Abstract
Democracy as parliamentary representation is the first of three hot issues in contemporary legal debate which I want to address in order to test the interception hypothesis as part of a critical theory of law. At the very heart of this issue lies the question what is represented in parliamentary representation, such that it can be called a (form of) democracy. Indeed, the basic problem of parliamentary democracy is a referential one: in what sense does this institution refer to ‘the people’? Both the usual defense and the usual critique of parliamentarism revolve around one specific interpretation of this reference: parliament is supposed to represent some entity (the people) which is already existent in virtue of certain characteristics which precede such institutional representation. The advocates of the system will point out that it more or less does, while the critics will try and prove that it does not to any reasonable extent. Morover, parliament’s authority as a legislator largely depends on the the belief in society that parliament is what it is supposed to be: a mirror image, or at least a small-scale model, of society. Whether the debate is about nationalism and separatist movements, collective rights of cultural minorities, or the democracy deficit in the European Union, reference to a ‘real’ people is what is at stake. The interception hypothesis will allow us to discover that democracy is as much about challenging such political closure than it is about reinforcing it. We will use it to propose two readings of a famous characterization of democracy, namely as the political organisation of a ‘fatherless society’.
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References
The paper on which this chapter is based started out as a critique of Habermasian thought, and made several detours in political philosophy before receiving Habermas’s most appreciated and illuminating direct reply at the 1994 Tilburg symposium on Faktizität and Geltung. Parts of it were already submitted on prior occasions, in particular at the meeting of the working group on Critical Theory (Utrecht, 19–4–1991), at a seminar on Carl Schmitt (Leiden, 15–12–1992), at a public lecture on the Claude Lefort’s ideas at the eve of his honorary doctorate (Tilburg, 18–9–1992) and at the 1993 IVR World Congress in Reykjavik. I thank all who made comments and asked questions. I am also indebted to my colleague Dr. Mogobe Ramose at Tilburg for his incisive remarks.
I am reluctant to call it a principle of discourse,as, for one thing, discourse and Diskurs are far from identical in meaning and, for another, I am not sure whether or not Habennas’s principle is meant to serve both meanings.
eine Solidarität unter Fremden - unter Fremden die auf Gewalt verzichten und die sich, bei der kooperativen Regelung ihres Zusammenlebens, auch das Recht zugestehen, für einander Fremden zu bleiben.’ (my translation, offered with the caveat that `Fremden’ is ambiguous between `strangers’ and `foreigners’. I chose the more political term. The italics are Habermas’s.) Cf. Habermas ( 1992: 374 ).
Though it is quite conceivable to `intersubjectively enlarge’ this first person plural (Habermas (1992: 280)), the enlarged `we’ will still be a `we’ distinct from `others’. In order to ground that distinction, this `we’ will have to refer to a realm that transcends what is, for that `we’, social reality. By hypothesis it cannot find such a point of reference, in social reality itself, since reference to this point is what constitutes social reality in the first place.
This section is indebted to both Weyembergh’s (1988) and Claude Lefort’s insights, to which I shall turn within a few paragraphs.
See especially the essay `Permanence du théologico-politique’ in Lefort (1986: 251300); cf. 255 ff.
I would like to think that perhaps there is some connection here between Debray’s guess, Lefort’s (1992) idea of the `corps interposé’ and with Girards scapegoat: the former as one in the row of guardians to protect one’s own body from death, the latter as the same picture in the negative (as with the corpse of Louis XVI becoming the founding body of the Revolutionary Era).
Lefort (1981: 123 t); (1986: 112; 264 ff).
Lefort (1981: 111 ff); (1986: 276).
Lefort (1986: 27; 265; 268f.; 273 f).
Lefort (1981: 45–86; 68); (1986: 31–38).
Cf. Habermas (1992: 534), where Habermas refers indirectly (via U. Rödel) to Le-fort’s famous dictum: `Im demokratischen Rechtsstaat als der Behausung einer sich selbst organisierenden Rechtsgemeinschaft, bleibt (…) der symbolischen Ort der diskursiv verflüssigten Souveränität leer.’
Habermas (1992: 141): `Das Demokratieprinzip erklärt (…) den performativen Sinn der Selbstbestimmungspraxis von Rechtsgenossen, die einander als freie und gleiche Mitglieder einer freiwillig eingegangenen Assoziation anerkennen.’ This is to be read in connection with (1992: 153): `Die Idee der Selbstgesetzgebung von Bürgern fordert nämlich, daß sich diejenigen, die als Adressaten dem Recht unterworfen sind, zugleich als Autoren des Rechts verstehen können.’ The immediately following phrases (154) make it clear that this `zugleich’ is to be understood as `identical’. This also appears to be the idea of the fourth principle (156) on public autonomy, whereby `(…) Rechtssubjekte auch die Rolle von Autoren ihrer Rechtsordnung (erwerben) (…).’ Cf. the explanation on (160 f) and (162): `In den verfassungsgebenden Akten einer rechtsverbindlichen Auslegung des Systems der Rechte machen die Bürger einer originären Gebrauch von einer politischen Autonomie, die sich damit auf eine performativ selbstbezügliche Weise konstituiert.’ See also p. 492. (All italics are Habermas’s.)
Es konnte und durfte niemand mehr die Machtvollkommenheit des Vaters erreichen, nach der sie doch alle gestrebt haben.’ (my translation). Freud, Totem und Tabu ( 1913: 179–180 ).
Totem and Tabu (1913: 194).
Roermund (1990b), ch. 3.
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Van Roermund, B. (1997). Democracy and Representation. In: Law, Narrative and Reality. Law and Philosophy Library, vol 30. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2051-9_8
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