Abstract
Nietzsche deliberated, in his mature work, about a perspectivist ontology according to which the world is composed of quanta of power to each of which, and to each society of which, there is coupled a perspective. In what follows, I outline some relations between that perspectivist ontology and Nietzsche’s perspectivist epistemology. But there are ambiguities here — many relations between Nietzsche’s ontology and epistemology might be discussed, but only some will be discussed in this essay. One issue that will not be addressed here is the epistemological considerations that led Nietzsche to a perspectivist ontology. Another is the compatibility of a perspectivist ontology with an antecedent commitment to a perspectivist epistemology. I will instead focus on a third issue, viz., some of the drastic implications a perspectivist ontology has for de re knowledge.1
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I have considered these questions in earlier papers. See Robert C. Welshon, “Nietzsche’s Perspectivist Ontology,” International Studies in Philosophy (Summer, 1996): 77–98; Robert C. Welshon, “Nietzsche’s Perspectivist Causality” International Studies in Philosophy, forthcoming. See also chapters 3, 4, and 5 in Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, a book-length manuscript co-authored with Steven Hales. The ideas in this paper are direct and indirect implications of work done by both of us in Nietzsche’s Perspectivism, so I gratefully ackowledge Steven Hales’s participation in this paper as well.
See in D. B. Allison, ed., The New Nietzsche (New York: Dell Publishing, 1977), Jean Granier, “Nietzsche’s Conception of Chaos,” pp. 137 and 139; Michel Haar, “Nietzsche and Metaphysical Language,” pp. 6 and 12; Sarah Kofman, “Metaphor, Symbol, Metamorphosis,” pp. 201–214. Cf. Ofelia Schutte, Beyond Nihilism: Nietzsche Without Masks. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 47, 92–104; Alan Schrift, Nietzsche and the Question of Interpretation (New York: Routledge, 1990), chapters 5–7.
Nietzsche, TI VII 3; also GS 335, BGE 11, TI V, WP 552b.
See GS110, 111; WP 520. See Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1976 ), pp. 92–97.
Cf. BGE 13, 36, 230, 259; GS 118, 349; AC 2; GM II 12; WP 644
See GM II 12
See WP 567, 637, and 639.
Cf. WP 259; BGE 34.
An alternative view, that societies are property constituted, is discussed at WP 557 and WP 558.
For more on mereology, see Chisholm, Person and Object,Appendix B.
Following Nietzsche; cf. WP 551.
Again following Nietzsche: WP 561.
See also WP 515, 559, and 639.
Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985 ), p. 83.
For further reflections on the other questions, see chapter 6 of Hales and Welshon, Nietzsche ‘s Perspectivism.
One (bad) argument for the conclusion that there can be no de re knowledge of Nietzschean bundle-objects is considered in the paragraph after next.
The set of all possible configurations of power quanta is the power set of the set of power quanta.
Were perspectives sets of beliefs, there could be no untrue beliefs within a perspective. But Nietzsche affirms just the opposite. In AC 23 he writes “truth and the belief that something is true: two completely diverse worlds of interest”. Compare: “a belief, however necessary it is for the preservation of a species, has nothing to do with truth” (WP 487) and “a belief can be a condition of life and nonetheless be false” (WP 483).
Thus Nietzsche claims at GM III 23 through 25 that even science is perspectival.
Just as denumerable infinities are smaller than non-denumerable infinities.
Natural kinds with a caveat: kinds are typically thought to be inhabitants of the world regardless of perspective. But Nietzschean natural kinds are perspectivist inhabitants of a perspectivist world.
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Welshon, R.C. (1999). Perspectivist Ontology and de re Knowledge. In: Babich, B.E. (eds) Nietzsche, Epistemology, and Philosophy of Science. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol 204. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2428-9_3
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