Abstract
That “value” was central to classical phenomenology, is indicated by the following passage from Edmund Husserl’s Ideas:
this world is there for me not merely as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a world of objects with values, a world of goods, a practical world. I simply find the physical things in front of me furnished not only with merely material determinations but also with value-characteristics, as beautiful or ugly, pleasant and unpleasant, agreeable and disagreeable, and the like. Immediately, physical things stand there as Objects of use, the “table” with its “books,” the “drinking glass,” the “vase,” the “piano,” etc. These value characteristics and practical characteristics also belong constitutively to the Objects “on hand” as Objects, regardless of whether or not I turn to such characteristics and the Objects. Naturally this applies not only in the case of the “mere physical things,” but also in the case of humans and brute animals belonging to my surroundings. They are my “friends” or “enemies,” my “servants” or “superiors,” “strangers” or “relatives,” etc.1
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References
Ideen zu einer reinen Phaenomenologie und phaenomenologischen Philosophie, bk. 1, Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phaenomenologie, lst-3rd eds., ed. Karl Schuhmann, vol. 3, no 1, of Husserliana (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 58 [50]; Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 53.
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Para. 21. Emphasis in the original. The Macquarrie and Robinson English translation is somewhat misleading here.
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Only secondarily does this single becoming tendency differentiate into force centers and vital centers, which in turn become objectified into organic and inorganic nature. Frings, Max Scheler, p. 33, and “Max Scheler: A Descriptive Analysis of the Concept of Ultimate Reality,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning 3 (1980): 138, 140. Such a view was recently supported by Max Delbrueck, 1969 recipient of the Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine; see his Mind from Matter (Palo Alto: Blackwell, 1986), and “Mind from Matter?” The American Scholar 47 (Summer 1978): 339–53. Frings notes the striking parallels between Scheler and Delbrueck, Philosophy of Prediction, p. 46.
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As quoted by Frings, “Scheler’s 1927 Reading of Being and Time ” p. 112.
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Frings offers a different account of the temporality of value, although one that I believe is compatible with what has been suggested above. Frings, “Einleitung” to Karol Wojtyla Johannes Paul II, Primat des Geistes, Philosophische Schriften (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1980), pp. 19–33.
Rudolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy of Reflection (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986).
Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness, trans. J. S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964).
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Stikkers, K.W. (1997). Value as Ontological Difference. In: Hart, J.G., Embree, L. (eds) Phenomenology of Values and Valuing. Contributions to Phenomenology, vol 28. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2608-5_9
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