Abstract
Free will matters in large part because it seems to be a requirement of responsibility. If the ‘ability to do otherwise’ was not thought to bring with it the capacity for an agent to be responsible, it is hard to see what would make such an ability particularly desirable. Because we do see ourselves as responsible, however, and we wish to understand how our attributions of responsibility can be legitimate, questions surrounding the nature of our abilities as free agents arise. Susan Wolf begins chapter five of Freedom Within Reason, entitled ‘Ability and Possibility’, with just such a question: ‘what, if any, metaphysical conditions must be satisfied in order for attributions of psychological abilities to agents ever to be justified.’1 Wolf goes on to sketch an account of ability, and its metaphysical implications, which she believes is sufficient to meet the demands of our ordinary conception of moral responsibility. I will be critically examining Wolf’s view, and considering the extent to which her proposed analysis succeeds in offering an account of ability that can avoid the problems that have plagued traditional approaches.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Daniel Dennett, Elbow Room (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1984). 147. A larger version of this contribution includes an in depth comparison of Dennett’s and Wolf’s positions.
One might object that the crucial aspect of Wolf s story is the divine foreknowledge, which corresponds to the physical determinism later employed. I do not believe the divine foreknowledge present in her story to be particularly problematic. (For a convincing argument that foreknowledge alone doesn’t interfere with freedom, see Alvin I. Goldman, A Theory of Human Action, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970) 186196. Stronger arguments offered by Goldman regarding determinism are not as convincing.) If one has independent reasons for believing he/she is free, then foreknowledge alone doesn’t block freedom. The problem with the secularization of Wolf s story is that we lose an important reason for thinking we are free: namely, God setting up the world with our freedom in mind. What we have instead is a mechanistic conception of the world which itself, regardless of whether it is completely deterministic, poses a threat to our belief that we are free and responsible.
See, for example, Jerry A. Fodor, ‘Special Sciences, or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis’ and Hillary Putnam, ‘Philosophy and Our Mental Life’, both in Ned Block (ed), Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, Volume 1, ( Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1980 ).
Referring to simply ‘physical explanation’ here would be importantly vague, as many ‘physical’ explanations, such as those given in biology, are considered functional in nature.
Hillary Putnam, ‘Philosophy and Our Mental Life’, 139. My thoughts here on Putnam and functionalism were aided and improved by a discussion with Peter Achinstein.
Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, in Essays on Actions , and Events, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 225. Wolf herself might not approve of such a move: she has (in conversation) claimed to be skeptical with regard to the possibility of a successful Davidsonian account.
Donald Davidson, ‘Psychology as Philosophy’, also in Essays on Actions , and Events, 231.
Donald Davidson, ‘Mental Events’, 222.
See in particular Jaegwon Kim’s essay ‘Psychophysical Laws’, in Supervenience and Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 194–216, and Frederick Stoutland’s essay ‘Davidson on Intentional Behavior’, in Actions and Events, Le Pore, Ernest, and McLaughlin, B. (Eds.), (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1985), 44–59. I have found Kim’s essay particularly helpful for understanding Davidson’s view, though Kim also makes clear that more work needs to be done in order to secure a Davidsonian position against criticisms from Quinean elimitivists.
See p. 63 of ‘Freedom to Act’, in Essays on Actions , and Events.
One obvious question would be whether a Davidsonian position could adequately respond to Searle’s worry that supervenience alone is enough to block psychological freedom from seeming real. Here I think much depends upon one’s conception of supervenience, as Kim suggests in Psychophysical Laws’, p.213, footnote 28. Davidson seems to endorse what Kim has called a ‘weak’ form of supervenience, and it appears as though Searle is working with a significantly stronger variety. Regardless of Davidson’s actual view, a weak form of supervenience is, I think, necessary in order to make sense of Wolf’s view. See in addition Kim’s essay ‘Concepts of supervenience’, Supervenience and Mind, 53–79. Stoutland’s essay ‘Davidson on Intentional Behavior’ is also relevant here.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Grau, C.M. (2000). Moral Responsibility and Wolf’s Ability. In: van den Beld, T. (eds) Moral Responsibility and Ontology. Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy, vol 7. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2361-9_10
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2361-9_10
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
Print ISBN: 978-90-481-5435-7
Online ISBN: 978-94-017-2361-9
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive