Abstract
Consciousness — Bewußtsein — was one of the key concepts of Husserl’s phenomenology. In contrast to this, Heidegger — regarded as Husserl’s most outstanding pupil — placed Dasein at the center of his own phenomenology. This change in key concepts may be seen as an upheaval in the phenomenology that purports to study the “things themselves”: as a shift of focus from the activity of a Bewußtsein that constitutes the Being of objects, to the passivity of a Dasein that receives the donation of Being. But there is another aspect of Dasein that lies in the concept of “Da” (disclosedness), and it implies another possibility for the development of phenomenology that Heidegger did not fully develop. Kitaro Nishida, the Japanese philosopher who introduced phenomenology to Japan during the first half of the 20th century, developed this concept in his own way by analyzing the structure of disclosedness in terms of self-consciousness. In this paper I will follow the development of phenomenology from the “I” of Husserl, through Heidegger’s concept of “disclosedness,” to “self-consciousness” as it is understood by Nishida.
... seeing the shape of the shapeless, hearing the voice of the voiceless ...
Kitaro Nishida (IV, p. 6)
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt,Volume 1, p. 125f.
Brentano: Ibid.,p. 180.
Ms. M 1113, p. 2, cit. from Alwin Diemer, Edmund Husserl - Versuch einer systematischen Darstellung seiner Philosophie, 2. verbesserte Auflage, Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain 1965, p. 15.
Ms. C 17 IV p. 6 [1932], cit. from Klaus Held, Lebendige Gegenwart, The Hague: Marti-nus Nijhoff, 1966, p. 102.
Iso Kern, “Object, Objective Phenomenon and Objectivating Act according to the `Vijnaptimatratasiddhi’ of Xuanzang” (600 — 664).
Ms. A V 5, p. 5 [1933], cit. from Held: Ibid. p. 106.
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,Tübingen: Max Niemeyer 1977, pp. 132 — 133.
Heidegger is critical of all active operations of consciousness which constitute the Object and its Being thematically. Concepts such as “Sorge,” which operate athematically and in a non-object-oriented manner, are closely related to this aspect of his critique. But such concepts seem to me to be secondary in his critique of Husserl. The primary target of criticism is Husserl’s idea of the constitution of Being.
To this end, he considers not only the matter of “Geschick” in the problematics of historicality, but also the ancient Greek concept of physis that reigns over all movement.
Ms. A V 5 p. 2, cit. from Held: Ibid. p. 121.
Cf. Yorihiro Yamagata, “The Philosophy of Nishida and French Philosophy” in NishidaTetsugaku wo manabu Hito no tameni, Sekaishiso-sha, 1996, p. 86.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Résumé de cours, Paris: Gallimard 1968, p. 107.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le visible et l’invisible, Paris: Gallimard 1964, p. 302.
Merleau-Ponty, La nature, Paris: Edition de Seuil 1995, p. 73.
Their “dialectical” path as a way of recovering the original situation contains another problem: it does not encounter the radical Other — a problem I cannot investigate within the scope of this paper.
Lao-tze: 5th Stanza.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Tani, T. (1998). Inquiry into the I, disclosedness, and self-consciousness: Husserl, Heidegger, Nishida. In: Steinbock, A.J. (eds) Phenomenology in Japan. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2602-3_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2602-3_2
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5118-9
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2602-3
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive