Abstract
Reliabilist accounts of epistemic justification have come under heavy attack: it has been claimed that it is impossible to establish the reliability of certain basic belief producing processes (like, e.g. perception or memory) in a noncircular way. From this it has been concluded without further ado that the belief in the reliability of such basic processes cannot be justified. In this paper I shall concede that the reliability of certain basic belief producing processes cannot be established in a noncircular fashion, but I shall argue that the circularity involved is not vicious and therefore does not prevent us from having justified beliefs about the reliability of basic belief producing processes.
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© 1996 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Stubenberg, L. (1996). Justifying Basic Belief Forming Processes. In: Lehrer, K., Lum, B.J., Slichta, B.A., Smith, N.D. (eds) Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 67. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2022-9_11
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2022-9_11
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