Singular Causal Sentences and Two Relational Views

Abstract

What do we assert when we utter singular causal sentences? To answer this question we have to enquire into the logical form of these sentences, and look for the objects we are making claims about when uttering them. Among the many authors writing on this subject there is a prevailing assumption in favor of a relational account. The idea is, in making a singular causal claim, that we predicate a two-place relation between certain kinds of entities. There are at least two main proposals providing this idea with a specific shape. Both proposals have arguments supporting the idea that singular causal sentences are extensional, but there are considerable differences among them, concerning not only the objects but also the logical form of such sentences. In what follows I will first, in section II, present both proposals. In sections III and IV I will deal in detail with the two as possible analyses of our ordinary causal talk. In section V both proposals will be assessed along this line.