Abstract
I believe that Mill’s growth ethic provides powerful ideas for promoting human excellence and progress. Without question, growth, for individuals and groups, is a desirable goal. Mill’s conception of growth, by definition, called for positive changes that would bring desirable consequences. He was correct in observing that the potential for human betterment exists, and that we have it in our power to improve things. He recognized that we must attend to development at many levels, ranging from character formation to institutional reform. He was also correct in noting that positive change and progress are not inevitable. Therefore, growth is something we must consciously navigate toward, and we must be vigilant against complacency, stagnation, and regression. Moving forward, onward, or upward is certainly better than the alternatives. Mill is to be commended for advocating cultivation and improvement and making it a top priority.
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Endnotes
A good recent discussion is John Robson, “Civilization and culture as moral concepts,” in John Skorupski, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also Robson’s “Rational Animals and Others,” in John M. Robson and Michael Laine, eds., James and John Stuart Mill/Papers of the Centenary Conference (University of Toronto Press, 1976); and, Daniel N. Robinson, Toward A Science of Human Nature: Essays on the Psychologies of Mill,Hegel, Wundt, and James (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982). It is interesting to note the observation of Mill’s caustic critic, James Fitzjames Stephen: Mill seems to me to be one of those people whose logical and thinking power is quite out of all proportion to his seeing power. For the purpose of arranging his thoughts and putting them all in proper relations to each other, he is incomparable and unapproachable, but the quality of the thought itself seems to me, in many cases, exceedingly poor and thin. His whole concept of human nature appears to me to be a sort of unattractive romance, yet it is the romance of a man who, in some aspects, is very good. Stephen’s letter to Lady Egerton (April 26, 1872). Quoted in K. J. M. Smith, James Fitzjames Stephen: Portrait of a Victorian Rationalist (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 161. Smith accurately explains that Stephen’s harsh critique of Mill is characterized by “a dark Hobbesian disbelief in the perfectibility of mankind, an un-suppressed incredulity that Mill with his impeccable philosophic lineage could propagandise such alien humanistic and optimistic doctrines.” (p. 162.)
Alexander Bain considered J. S. Mill’s adherence to associationist psychology his greatest mistake as a ‘scientific thinker.’ See Bain’s John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections (London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1882), p. 146. Like Coleridge, Binet, and others, Bain believed in associationism but later rejected it. It is also interesting to note that S. T. Coleridge named his first-born son David Hartley Coleridge. Although Hartley’s eighteenth-century association psychology is outmoded, it remains of great historical interest. Important movements in psychology (such as experimental psychology, classical conditioning, and behaviorism), follow from it. Furthermore, associationism provides the theoretical foundations for current psychological and computer science research in connectionism, such as parallel distributed processing. See, for example, James L. McClellan and David G. Rumelhart, Explorations in Parallel Distributed Processing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988). As I mentioned in chapter one, Steven Pinker, in his refutation of associationism, recognizes its historic legacy and describes it as “the most influential theory of how the mind works that has ever been proposed.” See How the Mind Works (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), p. 113. Pinker also argues against the associationist view of learning and grammar in Words and Rules: The Ingredients of Language (New York: Basic Books, 1999).
This is particularly evident late in his career, when he edited a new printing of his father’s book buttressed by his own commentary. As John Robson points out in the Introduction to Volume XXXI of the Collected Works, J. S. Mill’s 1869 edition was a “carefully considered endeavor, and one that reflects lifelong intellectual and indeed personal concerns.” (p. xix.) Robson goes on to say: “He was loyal almost to a fault to his father’s writings.” (p. xxi.) See also Mill’s letter to James Fitzjames Stephen, May 17, 1869 (Collected Works XXXII, pp. 206–7). For the best study of Mill’s psychology, and how it relates to the associationism of James Mill, see Fred Wilson, Psychological Analysis and the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill (University of Toronto Press, 1990), esp. pp. 113ff and chapter four.
Autobiography of John Stuart Mill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), pp. 75–76 (Collected Works I, pp. 109, 111).
For an interesting discussion on this, see The Subjection of Women (Collected Works XXI, chapter III, esp. pp. 313ff). Mill argues against the “apparent inferiority of women to men” by attributing the differences in observable achievements to social factors.
Diary, in Hugh S. R. Elliot, ed., The Letters of John Stuart Mill (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), Vol. II, appendix A (Collected Works XXVII, p. 668). See also Mill’s letter to Edward Herford, 22 Jan. 1850 (Collected Works XIV, p. 45).
Ibid. See also John Morley, “Mr. Mill’s Autobiography,” Fortnightly Review, new series, 85 (Jan., 1874) reprinted in Nineteenth-Century Essays (University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 156.
Three Essays on Religion (Collected Works X, p. 409). See also Mill’s speech “The Present State of Literature,” (Collected Works XXVI, p. 411); and, Mill’s letter to Thomas Story Spedding, 31 August 1848 (Collected Works XXXII, pp. 74–75). Cf. “Chapters on Socialism” Fortnightly Review, n.s. XXV, 1879 (Collected Works V, pp. 740, 745–46).
“Coleridge,” London and Westminster Review XXXIII, March, 1840 (Collected Works X, p. 130). James Mill’s faith in Associationism is expressed in his Dec. 6, 1817 letter to Francis Place, where he writes that the publication of his Analysis would make “the human mind as plain as the road from Charing Cross to St. Paul’s.” Quoted in Elie Halévy, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism (New York: Macmillan, 1928), p. 451.
See, for example, James Mill’s lengthy 1818 essay on “Education,” written for the fifth edition of Encyclopaedia Britannica. See also W. H. Burston, James Mill on Philosophy and Education (London: Athlone Press, 1973).
For a discussion on Mill’s hedonism, see above, chapter three. See also David O. Brink, “Mill’s Deliberative Utilitarianism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 21:1 (Winter, 1992); and Roderick T. Long, “Mill’s Higher Pleasures and the Choice of Character,” Utilitas, 4:2 (Nov., 1992).
As stated in the text, Mill recognized this. See, e.g., Mill’s anonymous Appendix to Edward Lytton Bulwer’s England and the English (1833), “A Few Observations on Mr. Mill” (Collected Works I, p. 591). See the conclusion to chapter three, as well as endnotes 97, 98, and 99. See also my article “Human Nature,” in John K. Roth, ed., Ready Reference: Ethics, Vol. II (Pasadena, CA and Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Salem Press), 1994, pp. 404–7.
Richard Norman characterizes Mill’s higher/lower distinction along the lines of a misleading “intellectual/physical dichotomy,” and seeks to qualify Mill’s “severely intellectualist account of the higher pleasures.” See Norman’s The Moral Philosophers: An Introduction to Ethics, second edition (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 96. I agree with Norman that Mill tended to favor intellectual pleasures over physical ones, and that Mill’s position is often misleading. However, on my interpretation, Mill does not exclude physical improvement from the higher pleasures. Thus, refining one’s talents as a gymnast, golfer, or goalkeeper would count as examples of pursuing the growth ethic.
Utilitarianism (Collected Works X, p. 211). On this point, see John Rawls’ A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971), section 65; and William Galston, Justice and the Human Good (University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 61. See above, chapter three, note 51.
Ibid., p. 212. Mill also blames “hostile influences” of benighted society (p. 213). On this point, see Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 197; and, Richard Norman, The Moral Philosophers, (op. cit., endnote 13).
John Morley, Recollections, Vol. I (New York: Macmillan, 1917), p. 56.
Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on Education in Society (Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 190. Garforth cites Considerations on Representative Government (Collected Works XIX, p. 382) for his paraphrase of Mill.
J. A. Hobson, “John Stuart Mill,” The Speaker (May 26, 1906), p. 177. See also Roger Crisp, Mill on Utilitarianism,p. 194.
See A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. ii, esp. sect. 3 (Collected Works VIII, p. 840). See also An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, chapter XXVI.
See Mill’s essay on “Nature” (Collected Works X, p. 397).
Psychological studies of happiness contradict this assumption, suggesting that one’s level of happiness is governed by a genetic set point, rather than one’s socioeconomic status or sense of accomplishment. Hence, our efforts at self-improvement might make us more developed, but are unlikely to make us more happy than we are already predisposed to be. I suppose that Mill would adamantly reject these conclusions, and probably argue that people’s positive assessment of their own happiness (particularly when defined as subjective well-being) simply reflects a satisfaction with the lower pleasures—not an appreciation of their standing in terms of the higher pleasures. I would add that the studies in psychological happiness and wellbeing are not yet as established as studies of depression and anxiety, or physical and material well-being. This remains a very interesting research area to follow in the coming years. See above, chapter three, endnote 63.
Autobiography (Collected Works I, pp. 274–75). See also “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform” (Collected Works XIX, p. 338); and, Mill’s response to questions in “The Westminster Election of 1865” (Collected Works XXVIII, pp. 35–36).
Ibid., p. 279. In a letter to Charles A. Cummings, he writes: I do not… take a gloomy view of human prospects. Few persons look forward to the future career of humanity with more brilliant hopes than I do. I see, however, many perils ahead, which unless successfully avoided could blast these prospects, & I am more specially in a position to give warning of them since being in strong sympathy with the general tendencies of which we are all feeling the effects, I am more likely to be listened to than those who may be suspected of disliking them. The letter is dated Feb. 23, 1863, and is found in Collected Works XV, p. 843. See also C. L. Ten, “Democracy, socialism, and the working classes,” in John Skorupski, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge University Press, 1998). For a good discussion on the tension between Mill’s optimism and pessimism, see John MacCunn’s Six Radical Thinkers (New York: Russell & Russell, 1964 [first published, 1910]), chapter two.
See Mill’s letter to John Boyd Kinnear, Sept. 25, 1865 (Collected Works XVI, p. 1103). See also C. L. Ten, “Democracy, socialism, and the working classes (op. cit. above), p. 380.
See J. G. Merquior, Liberalism: Old and New (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), pp. 60–61; see also J. W. Burrow, Whigs and Liberals: Continuity and Change in English Political Thought (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), pp. 92, 102–7.
Mill’s discussion of the “transitional age,” which reflects the influence of the French Positivists on his early thought, is found in The Spirit of the Age (1831), Collected Works XXII. A transitional age is characterized by the gradual weakening of the old social order and a rise in the development of economic, political, and ideological forces that eventually usher in a new social order. Following the San Simonians, Mill believed that he was living in a ‘critical’ period where social institutions were no longer in harmony with social realities and prevailing beliefs. The job of the social reformer was to move society away from chaotic, egoistic, fragmentation and anomie, and steer it in a direction toward orderly, progressive change.
See On Liberty. Isaiah Berlin supports this interpretation in his celebrated 1958 essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” but he then makes the opposite point in his “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life.” See Berlin’s Four Essays on Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 183. Cf. John Gray’s treatment of Mill as a limited product of his time, who (unlike Nietzsche) lacked the foresight to predict the catyclisms of the twentieth century. See “Mill’s and Other Liberalisms,” in Knud Haakonssen, ed., Traditions of Liberalism: Essays on John Locke, Adam Smith, and John Stuart Mill (Australia: The Centre for Independent Studies, 1988), pp. 13132. Also printed in Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 229. Jean-Claude Wolf claims that Mill did not foresee the role of mass political parties, interest groups and unions, or the power of the mass media and propaganda. Further, he claims that Mill did not anticipate the rise of technology and the dangers it brings. See the concluding paragraph to Wolf s John Stuart Mills „Utilitarismus“: Ein kritischer Kommentar (Freiburg/München, 1992), p. 225. J. Salwyn Schapiro also fails to appreciate Mill’s foresight. See Schapiro’s ”J. S. Mill, Pioneer of Democratic Liberalism in England,“ Journal of the History of Ideas, 4:2 (April, 1943), p. 158.
“The Bank Charter Question,” Morning Chronicle, April 20, 1844, p. 4 (Collected Works XXIV, p. 846). See also Mill’s article “Attack on Literature,” Examiner, June 12, 1831 (Collected Works XXII, p. 322). For the interested reader, see also D. J. Manning, Liberalism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1976), pp. 126–28.
Considerations on Representative Government (Collected Works XIX, p. 396).
Principles of Political Economy,Bk. V, ch. xi, especially section one.
See George Sher, Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 15. Among those advocating neutrality are many of the leading philosophers of liberal theory, such as: John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, Brian Barry, Bruce Ackerman, Robert Nozick, Isaiah Berlin, and Bernard Williams. See above, chapter two, note 79.
Mill advocated that individuals should be free to pursue their own pleasures, but it does not follow that he approved of how they chose to exercise their liberties. He took a dim view of intoxication and human sexuality. For a typical remark on sex, see his Diary entry for March 26, 1854 (Collected Works XXVII, p. 664). For his stand on temperance, see “The Westminster Election of 1865” (July 5, 1865), where candidate Mill explains his sympathy with those who wish to ban alcohol and reportedly states that “the prevalence of drunkenness was one of the greatest obstacles to real national progress.” (This is reported in several newspapers [i.e., the Morning Star, Daily Telegraph, Daily News, and The Times] on July 6, and is most easily found in Collected Works XXVIII, p. 27.) Mill’s comments on dollar hunting are worth quoting. In his discussion ‘Of the Stationary State’ in the Principles of Political Economy, he writes: The northern and middle states of America are a specimen of this stage of civilization in very favourable circumstances; having, apparently, got rid of all social injustices and inequalities that affect persons of Caucasian race and of the male sex… and all that these advantages do for them is that the life of the whole of one sex is devoted to dollar-hunting, and of the other to breeding dollar-hunters. (Book IV, chapter vi, section 2 [Collected Works III, p. 754n].) After an exhaustive study of Mill, I have not the slightest doubt that he would regard most television programming in the United States to be a ’vast wasteland,’ were he alive today.
See Escape from Freedom (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1941). See also Considerations on Representative Government (Collected Works XIX, p. 416).
At times, Mill is actually ambivalent on this point. See his letters to Alexander Bain, August 6, 1859 (Collected Works XV, p. 631), and to James M. Barnard, October 28, 1869 (Collected Works XVII, p. 1662).
On Liberty (Collected Works XVIII, p. 267). See also Principles of Political Economy, Bk. V, ch. xi, s. 8 (Collected Works III, p. 948n); and, “Civilization” (Collected Works XVIII, p. 137). Wendy Donner seems to overlook the dynamic by which society as a whole benefits by investing its resources in a small elite class. She sees a competition between the elites and the masses over society’s resources. This is probably due to her concern that Mill’s elitism is misunderstood to favor the clerisy at the expense of the majority. She argues against what she considers to be a “common” interpretation: that a large or majority share of social resources would justifiably be spent on the developed elite, giving them everything they need to fully satisfy their developed desires, while the majority of less developed could be ignored or given a proportionally smaller share of resources. A related elitist view mistakenly attributed to Mill is that the value choices of the elite could justifiably be imposed on the less developed members of society, since the elite are the ones who make the correct value choices; we would not want to give a voice to the less developed members of society. (The Liberal Self John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy [Cornell University Press, 1991], p. 129.) I agree with Donner that this interpretation is seriously mistaken, although it is certainly not common. See also Manfred Weber, Verbesserung Der Menscheit: Untersuchungen zum politischen Denken John Stuart Mills (University of Munich, 1971), pp. 17071.
See “The Claims of Labour” (Collected Works IV, p. 377); “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform” (Collected Works XIX, esp. pp. 327, 334, 338); Autobiography, p. 199 (Collected Works, pp. 274–75); Principles of Political Economy (Collected Works III, p. 947); and Mill’s Diary entry for Jan. 10, 1854 (Collected Works XXVII, p. 641). Compare the anti-elitist arguments presented in this section with Mill’s deferential remarks in the “Use and Abuse of Political Terms,” Collected Works XVIII, p. 7; The Spirit of the Age (University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 28–31, 62, 76 (Collected Works XXII, pp. 242–44, 290–91, 304); and, Representative Government, pp. 47379. In a letter to David Urquhart (Oct. 4, 1866), Mill specifically exempts the English working classes from the insensitive moral condition of the English nation (Collected Works XVI, pp. 1205–6). Cf. Mill’s letter to Harriet Mill, March 14, 1854 (Collected Works XIV, p. 186).
Auguste Comte and Positivism, Part II (Collected Works X, p. 338). See also Jonathan Riley, Liberal Utilitarianism: Social choice theory and J. S. Mill’s philosophy (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 222.
Considerations on Representative Government (Collected Works XIX), p. 510. In a letter to Oscar Browning (Oct. 26, 1867), Mill also acknowledges the “special responsibilities of a governing class” (Collected Works XVI, p. 1321). Cf. the position Mill takes on temperance as a candidate for Parliament. See “The Westminster Election of 1865” (July 5, 1865), in (Collected Works XXVIII, p. 27.) See also John Morley, On Compromise (London: Macmillan, 1901), and D. A. Hamer, John Morley: Liberal Intellectual in Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 51. For outspoken criticisms of compromise, see the fictional works of Ayn Rand, such as The Fountainhead (Indianapolis and New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1943). For a critical discussion of Mill’s ‘naive’ and ’defective’ understanding of power in social and economic relations, as well as his faith in education, see Abram L. Harris, “J. S. Mill’s Theory of Progress,” Ethics, 16:3 (April, 1956), pp. 172–73.
“Endowments” (1869) Collected Works V, p. 627. Cf. John Day, “John Stuart Mill: On Liberty,” in Murray Forsyth, Maurice Keens-Soper and John Hoffman, eds., The Political Classics: Hamilton to Mill (Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 223.
See On Liberty (Collected Works XVIII, p. 256). The quotation Mill cites (or anything resembling it), is not found in the Qur’an. It is in the Sunna. The quotation is traced to a paraphrase of Ali ibn Abi Bakr, The Hedàya or Guide: A Commentary on the Mussulman Laws, Charles Hamilton, transi. (London: Bensley, 1791), vol. II, p. 615. In the easier to find reprint of Hamilton’s translation of The Hedàya (Delhi: Islamic Book Trust, 1982) the passage is in Book XX, chapter 1, p. 335.
As long as the elite concern themselves with the public interest (as opposed to their own selfish interests), Mill inferred that they would be likeminded. See the Autobiography, p. 148 (Collected Works I, p. 219); The Early Draft o f John Stuart Mill’s “Autobiography,” Jack Stillinger, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), p. 189; “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I]” (Collected Works XVIII, pp. 73–74); Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews (Collected Works XXI, p. 250); On Liberty, p. 250; “Bentham” (Collected Works X, pp. 79, 110); Utilitarianism (Collected Works X, p. 213); Mill’s letter to Sterling, Oct. 2022, 1831 (Collected Works XII, p. 77); and, The Spirit of the Age, pp. 62–63 (Collected Works XXII, p. 291).
This is not to say that Mill believed this would always be the case. In On Liberty, he explicitly acknowledges this when he states: “the dictum that truth always triumphs over persecution, is one of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another till they pass into commonplaces, but which all experience refutes.” (p. 238.) My point is that Mill thought the dominant trend is towards greater and greater accuracy, resolution, and truth. On this point see Raphael Cohen-Almagor, “Why Tolerate? Reflections on the Millian Truth Principle,” Philosophia, 25:1–4 (April, 1997), pp. 135, 139.
Nicholas Rescher, Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), p. 4. Sir Isaiah Berlin made this point a generation earlier. For the interested reader, a worthwhile discussion on the role of consensus in political liberalism is found in some works by John Rawls. See “The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 7:1 (1987); “The Domain of the Political and Overlapping Consensus,” New York University Law Review, LXIV (1988); Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and, “Reply to Habermas,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCII:3 (March, 1995). See also Jürgen Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCII:3 (March, 1995); and, Larry Krasnoff, “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in Rawls’s Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, XCV:6 (June, 1998).
See Mill’s letter to James M. Barnard, October 28, 1869 (Collected Works XVII, p. 1662). See also Mill’s Examiner article “Attack on Literature,” June 12, 1831 (Collected Works XXII, p. 325).
See Mill’s Inaugural Address; “Civilization” (Collected Works XVIII, pp. 139, 144–5); “On Genius” (Collected Works I, pp. 334–39); “Taylor’s Statesman” (written with George Grote), London & Westminster Review, V & XXVII, April, 1837 (Collected Works XIX, p. 625); and Autobiography (Collected Works I, p. 287). See also volume XI of Mill’s Collected Works, Essays on Philosophy and the Classics; and, Mill’s speech “The Universities,” April 7, 1826 (Collected Works XXVI, pp. 348–58).
For the interested reader, see Jenean Chun’s `cover story’ article “Making Magic” and interview with Earvin “Magic” Johnson in Entrepreneur, 26:7 (July, 1998), pp. 108–16. Also of interest is: Johnnie L. Roberts, “A Touch of Magic,” Newsweek (June 15, 1998), pp. 40–43.
While I maintain that Mill’s notion of the elite is distinct from the elite of popular culture, there are exceptions to this dynamic. I offer a few examples to illustrate an interesting point (not to suggest anything about Mill’s taste). Despite their immense talents and originality, artists such as Vincent Van Gogh the painter, Franz Schubert the composer, Emily Dickinson the poet, and Franz Kafka the writer never achieved recognition or success during their lifetimes. The appreciation of their work and their subsequent fame came posthumously. At least in these cases, civilization eventually became enriched from their contributions. Yet what remains unknown are the works of countless outstanding artists, intellectuals and innovators whose work remains unrecognized, unappreciated, or lost to posterity.
See for instance, Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 206n. See above, chapter four, endnote 41. See also John Gray, Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1989), chapter 12; and, George C. Christie, Jurisprudence: Text and Readings on the Philosophy of Law (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1973), p. 470.
On Liber ty, pp. 262–64.
Inaugural Address, pp. 229–30. See also p. 250.
See, for example, “Grote’s Aristotle” (Collected Works XI, pp. 507–10). See also “Bentham” (Collected Works X, pp. 78ff).
For a discussion on this point, see F. W. Garforth, John Stuart Mill’s Theory of Education, (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1979), chapter three, esp. pp. 144–52.
“On Genius” (Collected Works I), p. 332. See also The Spirit of the Age, pp. 71–72 (Collected Works XXII, pp. 294–95); “Civilization,” p. 146; and, Inaugural Address, p. 244. Numerous other references are cited by Garforth (see endnote above).
On Liber ty, p. 258.
“Speech on the Church,” in Harold Laski, ed., Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1924), Appendix, p. 322 (Collected Works XXVI, pp. 425–26). In a similar vein, the young Mill wrote: “There is scarcely a single improvement, either in physical or political science, which has not at one time or another been opposed by religion.” Morning Chronicle 28, Jan. 1823 (Collected Works XXII, p. 11). See also Mill’s letter to Edward Herford, 22 Jan. 1850 (Collected Works XIV, p. 45). Cf. “Coleridge” (Collected Works X, pp. 133–34).
A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. x, sect. 7.
Collected Works V, p. 641. See “Bailey on Berkeley’s Theory of Vision” (Collected Works XI, pp. 246–47). A classic work in the history and philosophy of science that deals specifically with this point is Thomas S. Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (University of Chicago Press, 1962).
“Guizot’s Essays and Lectures on History” (Edinburgh Review LXXXII [Oct., 1845]) reprinted in Dissertations and Discussions (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859), v. II, p. 236 (Collected Works XX, p. 269). For further discussion on the principle of antagonism, see: “Vindication of the French Revolution of February 1848” (Westminster Review [April, 1849]), reprinted in Dissertations and Discussions II, p. 402, and Collected Works XX, pp. 358–59; “Coleridge” (Collected Works X, p. 122); “Bentham” (Collected Works X, pp. 107–8); On Liberty, pp. 251–52; and, Representative Government, pp. 458–59.
See Auguste Comte and Positivism (Collected Works X, pp. 302–3); Representative Government, p. 445; “Bentham,” pp. 106–8; Mill’s letter to John Boyd Kinnear, Sept. 25, 1865 (Collected Works XVI, p. 1103); and, “Durveyrier’s Political Views of French Affairs,” Edinburgh Review, LXXXIII, (April, 1846), p. 464 (Collected Works XX, pp. 306–7); see also, “Centralisation” (1862), Collected Works XIX, p. 610. For a helpful discussion on Mill and problems of power, see Maria H. Morales, Perfect Equality: John Stuart Mill on Well-Constituted Communities (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), chapters four and five.
The Bermondsey Book (London: C. Palmer), volume 6 (March-May, 1929), pp. 15–16 (Collected Works XXVI, p. 395). Mill makes similar points in his “Speech on Perfectibility” (Collected Works XXVI). See also Mill’s Diary entries for February 1 and March 8, 1854 (Collected Works XXVII, pp. 649, 660). The corrupting nature of power is even more evident today, as technology, a competitive media, and the public’s interest in scandal bring the possibility of intense scrutiny to political leaders, celebrities, etc. Oddly, the sobering fact of living in the public spotlight is not necessarily a deterrent from engaging in illegal, dishonest, or otherwise disreputable behavior.
See, for example, On Liberty, p. 272. See also “Newman’s Political Economy” (Collected Works V, pp. 453–57). Cf. Mill’s discussions on permanence and progress in Considerations on Representative Government, chapter II, and “Coleridge” (Collected Works X, pp. 133ff). See also Principles of Political Economy,Bk. II, ch. iv.
Utilitarianism, p. 216. See also “Chapters on Socialism” (Collected Works V, p. 746).
See Maria H. Morales, Perfect Equality: John Stuart Mill on Well-Constituted Communities (op. cit., endnote 59).
“On Genius,” pp. 330–31. See also Mill’s unheaded article in the Globe, Oct. 23, 1835 (Collected Works XXIV, pp. 786–87). In this obscure article, he echoes the same points that he made in “On Genius,” however, he concedes ‘that many truths must be taken upon trust from others.’
See Mill’s Diary entry for March 15, 1854 (Collected Works XXVII, p. 661); and, On Liberty, pp. 242–43. See also “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America” [1835] (Collected Works XVIII, p. 63); and, Dennis F. Thompson, John Stuart Mill and Representative Government (Princeton University Press, 1976), chapter 1, “The Principle of Participation.”
“Law of Libel and Liberty of the Press,” Westminster Review III, April, 1825 (Collected Works XXI, p. 11). See also “Technicalities of English Law,” Morning Chronicle, Sept. 18, 1823 (Collected Works XXII, pp. 6062). See also the end of Mill’s article “Reputed Thieves,” Morning Chronicle, Oct. 30, 1823 (Collected Works XXII, pp. 76–77).
Mill’s letters to the French Positivists provide illustrations. See his letters to Gustave D’Eichthal (7 Nov., 1829 and 9 Feb., 1830) Collected Works XII, pp. 40, 48; and, his letter to Auguste Comte (26 avril, 1845) Collected Works XIII, p. 664. See also “The Spirit of the Age,” Part II, Examiner, Jan 23, 1831, pp. 50–52 (Collected Works XXII, pp. 238–45).
John Stuart Mill (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 354. See also Skorupski’s “Introduction: The fortunes of liberal naturalism,” in John Skorupski, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Mill (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 29.
See, for example, Mill’s campaign speech, “The Westminster Election of 1865” [2], July 5, 1865 (Collected Works XXVIII, pp. 220. See also The Subjection of Women (Collected Works XXI, p. 294).
See “DeTocqueville on Democracy in America” [II] (Collected Works XVIII, pp. 195–96). Mill discusses questions of authority in “The Spirit of the Age” [II], (Collected Works XXII).
John Gray, “Mill’s and Other Liberalisms,” in Knud Haakonssen, ed., Traditions of Liberalism (op. cit., endnote 27), p. 128. [Also in Gray’s Liberalisms (op. cit., endnote 27), p. 226.] A good refutation of Gray is Jonathan Riley’s “Individuality, Custom, and Progress,” Utilitas, 3:2 (Nov., 1991). See also Maria Morales, Perfect Equality, pp. 102ff.
See, for example, Herbert Cowell, “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity: Mr John Stuart Mill,” Blackwoods Edinburgh Magazine, vol. 114 (Sept., 1873); and, John Wilson’s review article in The Quarterly Review, vol. 135 (1873). Both appear in Andrew Pyle, ed., Liberty: Contemporary Responses to John Stuart Mill (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1994). Pyle writes in his introduction: “in the eyes of these Tory critics, is Mill’s sustained attempt to overturn all legitimate authority, to undermine the hierarchic principle on which Society rests.” (p. xi.) In some moods, Friedrich August von Hayek criticizes Mill for over-reacting to the moral coercion of Victorian England. See, for example, F. A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (University of Chicago Press, 1960), p. 146; and, John Stuart Mill and Harriet Taylor: Their Correspondence and Subsequent Marriage (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951).
On Liberty, p. 264; see also pp. 227, 268.
Ibid., p. 224. See also, Representative Government (Collected Works, XIX, p. 415); and, “Civilization” (Collected Works XVIII, p. 122). See above, chapter six.
“Civilization” (Collected Works XVIII, p. 121). See also pp. 129 and 133ff.
Ibid., pp. 133–34.
On Mill’s optimism, see Principles of Political Economy, Bk. III, ch. xvii, sect. 5, p. 594. See also Bk. IV, ch. i, sect. 2.; Utilitarianism (Collected Works X, pp. 216–17); and, A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. x, sect. 3 (Collected Works VIII, pp. 913–14).
Letter to Thomas Story Spedding, August 31, 1848 (Collected Works XXXII, p. 74).
See Mill’s “Speech on the Utility of Knowledge” (1823) Collected Works XXVI. See also Utilitarianism and Auguste Comte and Positivism (Collected Works X, pp. 248–49, 322–23).
Twentieth-century history provides us with a clear example. During the first third of the twentieth century, Germany was probably the most advanced nation in the world scientifically, technologically, intellectually, and artistically. And yet, during World War II, the German people (including the great majority of scientists, artists, clergy, and university educated professionals) went along with and supported a regime that was dedicated to waging war, racial hatred, world domination, and genocide. They put a tremendous degree of faith in the authority of their leaders, and they obediently applied their talents and technologies to destroying much of the ‘civilized’ world. For an interesting discussion on this, see Stuart Hampshire, Innocence and Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 8, 66–78. See also Michael Burleigh, Ethics and extermination: Reflections on Nazi genocide (Cambridge University Press, 1997).
Quoted in Michael St. John Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill (New York: Macmillan, 1954), p. 507. Packe cites Pasteur Louis Rey, John Stuart Mill en Avignon (Vaison, 1921), p. 13.
On this point, see Jean-Claude Wolf, John Stuart Mills „ Utilitarismus Ein kritischer Kommentar, (Freiburg/München, 1992), p. 57; Alexander Bain, John Stuart Mill: A Criticism with Personal Recollections, p. 149; and, Michael St. John Packe, The Life of John Stuart Mill, Bk. V, chapter ix, pp. 317ff.
Inaugural Address (Collected Works XXI, p. 232). See also, “Speech on Perfectibility,” Three Essays on Religion (Collected Works X, pp. 485–86); and, Autobiography, pp. 1, 22 (Collected Works I, pp. 5, 34).
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Habibi, D.A. (2001). Mill’s Ethic of Human Growth: Criticism and Evaluation. In: John Stuart Mill and the Ethic of Human Growth. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 85. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2010-6_7
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