Abstract
Shakespeare’s Hamlet best illustrates the problem with which a thoughtful and morally motivated person is confronted if crime, dishonesty and betrayal flourish in his or her social surroundings. The Danish prince finds himself in a genuine moral dilemma upon learning that his father, the former king, died not of natural causes but was insidiously murdered by his own brother, Hamlet’s uncle, Claudius, who now reigns over Denmark and shares the bed of the victim’s widow, Hamlet’s mother. Hamlet vacillates for some time about what he ought to do. Finally, not without hesitancy and reluctance, he resolves to take revenge. To conceal his intentions, he acts as if he were crazy, astonishing the royal court with his altogether strange behavior. By doing so, however, he provokes the mistrust of King Claudius all the more. Claudius employs the Lord Chamberlain, Polonius, to whose daughter Ophelia Hamlet finds himself attracted, and two friends from Hamlet’s youth, Rosencrantz and Guildenstem, to spy on him. Acting on his emotions, Hamlet kills Polonius, an unprincipled and foolish schemer. This gives Claudius a welcome opportunity to get rid of Hamlet by banishing him, guarded by Rosencrantz and Guildenstem, to England, with the intention of having him murdered there (something Hamlet’s guards are unaware of). Yet Hamlet has become suspicious. In the luggage of his companions he finds the king’s letter with the order for his murder, and he replaces it with another, instructing those to whom it is addressed to kill Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. He himself succeeds in escaping and returns to the Danish royal court. There he runs into Laertes, the son of Polonius and brother of Ophelia (who, in the course of events, had gone mad and committed suicide). Laertes, who cannot wait to take revenge for the deaths of his father and sister, becomes entangled by Claudius in a disgraceful attempt on Hamlet’s life. They persuade Hamlet into agreeing to a fencing match, not knowing that, whatever the outcome, he will die. For Laertes fences with a poisoned blade, and Claudius has a poisonous drink for Hamlet in reserve. The tragic end of the story is well known.
I would like to thank Thomas W. Pogge (New York) and Peter Strasser (Graz) for their critical comments on an earlier, German draft of this paper. Moreover, I wish to thank those participants of the Vienna Circle-Symposion in Vienna, 1993, who commented on the lecture from which this article emerged, particularly Dieter Birnbacher (Essen), Johannes Brandi (Salzburg), Georg Graf (Salzburg), Anton Leist (Zurich), and Julian Nida-Rümelin (Göttingen). Last but not least, I wish to express my special gratitude to Stanley L. Paulson (St. Louis, Göttingen) for his endeavours in improving the English version of the paper.
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Notes
See the editor’s introduction to Holger M. Klein (ed.): William Shakespeare: Hamlet, Vol. 1: Text, Stuttgart: Reclam 1992, pp. 13–49.
There are, however, a handful of exceptions. I think, for example, of John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, London: Oxford University Press 1972
Karl-Otto Apel: Diskurs und Verantwortung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1988
Sissela Bok: Lying, New York: Vintage Books 1979
Tzvetan Todorov: Face à l’extrême, Paris: Editions du Seuil 1991.
Its disapproval of retaliation is derived from several biblical statements, above all: Matthew 5, 38–42; Luke 6, 27–30; Romans 12, 17–21.
Cf. Heribert Jone: Katholische Moraltheologie,18th ed., Paderborn: Schöningh 1961, pp. 290ff.
For Kant’s refusal of private retaliation see: Immanuel Kant: Eine Vorlesung über Ethik, ed. Gerd Gerhardt, Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch 1990, p. 230
Kant: Die Metaphysik der Sitten. Tugendlehre, A 136f. (Kant-Werkausgabe in zwölf Bänden, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1968, Vol. VIII, pp.598f.).
Cf. Georg Geismann and Hariolf Oberer (eds.): Kant und das Recht der Lüge, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann 1986.
In this respect I agree, by and large, with Sissela Bok: Lying, op.cit.,pp.34ff.
See, for example, R.F. Harrod: “Utilitarianism Revised”, in: Mind 45, 1936, pp. 137–156
Jonathan Harrison: “Utilitarianism, Universalization and Our Duty to be Just”, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 53, 1952/53, pp.105–134
James O. Urmson: “The Interpretation of the Moral Philosophy of J.S. Mill”, in: The Philosophical Quarterly 3, 1953, pp. 3339.
First steps towards such a theory already have been made by a few philosophers, in particular John Rawls and Karl-Otto Apel. Rawls introduced a distinction between two parts of a theory of justice: (1) an ideal part that deals with the principles of justice of a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances, including the fact that everyone complies with these principles, and (2) a non-ideal theory that, taking the ideal part as its point of departure, asks for the principles of just conduct under less fortunate conditions; see Rawls: A Theory of Justice, op.cit.,pp.244ff., 350ff. Similarly, Apel divided his discourse ethics into two parts, “part A” and “part B”; cf. Apel: Diskurs und Verantwortung, op.cit.,pp.267ff., 271ff. Still, both approaches do not go very far, because they are limited to strategies of dealing with nonideal conditions in order to arrive at a state of moral perfection. A different approach has been taken by Tzvetan Todorov: Face à l’extrême, op.cit.,who, however, sticks to a descriptive phenomenology of situations of moral imperfection rather than providing a normative conception of moral conduct in such situations.
See, e.g., J.O. Urmson: “Saints and Heroes”, in: A.I. Melden (ed.): Essays in Moral Philosophy, Seattle and London: University of Washington Press 1958, pp. 198–216.
Cf. John L. Austin: “A Plea for Excuses”, in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, 1956–57, pp. 1–30
H.L.A. Hart: Punishment and Responsibility, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1968, pp. 13–24, 28–53.
See Marcus G. Singer: Generalization in Ethics, New York: Knopf 1961
Jürgen Habermas: Moralbewußtsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1983, pp. 74–76.
Cf. Jürgen Habermas: Faktizität und Geltung, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1992, p. 148.
Cf. Otto Triffterer: Österreichisches Strafrecht. Allgemeiner Teil, Vienna and New York: Springer 1985; pp.212ff.
Andrew Ashworth: Principles of Criminal Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1991, pp. 110–122.
Cf. Arthur Schopenhauer: Über die Grundlage der Moral, § 17 (Schopenhauer, Zürcher Ausgabe. Werke in zehn Bänden, Vol. VI, Zurich: Diogenes 1977, p.262); Sissela Bok: Lying, op. cit., pp.77ff.
Cf. Ruth Klüger: Weiter leben. Eine Jugend, Göttingen: Wallstein 1992, pp. 131–135.
See Eugen Kogon: Der SS-Staat, Paperback edition, Munich: Kindler 1974, pp. 89–103
Hermann Langbein: Menschen in Auschwitz, 2nd ed., Frankfurt et al.: Ullstein 1980, pp.169–196.
For a sophisticated discussion of those difficult problems see. Judith J. Thomson: “Self-Defense”, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 20, 1991, pp.283–310.
See George P. Fletcher: “Punishment and Self-defense”, in: R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Moms (eds.): Liability and Responsibility, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1991, pp. 415–430.
See, for example, Jean Hampton: “Moral Education Theory of Punishment”, in: Philosophy & Public Affairs 13, 1984, pp.208–238.
Cf. Philip Pettit: “Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives”, in: Ethics 100, 1990, pp.225–755.
See Eugen Kogon: Der SS-Staat, op.cit.,pp.308ff.
Hermann Langbein: Menschen in Auschwitz, op. cit.,pp.160f., 219.
See, e.g., Herbert Morris: “Persons and Punishment”, in: Jeffrey G. Murphy (ed.): Punishment and Rehabilitation, Belmont, Mass.: Wadsworth 1973, pp. 40–64
Jean Hampton: “A New Theory of Retribution”, in: R.G. Frey and Christopher W. Moms (eds.): Liability and Responsibility, op.cit., pp.377–414.
Cf. Inge Scholl: Die Weiße Rose, new ed., Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch 1992.
Cf. Kurt R. Grossmann: Die unbesungenen Helden, 2nd ed., Frankfurt et al.: Ullstein 1984, pp. 200–202.
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Koller, P. (1994). Moral Conduct Under Conditions of Moral Imperfection. In: Pauer-Studer, H. (eds) Norms, Values, and Society. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook, vol 2. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2454-8_8
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