Abstract
There are few problems to which legal philosophers have devoted more attention than the relationship between morality and law, or, said in different terms, between the “good” and the “obligatory”. One might think that all that should and could be said about it has already been uttered or written. Nevertheless philosophy — and legal philosophy is no exception — is just this: rethinking old problems which are in fact always new,1 and for which no definitive solution is given — nor is possible, I would add — and which need a permanent effort of reassessment. There is no reason for disappointment or despair in this endless work. It is neither pointless nor irrelevant.
This paper was written during my stay at the University of Münster in Summer 1993 as Alexander von Humboldt research fellow. I would like to express my gratitude to the Humboldt foundation for its generosity, and to my host Professor Werner Krawietz for his friendly hospitality and his stimulating comments on my work.
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Notes
Philosophisches Denken fängt immer wieder von vorn an“, says Helmuth Plessner in his introduction to: Das Fischer Lexikon — Philosophie, ed. by A. Diemer and I. Frenzel, Frankfurt: Fischer 1965, p.10.
R. Dreier: Recht-Staat-Vernunft. Studien zur Rechtstheorie 2, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1992, pp. 12–13.
For this somehow old-fashioned terminology, see R. de Stefano: Il problema del diritto non naturale, Milano: Giuffrè 1955.
J. Ritter: “Institution `ethisch’. Bemerkungenzur philosophischen Theorie des Handelns”, in: H. Scheisky (ed.): Zur Theorie der Institution, 2nd. ed., Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann 1970, p. 64.
An attempt to save the imperativist approach, although recognizing the “objective” nature of law, is tried by Karl Olivecrona with his concept of legal rules as “independent imperatives”.
G. Radbruch: “Gesetzliches Unrechtund übergesetzlichesRecht”, in: G. Radbruch: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, 8th ed., Stuttgart: Koehler 1973, p.345. See also G. Radbruch: “Fünf Minuten Rechtsphilosophie”, in: Grundzüge der Rechtsphilosophie, op. cit., p.328: “Es kann Gesetze mit einem solchen Maße von Ungerechtigkeit und Gemeinschädlichkeit geben, daß ihnen die Geltung, ja der Rechtscharakter abgesprochen werden muß” [italics in the text]. Cf. W. Ott: “Die Radbruchsche Formel. Pro und Contra”, in: Zeitschrift für Schweizerisches Recht, 1988, pp.335–347. Cf. also H. Dreier: “Die Radbruchsche Formel — Erkenntnis oder Bekenntnis?”, in: H. Mayer et al. (ed.): Staatsrecht in Theorie und Praxis. Festschrift für Robert Walter, Wien: Manz 1991, pp. 117–135.
M. Kriele: Recht und praktische Vernunft, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1979, p. 117.
See A. Peczenik: On Law and Reason, Dordrecht: Kluwer 1989, pp.243ff. See also A. Peczenik: “Dimensiones morales del derecho”, in: Doxa, 8, 1990, p. 100.
This was also the opinion of a brilliant Italian legal philosopher, the late professor Giovanni Tarello, whose realist theory, deprived of the holistic assumption which directs Dworkin’s concept of law, leads to a radical rule-scepticism affirming that the meaning of the legal mle was uniquely that ascribed to it by the interpreter, that is, by the single judge applying that particular rule. See G. Tarello: Diritto, enunciati, usi, Bologna: Il Mulino 1974.
R. Alexy: “On Necessary Relations Between Law and Morality”, in: Ratio iuris, 1989, p.177.
Ibid., p.179.
Ibid., p.180.
Ibid.
Ibid. Cf. R. Dreier: “Zur gegenwärtigen Diskussion des Verhältnisses von Recht und Moral in der Bundesrepublik”, in: Archiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 44, pp. 55–67.
E. Tugendhat: Fragen der Ethik, Stuttgart: Reclam 1984, p. 73.
See for instance L.L. Fuller: “Positivism and Fidelity to the Law: A Reply to Professor Hart”, in: Harvard Law Review, 1958, pp.630ff.
See H. Kelsen: Reine Rechtslehre, Wien: Deuticke 1934.
See H.L.A. Hart: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford: Clarendon 1983, pp.2lff.
For a similar position, see N. Hoerster: “Zur Verteidigung der rechtspositivistischen Trennungsthese”, in: Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, Beiheft 37, 1990, pp. 27–32.
J. Raz: Practical Reason and Norms, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992, p. 164.
Ibid., p.165.
Ibid., p.167.
N. MacCormick: “Natural Law Reconsidered”, in: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 1981, p.109.
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La Torre, M. (1994). Law and Morality: A Modest Assessment. In: Pauer-Studer, H. (eds) Norms, Values, and Society. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2454-8_9
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