founding of geometry, namely that it is a purely formal system of conventions, whose theory form is equal to the Euclidian” (XII, 448. Every quotation without an author’s name is from the Husserliana. A Roman numeral indicates the volume, and an Arabic numeral the page number. The line number, when necessary, is indicated as, for example, 1.3.). Moreover, Husserl also conceived a theory of definite manifolds which is quite similar to the Hilbertian conception.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Kusch, op. cit., p. 70.

    Google Scholar 

  8. N. Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978), ch. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975 and 1984), 2 Band, Band 1, §35. (Hereafter cited as, respectively “LU/1” and “LU/2.”)

    Google Scholar 

  10. Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), §65. (Hereafter cited as “Logic.”)

    Google Scholar 

  11. Edmund Husserl

    Google Scholar 

  12. G. Patzig, “Husserl on Truth and Evidence”, in Readings of Edmund Husserl’s Logical Investigations, ed. by J.N. Mohanty ( The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977 ), p. 196.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Ibid., p. 179

    Google Scholar 

  14. E. Tugendhat, Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1970 ), p. 181.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), Erstes Buch, p. 316. (Hereafter cited as Ideas I.)

    Google Scholar 

  16. Tugendhat, op. cit., p. 43.

    Google Scholar 

  17. Ibid.

    Google Scholar 

  18. See also Edmund Husserl, Analysen zur passiven Synthesis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), p 102, (Hereafter cited as “APS.”), Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 95. (Hereafter cited as “CM.”)

    Google Scholar 

  19. Husserl himself has considered that even for God things can be given only through appearances (Ideas I, pp. 97, 98, 101, 271, Tugendhat, op. cit., p. 76).

    Google Scholar 

  20. See also Logic, pp. 284, 286 and CM, p. 34.

    Google Scholar 

  21. Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1952) Zweites Buch, pp. 63–4. (Hereafter cited as “Ideas II.”)

    Google Scholar 

  22. Tugendhat, op. cit., p. 79.

    Google Scholar 

  23. See K. Rosen, Evidenz in Husserls deskriptiver Transzendental-philosophie ( Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag Anton Hain, 1977 ), p. 53.

    Google Scholar 

  24. See APS, pp, 110, 203, CM, p. 95–6, Logic, p. 164. See also Tugendhat, op. cit., p. 234.

    Google Scholar 

  25. I stressed this point at the Japanese-American Phenomenology Conference in Seattle, 1991. Cf. S. Nuki, “On the self-sufficiency of Language.” It seems to me, incidentally, that by this reformulation Husserl has also overcome “Kant’s archetypal mistake” as Hintikka called it. By Kant’s mistake Hintikka means the identification of cognition of a particular being and sensual perception. Cf. J. Hintikka, “Wittgenstein’s semantical Kantianism,” in Ethik Grundlagen, Probleme und Anwendungen (Wien 1981), p. 376. “Das Paradox transzendentaler Erkenntnis,” p. 135.

    Google Scholar 

  26. D. Davidson, “True to the Facts,” in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984 ), p. 47.

    Google Scholar 

  27. Ibid., p. 48.

    Google Scholar 

  28. A. Tarski, “Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages,” in Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics (Indianapolis, 1983 ), p. 155.

    Google Scholar 

  29. W.v.O. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” in From the Logical Point of View ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963 ), p. 33.

    Google Scholar 

  30. Tugendhat, op. cit., pp. 246f.

    Google Scholar 

  31. Edmund Husserl, Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phänomenologie (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 169fn.

    Google Scholar 

  32. K. Held, “Husserls neue Einführung in die Philosophie: Der Begriff der Lebenswelt,” in Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft, ed. C.F. Gethmann (Bonn: Bouvier, 1991).

    Google Scholar 

  33. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 58, B 82.

    Google Scholar 

  34. M. Dummett, “Truth,” in Truth and Other Enigmas ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980 ), p. 7.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Nuki, S. (1998). Phenomenology as Calculus?. In: Hopkins, B.C. (eds) Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 36. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2610-8_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2610-8_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5128-8

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2610-8

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics