Abstract
Though, if we take Wiggins at his word, he has no apparent reason to deny the claims that “same man” and “same cat” express relative equivalence relations, as argued in the last chapter, these claims can nevertheless be resisted quite easily if one adopts Quine’s view of continuants.
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© 1980 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Noonan, H.W. (1980). Quine on Synchronic Identity. In: Objects and Identity. Melbourne International Philosophy Series, vol 6. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2466-1_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2466-1_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-8259-6
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