Abstract
This essay attempts to explicate the concept of “knowledge” in the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas. Simultaneously, it seeks to explore what he makes of the relationship of knowledge to truth.
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Cf. Gilson, E., Le Thomisme, (The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas), trans. by Edward Bullough, ed. by Rev. G. A. Elrington, St. Louis: B. Herder Book Company, p. 261.
Aquinas, St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, II-II, 1, 4, c ad 1. Cf. Also II-II, 4, 2, c., in Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, New York: Random House, 1945, Vol. II, p. 1060.
Cf. Peifer, John Frederick, The Concept in Thomism, New York: Bookman Associates Inc., 1952, p. 29.
Aquinas, De Ventate, q. 1., a. 12. Cf. also Sum. Theo., II-II, q. 8 a. 1.
Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 5, in The Works of Aristotle, W. D. Ross, ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1931, p. 430a. Cf. also, De Anima III Lect. 10, n. 728ff.
Technically, in Thomistic usage, the term abstraction is used in a number of senses, depending on the qualification. Negative abstraction is the act of grasping one thing without another, as when a specific quality, say yellow, is abstracted from an object, say, dress. Formal negative abstraction grasps a form (e. g. a quality like size) from its matter (e. g. an object like pizza). Total negative abstraction grasps that which is common in many things without grasping the many (members from which the common element is derived and to which it is referred. In a way, it is a grasp of the whole (total) without grasping the parts, as when a concept, say man, is grasped without grasping individual men, say Mary, John, Jill, etc. Positive abstraction consists in mentally grasping that one thing is not another. This is an act of judgment, since in order to be able to declare that one thing is not another (say, John is not studious) two things (John and studious) must be grasped simultaneously. In negative abstraction (either formal or total), only one thing is grasped.
Cf. Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 10, a. 4. Cf. also Peifer, op. cit., p. 70f. for further discussion on the nature of this form.
Cf. Aquinas, De Potentia, qu. XI., art. 5, at Resp.; see also ibid., q. VIII., art. 1, ad Resp.
Cf. Wilhelmsen, Frederick D., Man’s knowledge of Reality, Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice Hall, 1956, pp. 86–87; Cf. also J. Maritain, Degrees of Knowledge, Trans. by Gerald B. Phelan, New York: Scribner, 1959, pp. 112–188.
Cf. De Verit., qu. I., art. 12 ad Resp. and Sum Theol., I, 16.
Cf. Truth, I, trans. by Robert W. Mulligan, S. J. Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952. Cf. Hoenen, Peter, Reality and Judgment according to St. Thomas, trans. by Henry F. Tiblier, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1952.
Aquinas, De Virtutibus in Communi, q. 1 a. 9. in Peifer p.30.
Heide, R., Theory of Knowledge, Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1983, p. 182.
Van Steenberghen, Fernand, Epistemology, trans. by Martin J. Flynn, New York City: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1949, p. 210.
For differing interpretations of Aquinas’ theory of knowledge among modern epistemologists, cf. Eleonore Stump, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 17, pp. 125–158; Alvin Plantings, ‘Reason and Belief in God,’ in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, eds. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.
E. Stump argues (in op. cit.) on the basis of Aquinas notion of “scientia” that Aquinas is not a foundationalist. Such an interpretation is, at best, questionable, considering that, in Aquinas, “scientia” is subordinate to metaphysics where the first principles are appropriately derived. For a discussion of Aquinas’ degrees (and subordination of levels) of knowledge, cf. J. Maritain, op. cit. Cf. Regis, L. M., Epistemology, trans. by Imelda Choquette Byrne, New York: The Macmillan Company. 1959; and Rickaby, John, The first Principles of Knowledge, London: Longmans, Green and Co., Ltd., 1926.
Gilson, E., Realisme thomiste et critique de Is connaisance, B 66, p. 197.
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Cruz, T.F. (1996). Rediscovering Aquinas’ Concept of “Knowledge”. In: Lehrer, K., Lum, B.J., Slichta, B.A., Smith, N.D. (eds) Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2022-9_8
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