Abstract
This paper is an attempt to engage in ‘applied philosophy’.1 My primary conclusion is that as teachers we would do well to imitate Socrates. On the way to this conclusion I will point to insights that can be gained through a look at two areas of philosophy. First, I will argue that an important debate in contemporary epistemology can help clarify one of our central goals as teachers, arguing that contemporary foundationalists and coherentists converge on the conclusion that a person with real understanding is characterized by a coherent set of beliefs. If this is so, as teachers we should seek to help our students examine their beliefs for coherence and prod them toward a more coherent system of beliefs. Second, I will argue that a look at the ancient philosopher Socrates provides a challenging model for how to lead our students toward this goal.
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Notes
Since my primary aim is to apply insights from philosophy to the practice of teaching, in this paper I will attempt to avoid technical jargon as much as possible. In applying philosophy in this way, it is virtually impossible to avoid making some claims with which some philosophers disagree. Nevertheless, it is not my aim to discuss philosophical controversies in detail. I hope, however, that those interested in investigating the relevant debates and discussions will find the reference provided in the endnotes as a place to begin. Other papers in this collection are also an excellent resource for this purpose.
See Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 4–5.
If you are not familiar with the arguments by which Descartes questioned his beliefs or the way in which he attempted to reason his way out of this doubt, I would suggest that you read his classic work, Meditations on First Philosophy. As is true with the views of all philosophers, Descartes’s exact position is open to different interpretations. Some argue that although Descartes called into question all of his beliefs about the physical world, he recognized that there were certain ‘common notions’ that he never doubted and which he needed to make his arguments. Often, however, he is attributed with indubitable: “Cogito, ergo sum.”
For an example of modest foundationalism, see Robert Audi, Belief, Justification, and Knowledge (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1988). The simple version of modest foundationalism I sketch below owes much to the version Audi presents in this work.
The notion of ‘negative dependence’ is developed by Robert Audi in Belief,Justification and Knowledge (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1988), 95.
Examples of coherentist theories of justification can be found in Laurence Bontour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); and Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990). The sketch of a simple coherentism below is most closely related to Lehrer’s version.
It should be noted that it is anachronistic to speak about Socrates’ ‘method of teaching’ at all. Not only did Socrates say he didn’t know the answers to his questions, he denied both that he has any wisdom to teach and that he was a teacher! Yet in spite of this, Socrates did attract followers who were profoundly influenced by their interaction with him. As teachers we seek to influence our students in similar ways. So over protests from Socrates himself, I will examine his life as an important educational model. For a helpful discussion of “Socratic Method” see chapter 1 of Plato’s Socrates, by Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Most scholars believe that it is possible to identify Plato’s ‘early’ dialogues and that these dialogues reflect a relatively accurate picture of the historical Socrates. See the “Editors Introduction” to Hugh H. Benson, ed Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (Oxford University Press, 1992), 3–6.
In this paper I can not live up to this call for a ‘careful look at the historical Socrates’ as well as I’d like. See the papers in this volume by Hugh Benson, Scott Calef and David Calhoun for more careful discussion of various aspects of the Socratic method. Additional discussion of the method and philosophy of Socrates can be found in Michael C. Stokes, Plato’s Socratic Conversations (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socrates on Trial (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989); and Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato’s C Socrates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Two helpful collections of articles on various aspects of Socrates’ method and philosophy including the elenctic method are Gregory Vlastos, ed. The Philosophy of Socrates: A Collection of Critical Essays (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1980); and Hugh H. Benson, ed. Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. Additional articles on the socratic method includes Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,” Richard Kraut, “Comments on Vlastos,” Vlastos, “Afterthoughts on the elenchus,” all in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983), 27–74; Hugh Benson, “The Problem of the Elenchus Reconsidered,” Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987), 65–85; Hugh Benson, “A note on Eristic and the Socratic Elenchus,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1989), 561–600; and Paul Woodruff, “Plato’s Early Theory of Knowledge,” in Stephen Everson, Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1990), 60–84.
Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983), 35–38.
See Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983), 3940; and Hugh Benson, “A Note on Eristic and the Socratic Elenchus,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1989), 594–596. As Benson notes, Socrates is concerned not just to examine the consistency of what his partners say, but the consistency of what they believe.
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12–14. As Brickhouse and Smith put it, “... Socrates does not say that he examines what people say or even what they believe; he says he examines people (e.g., Ap. 21c35, 23b4–6, 28e5–6, 29e4–5, 38a5), and as we have said, but this he means examining the ways in which they live (see esp. Ap. 39c7). See also Gregory Vlastos, ”The Socratic Elenchus,“ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983), 3638; and Hugh Benson, ”The Aims of the Socratic Elenchos,“ in this volume.
Laches 188a, quoted by Vlastos in “The Socratic Elenchus,” 37.
Meno, 80b; See Plato, Five Dialogues, trans. G.M.A. Grube (Hackett Publishing Company, 1981), 68–69.
The intended outcome of Socrates’ method of elenchus is something on which there is scholarly disagreement. Some see the historical Socratic elenchus as one which aims primarily at the negative goal of uncovering inconsistencies and presumptions claims to knowledge. Such a view is defended by Michael Stokes in Plato’s Socratic Conversations, (Johns Hopkins Press, 1986); and Hugh Benson, “The Problem of the Elenchus Reconsidered,” Ancient Philosophy 7 (1987), 65–87. Others see a more positive outcome resulting from the elenchus. This ‘constructivisf’ view is defended by the following: Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Plato’s Socrates (Oxford University Press, 1994), chapter 1; Gregory Vlastos, “The Socratic Elenchus,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 1 (1983); and Paul Woodruff, “Plato’s Early Theory of Knowledge,” in Stephen Everson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 60–84. But regardless of whether the elenchus itself could do more than show consistency or inconsistency, it seems clear that one of the aims of the elenchus was to at least ‘prod’ Socrates interlocutors toward greater understanding. On this see Hugh Benson, “The Aims of the Socratic Elenchos,” in this volume.
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Ebertz, R.P. (1996). Socratic Teaching and the Search for Coherence. In: Lehrer, K., Lum, B.J., Slichta, B.A., Smith, N.D. (eds) Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2022-9_5
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