Skepticism, Mitigated Skepticism, and Contextualism

Abstract

My subject in this paper is a central thesis of Hume’s mitigated skepticism, that although radical skepticism has no theoretical solution it may nevertheless be a means to achieve a balanced and tranquil life. I begin by arguing that this is an untenable view: there is no justification for the claim that skeptical reflections are a means to tranquility without a satisfactory answer to the skeptic’s challenge. Second, I consider a defense of mitigated skepticism based on the contextualist theory of justification developed by Michael Williams in his recent book, Unnatural Doubts.¹ Williams’ contextualism allows that the radical skeptic’s challenge has no answer, and in contexts of inquiry governed by the skeptic’s challenge we have no justification at all for our inductions or beliefs about the external world. But Williams’ view also allows that in contexts of inquiry not governed by the skeptic’s challenge-e.g., a context governed by the assumptions of empirical psychology-we may be justified in believing that radical skepticism is a means for bringing about a balanced and tranquil life. Finally, I argue that despite its attractions, Williams’ contextualism does not give a satisfactory answer to the skeptic’s challenge and, for that reason, is not an effective defense of mitigated skepticism.