Abstract
How is weakness of the will possible? This was the title question of an article published by Donald Davidson in 1969. His answer, which accords with ones offered by many philosophers from Socrates onwards, reads: Strictly speaking weakness of will is not possible — at least not if it is to be understood as a disposition to act intentionally contrary to one’s own belief that an available alternative action would have been better. This thesis, which appears implausible at first sight, gives rise to two questions. First, what are the premises from which Davidson’s thesis follows, and how does he justify them? Second, how does Davidson account for cases of what we are at least inclined to call “weakness of will”? It is the aim of this article to answer these questions.
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Stoecker, R. (1994). Willensschwäche — Wie Ist das Nur Möglich?. In: Preyer, G., Siebelt, F., Ulfig, A. (eds) Language, Mind and Epistemology. Synthese Library, vol 241. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2041-0_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2041-0_14
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