Abstract
In the sense of irrationality that interests Davidson, an act or a belief is irrational if it is inconsistent or undesirable in the agent’s own terms, by criteria or in light of facts he or she implicitly acknowledges.1 What is philosophically interesting about this kind of ‘internal’ irrationality is the way it presses on the nature of the mental; for ‘holism’ tells us that something can be construed as a belief or an intention only if it is linked to other such states in those generally rational ways that internal irrationality apparently ignores.
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Cavell, M. (1994). Dividing the Self. In: Preyer, G., Siebelt, F., Ulfig, A. (eds) Language, Mind and Epistemology. Synthese Library, vol 241. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2041-0_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2041-0_13
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