Abstract
... Black inserts a mechanism into Jones’ brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones’ activities. Jones, meanwhile, knows nothing of this. Black exercises this control through a sophisticated computer which he has programmed so that, among other things, it monitors Jones’ voting behavior. If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for Bush, then the computer, through the mechanism in Jones’ brain, intervenes to assure that he actually decides to vote for Clinton and does so vote. But if Jones decides on his own to vote for Clinton, the computer does nothing but continue to monitor — without affecting — the goings-on in Jones’ head.1
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
J. M. Fischer, The Metaphysics of Free Will (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), 131–132. All subsequent references to Fischer are to this book.
See H. Frankfurt, ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’, Journal of Philosophy 66 (1969), 829–839.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mackie, D. (2000). Fischer on Alternative Possibilities and Responsibility. In: van den Beld, T. (eds) Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2361-9_8
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2361-9_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5435-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2361-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive