Abstract
The idea of human improvement and progress precedes civilization. Philosophers have theorized on the subject since ancient times, and it remains a topic of serious study. Readers with a general interest in the subject of human growth will find the writings of many philosophers worthwhile. A prominent example is the American philosopher John Dewey, who articulated a sophisticated and elaborate theory of growth in his numerous writings.1 Mill’s growth ethic was shaped by a variety of influences, ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Wilhelm von Humboldt, Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet, Auguste Comte, and nineteenth-century romanticism. In this chapter, I focus on Mill’s particular theory of growth and attempt to define what it means. The first section aims to make the meaning of the ‘growth’ idea more intelligible by discussing how Mill understands and uses it. The next section probes the idea of growth more deeply by showing how it functions in the context of his social thought. The final section locates the theme of growth throughout his writings and establishes its centrality and importance.
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Endnotes
Among Dewey’s major books dealing with his theory of growth are: Democracy and Education, esp. ch. IV, ch. XVII, sect. 2, and ch. XXIII, sect. 2, no. 3; Reconstruction in Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948), pp. 177ff; Art as Experience (New York: Minton, Balch, 1934), pp. 23, 55; and, Experience and Education (New York: Collier Books, 1963). Among the secondary sources are: Robert J. Roth, John Dewey and Self-Realization (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962); Raymond D. Boisvert, John Dewey: Rethinking our time (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 58–65; and, a series of Educational Theory articles: Daniel Pekarsky, “Dewey’s Conception of Growth Reconsidered,” 40:3 (Summer, 1990); Eammon Callan, “Dewey’s Conception of Education as Growth,” 32:1 (Winter, 1982); Joe L. Green, “The Deweyan Growth Metaphor and the Problem of Sufficiency,” 26:4 (Fall, 1976); and, Dorothy June Newbury, “A Search for the Meaning of Discipline in Dewey’s Theory of Growth,” 6:4 (Oct., 1956). Some worthwhile books that deal with both Mill and Dewey are: Gerald F. Gaus, The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (London: Croom Helm, 1983); James Gouinlock, Excellence in Public Discourse: John Stuart Mill, John Dewey,and Social Intelligence (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986); and David L. Norton, Democracy and Moral Development (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991), esp. ch. 2.
For example, Mill makes the point that ‘progress’ is not synonymous with ’improvement,’ at least in one particular context. See A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. x, sec. 3. Cf. Considerations on Representative Government (Collected Works XIX, p. 396). In this study on Mill, I treat terms such as development and improvement, or progress and advancement, as virtually synonymous. I vary them primarily for stylistic reasons. The term ’family resemblance’ is borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s notion of ’die Familienähnlichkeit,’ which he develops in several of his books and lectures. See, for example, G. E. M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, eds., Philosophical Investigations, 2nd. edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1958), section 67; and, Alice Ambrose, ed., Wittgenstein’s Lectures, Cambridge 1932–35, from the notes of Alice Ambrose and Margaret MacDonald (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), sections 94–96.
Much has been written on Mill’s use of metaphors and similes, particularly in On Liberty. See Robert C. Schweik, “Mill’s Analogies in On Liberty: The Uses of Inconsistency,” The Mill News Letter 23:2 (Summer, 1988); Gordon D. Hirsch, “Organic Imagery and the Psychology of Mill’s On Liberty,” The Mill News Letter 10:2 (Summer, 1975); Charles Matthews, “Argument Through Metaphor in John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty,” Language and Style, 4:3 (Summer, 1971); John Grube, “On Liberty as a Work of Art,” The Mill News Letter, 5:1 (Fall, 1969); David R. Sanderson, “Metaphor and Method in Mill’s On Liberty,” Victorian Newsletter, 34 (Fall, 1968); Eugene R. August, John Stuart Mill: A Mind at Large (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), chapter 8; Michael S. Kearns, Metaphors of Mind in Fiction and Psychology (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1987), chapter 4; and, Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate: Unfashionable Essays (University of Chicago Press, 1998), pp. 70ff.
See: Reinhold Aris, History of Political Thought in Germany from 1789–181 S (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1936), p. 159; Gertrude Himmelfarb, On Liberty and Liberalism: The Case of John Stuart Mill (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971), p. 61; F. W. Garforth, Educative Democracy: John Stuart Mill on Education in Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 79 (cf. p. 200). For the relevant passages in von Humboldt, see Ideen z u einem Versuch die Wirksamkeit des Staats zu bestimmen, in Wilhelm von Humboldts Gesammelte Schriften (Berlin: B. Behr’s Verlag, 1903), v. I, pp. 108–9; in English see The Limits of State Action, J. W. Burrow, ed. (Cambridge University Press, 1969), pp. 18–19. Von Humboldt is not necessarily the source of Mill’s plant metaphor. Coleridge, Carlyle, Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and Wordsworth all employ similar organic metaphors. Moreover, Mill himself was an accomplished botanist, so it is far from clear that he learned this metaphor from von Humboldt.
On Liberty (Collected Works XVIII, p. 263). Mill, who had a lifelong interest in botany, uses similar organic metaphors elsewhere in On Liberty and throughout his other writings. Some good examples are found in “Bentham,” Utilitarianism, “Nature,” and “Theism” (Collected Works, X, pp. 94, 213, 396, 462); “The Negro Question” and The Subjection of Women (Collected Works XXI, p. 93, pp. 276–77); and, “Grote’s History of Greece [4]” (Collected Works XXV, p. 1131). In addition to the machine metaphor, Mill also compares people unfavorably to apes, cattle, and sheep. For a discussion on Mill’s hobby, see John Robson’s introduction to volume XXXI of the Collected Works. See also Simon Curtis’ “The Philosopher’s Flowers: John Stuart Mill as Botanist,” Encounter, 80:2 (Feb., 1988).
R. P. Anschutz mistakenly interprets Mill’s tree metaphor as saying that self-development “is to be all a matter of freedom and spontaneity—of unfolding as a flower unfolds—unhindered by anything in the way of training or self-denial.” Anschutz then concludes that Mill must be inconsistent since elsewhere he tells us that our conduct should be deliberate and not impulsive. (The Philosophy of J. S. Mill [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953], pp. 22–23.) See also Susan Mendus, Tolerance and the Limits of Liberalism (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1989), pp. 64–65; Robert C. Schweik, “Mill’s Analogies in On Liberty: The Uses of Inconsistency,” The Mill News Letter 23:2 (Summer, 1988), p. 5; Stephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy (University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 195–96; and, Robert Goehlert, “Individuality and the Active Society: J. S. Mill’s Man as a Progressive Being” (Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University, November, 1981), p. 15.
See Max Black Models and Metaphors (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), ch. 3; Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education (Springfield IL: Charles C. Thomas, 1960), ch. 3; and, Donald N. McCloskey, If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise (University of Chicago Press, 1990); and, The Rhetoric of Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), esp. chapter five.
Three Essays on Religion (Collected Works X, p. 402). In the same passage, Mill also writes: “the duty of man is the same in respect to his own nature as in respect to the nature of all other things, namely not to follow but to amend it.” (p. 397.) On the doctrine that ‘man ought to follow nature,’ Mill acknowledges an opposite meaning, that all human activity conforms to nature and that we cannot help but to follow nature; however, he dismisses this as meaningless. Cf. ’The word “Nature”’ (Collected Works XXII, pp. 8–9). As John Morley put it, in defense of Mill: He never said that we were to leave the ground uncultivated to bring up whatever might chance to grow. On the contrary, the ground was to be cultivated with the utmost care and knowledge, and with a view to prevent the growth of tares—but cultivated in a certain manner. “Mr. Mill’s Doctrine of Liberty,” Fortnightly Review, n.s., 80 (August, 1873), reprinted in Peter Stansky, ed., Nineteenth-Century Essays (University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 118, and in Andrew Pyle, ed., Liberty: Contemporary Responses to John Stuart Mill (Bristol, England: Thoemmes Press, 1994), p. 278.
John Gray, Liberalism (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), p. 92. Although Mill regards liberty as a means to growth and happiness, he does not attend to the tensions that arise among these values. For a discussion on the relationship between liberty and progress, see chapter four, section five.
With an unqualified, literal interpretation of Mill’s call to follow our own nature, desires, and impulses, Stephen Holmes criticizes Mill for fallaciously endorsing unbridled license. Holmes asserts a “Darwinist perspective” (which he states would be “unfamiliar to Mill”) to explain his position. See Passions and Constraint (op. cit., endnote 6), pp. 195–96. On Mill’s interest in Charles Darwin, see A System of Logic, Bk. III, ch. xiv, sect. 5 (Collected Works VII, pp. 498–99). See Mill’s letters to Edward Livingstone Youmans, March, 1869 (Collected Works XVII, p. 1570); to Herbert Spencer, Dec. 2, 1868 (Collected Works, XVI, p. 1505); to John Tulloch, Jan. 30, 1869 (Collected Works XVII, pp. 1553–54); and, to Hewett C. Watson, Feb. 24, 1869 (Collected Works XVII, p. 1567). See also John Robson, The Improvement of Mankind: The Social and Political Thought of John Stuart Mill (University of Toronto Press, 1968), Appendix, pp. 273–75.
Utilitarianism (Collected Works X, p. 213). See also Chapters on Socialism (Collected Works V, pp. 745–46).
Inaugural Address Delivered to the University of St. Andrews (Collected Works, XXI, p. 255). See also “Bentham,” London and Westminster Review, Aug., 1838 (Collected Works X, pp. 112ff). As John Robson puts it: “The cultivation of the beautiful which Mill desiderates is in truth for him primarily a cultivation of beautiful character; the most beautiful nature is human nature.” See The Improvement of Mankind, p. 121.
In addition to those cited in endnote 6 above, see James Gouinlock, Excellence in Public Discourse: John Stuart Mill, John Dewey, and Social Intelligence (New York: Teachers College Press, 1986), pp. 25, 28, 47, 75. Professor Gouinlock overlooks the points raised in this paragraph of text.
Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, who denies the distinction between humans and animals in his gibe at improvement. See Der Wille Zur Macht in Freidrich Nietzsche: Werke in Drei Bänden (München: Carl Hanser, 1956), vol. 3, pp. 807, 812. See also Die Götzendämerung, “Die Verbesserer der Menschheit,” in Werke, vol. 2, pp. 979–82.
Geraint Williams, “The Greek Origins of J. S. Mill’s Happiness,” Utilitas, 8:1 (March, 1996), pp. 8–9.
Supplement to the forth, fifth, and sixth editions of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (Edinburgh: Archibald Constable and Co., 1824), p. 31.
Continuing, Mill writes: Nor let it be thought that only the more eminent of our species, in mind and heart, are capable of identifying their feelings with the entire life of the human race. This noble capability implies indeed a certain cultivation, but not superior to that which might be, and certainly will be if human improvement continues, the lot of all. Three Essays on Religion (Collected Works X, p. 420–21).
Much can be said to elaborate on this point. See Wilhelm von Humboldt, The Limits of State Action, pp. 16f.; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 523–24; and, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 395. Gerald Gaus makes an interesting (and arguable) psychological observation on this point. He writes that “modern liberals do not believe that these unsatisfied capacities merely lie dormant. They are, we are told, deflected into pathological channels or lead to feelings of oppression.” The Modern Liberal Theory of Man (London and Canberra: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 141. Cf. John Dewey, Problems of Men (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 95–96.
See “Spirit of the Age” (Collected Works XXII, p. 241); and, Inaugural Address (Collected Works XXI, p. 233). Cf. Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self John Stuart Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 6, 144.
Some of Mill’s critics misunderstand this important point. A nineteenth-century critic, ‘L. S.’ (believed to be Leslie Stephen), in an article entitled “Social Macadamisation,” attributes to Mill an unbounded belief in freedom and ignores some salient features of Mill’s position on individuality and self-development. He writes: “Indeed, the hope that people are to be rendered more vigorous by simply removing restrictions, seems to be as fallacious as the hope that a bush planted in an open field would naturally develop into a forest tree.” (Fraser’s Magazine, 6:32 [August, 1872], p. 157); also cited in J. C. Rees, “Mill and His Early Critics” (University College, Leicester, 1956), p. 27. What L. S. overlooks is that for Mill, proper character formation calls for people following their own path to growth. The last thing that Mill wanted was for people to follow a path that was not suited for them, or contrary to their wishes. Although a non-restrictive environment is necessary for the individual’s ability to flourish, it is not, in and of itself, sufficient. Michael Freeden makes a similar oversight in The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), pp. 23, 96, 216.
John Dewey discusses this question using the example of a burglar. See Experience and Education (New York: Macmillan, 1956), pp. 28–29. A good discussion on this topic is Daniel Pekarsky’s “Burglars, Robber Barons, and the Good Life,” Educational Theory, 41:1 (Winter, 1991). See also, Henry Sidgwick, Lectures on the Ethics of T.H. Green, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and J. Martineau (London: Macmillan, 1902), p. 64; David L. Norton, Democracy and Moral Development: A Politics of Virtue, pp. 90, 103; and, Alan Gewirth, Self-Fulfillment (Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 5.
On Liberty, p. 261. See von Humboldt’s Ideen in Gesammelte Schriften, p. 106; (The Limits of State Action, p. 16). For discussions of von Humboldt’s notion of human growth, see: S. A. Kaehler, Wilhelm v. Humboldt und der Staat: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte deutscher Lebensgestaltung u m 1800 (München und Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1927); and, David Sorkin, “Wilhelm Von Humboldt: The Theory and Practice of Self-Formation (Bildung), 1791–1810,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 44:1 (Jan-March, 1983). See also John M. Robson, “Rational Animals and Others,” in John Robson and Michael Laine, eds., James and John Stuart Mill: Papers of the Centenary Conference (University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 156.
See Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VII, chs. 11–14, and Bk. X, chs. 1–5, and Politics, Bk. I, ch. 2. My definitions are taken from Douglas B. Rasmussen, “Perfectionism,” Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics,Vol. III (San Diego: Academic Press, 1998). Authoritative analyses of eudaimonia are found in John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Harvard University Press, 1975), ch. II; W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory,second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), ch. II; and, Deal W. Hudson, Happiness and the Limits of Satisfaction (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996), ch. 4, 8, 9, 10. An interesting, related article is Roger Crisp’s “Mill on Virtue as a Part of Happiness,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 4:2 (Sept. 1996). In some respects, Mill saw Aristotle and the ancients not as believers in improvement and progress, but as conservative guardians preventing social degeneration. See “Grote’s Aristotle,” Fortnightly Review, new series XIII (Jan., 1873), Collected Works XI, p. 505. (Cf. Mill’s mention of “the judicious utilitarianism of Aristotle” in On Liberty, p. 235.)
See Mill’s letter to Gustave D’Eichthal (Nov. 30, 1831), Collected Works XII, p. 89 (cited in note 40 below). Simone De Beauvoir makes this point eloquently in Pour une morale de l’Ambiguité (Gallimard, 1947), p. 111. In English, see The Ethics of Ambiguity, transl. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Citadel, 1970), p. 79. See also Freedom As a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1988), p. 185.
In “Civilization,” Mill writes: All that we are in danger of losing we may preserve, all that we have lost we may regain, and bring to a perfection hitherto unknown; but not by slumbering, and leaving things to themselves, no more than by ridiculously trying our strength against their irresistible tendencies: only by establishing counter-tendencies, which may combine with those tendencies, and modify them. (Collected Works XVIII, p. 136.) This does not mean, however, that Mill advocates these values only because they counter negative tendencies. Each of these values help to promote growth and happiness. Therefore, they serve many useful purposes in Mill’s value system. More will be said on this in the following chapters.
“Stability of Society,” Leader (Aug. 17, 1850), p. 494 (Collected Works XXV, p. 1181). Cf. “Alison’s History of the French Revolution,” Monthly Repository, n.s., VII, Aug. 1833 (Collected Works XX, pp. 119–20).
See A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. x, s. 3 (Collected Works VIII, pp. 913–15). Cf. Considerations on Representative Government, chapter two. See also, “Duveyrier’s Political Views of French Affairs,” Edinburgh Review LXXXIII (April, 1846), p. 453 (Collected Works XX, p. 297).
“Political Progress” (speech to the Manchester Reform Club, Feb. 4, 1867, Collected Works XXVIII, p. 128), and The Subjection of Women (New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1869), p. 175 (Collected Works XXI, p. 335). See also Mill’s letter to D’Eichthal (October 8, 1829), Collected Works XII, p. 37. He writes that while man advances in some things, he goes back in others. The same point is reiterated in “Enfranchisement of Women” (written with Harriet Taylor Mill), Collected Works XXI, p. 412.
See On Liberty p. 267. See also Logic, Bk. VI, ch. vi, s. 1, p. 875 and ch. vii, s. 1, p. 879. This does not mean that Mill gives free reign to egoism or individuality. He sees a vital role for society as a guiding source of accumulated knowledge and values, and as a reminder of our responsibilities to others. He also recognizes the need for developing social institutions that facilitate individual growth and social progress. Cf. above, chapter one, endnote 3, and below, chapter seven.
Logic, Bk. VI, ch. v, s. 2, p. 864. See also Principles of Political Economy, Bk. II, ch. i, s. 3 (Collected Works II, p. 209); and, “A Few Observations on Mr. Mill,” anonymously published as Appendix C in Edward Lytton Bulwer’s England and the English (London: Bentley, 1833), Collected Works I, p. 591. On the notion that there is no single path to development, and different peoples require different approaches to improvement, see “Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy,” also from Bulwer’s England and the English, Appendix B (Collected Works X, p. 16).
“Chapters on Socialism,” Fortnightly Review, n.s. XXV (1879), Collected Works V, p. 745; and, “Centralisation,” Edinburgh Review CXV (April, 1862, p. 358), Collected Works XIX, p. 613. See also “Endowments,” Fortnightly Review, n.s. V (April, 1869) (Collected Works V, p. 617); and, “Guizot’s Lectures on European Civilization,” London Review II (Jan., 1836) [corresponding to the Westminster Review XXXI] (Collected Works XX, pp. 381–82).
See, for example, James Fitzjames Stephen, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity (Cambridge University Press, 1967), pp. 73, 81; Robert Paul Wolff, The Poverty of Liberalism (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), pp. 146–47; and, F. W. Garforth, Educative Democracy, p. 190. See also Robert Goehlert, “Individuality and the Active Society,” p. 134. I raise this point again in chapter seven.
See Considerations on Representative Government, chapter eight; and, “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform” (Collected Works XIX, p. 323).
In “Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform,” Mill writes: None are so illiberal, none so bigoted in their hostility to improvement, none so superstitiously attached to the stupidest and worst of old forms and usages, as the uneducated…. [N]o lover of improvement can desire that the predominant power should be turned over to persons in the mental and moral condition of the English working classes. (p. 327.) See also p. 334, and p. 338 where he remarks that the ‘lower classes are habitual liars.’ Also see the Autobiography of John Stuart Mill (New York: Columbia University Press, 1924), p. 199 (Collected Works I, pp. 274–75); Principles of Political Economy, Bk. V, ch. xi, s. 8 (Collected Works III, p. 947); “The Claims of Labour” (Collected Works IV, p. 377); “Coleridge” (Collected Works X, p. 140n); “Lewis’s Remarks on the Use and Abuse of Political Terms,” Examiner, April 22, 1832 (Collected Works XXIII, p. 448); and, Mill’s Diary entry for January 10, 1854, in The Letters of John Stuart Mill, v. II, Hugh S. R. Elliot, ed. (London: Longmans, Green, 1910), p. 357 (Collected Works XXVII, p. 641).
Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, v. I (1835), v. II (1840). Both volumes were favorably reviewed by Mill. See London Review I (Oct., 1835), and Edinburgh Review, LXXII, unsigned (Oct., 1840). Both reviews appear in volume XVIII of the Collected Works.
See Subjection of Women, p. 152 (Collected Works, XXI, p. 325).
See: On Liberty, p. 269; “De Tocqueville on Democracy in America [I]” (Collected Works XVIII, pp. 73–4); The Spirit of the Age (University of Chicago Press, 1942), pp. 62, 76 (Collected Works XXII, pp. 290, 304); Principles of Political Economy, Bk. IV, ch. vii, s. 2 (Collected Works III, pp. 764–65); Inaugural Address (Collected Works XXI, pp. 223–24); The Early Draft o f John Stuart Mill’s “Autobiography,” Jack Stillinger, ed. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), pp. 188–89; and “The Rationale of Political Representation,” London Review I (July, 1835). Also see David Spitz, “Freedom and Individuality: Mill’s Liberty in Retrospect,” in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Liberty: Nomos IV (New York: Atherton Press, second edition, 1966), p. 185.
This idea appears in numerous passages in Mill’s work. A System of Logic, Bk. VI, ch. x, s. 7 (Collected Works VIII, p. 926); Bk. VI, ch. xi, s. 2 (p. 935); Principles of Political Economy,Bk. I, ch. 2, s. 8 (Collected Works, II, p. 43); Autobiography,p. 167 (Collected Works I, p. 245); Considerations on Representative Government, chapter II; and, the “Speech on the Utility of Knowledge.” Cf. Mill’s Diary entry for Jan. 15, 1854 (in Elliot (op. cit., endnote 34), p. 359 (Collected Works, XXVII, p. 643).
On this point I disagree with John Gibbins. See “J. S. Mill, liberalism, and progress,” in Richard Bellamy, ed., Victorian Liberalism: Nineteenth-century political thought and practice (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 92, 106.
These speeches can be found in Collected Works, vol. XXVI and in the appendix to the 1924 Oxford University Press edition of Mill’s Autobiography (Preface by Harold Laski). On the last point of perfectibility as a goal, see Mill’s letter to Gustave D’Eichthal (November 30, 1831). Mill writes that each step toward the goal of reaching a permanent improvement of society is in itself, a great positive good. Your system, therefore, even supposing it to be impracticable, differs from every other system which has ever proposed to itself an unattainable end, in this, that many, indeed almost all attainable good lies on the road to it. (Collected Works XII, p. 89.) On the idea of human improvement and opposition to this idea, the interested reader should see Mill’s letter to John Sterling, October 20–22, 1831 (Collected Works XII, pp. 83–84).
See Mill’s “Tennyson’s Poems,” London Review I, July, 1835 (Collected Works I, p. 414).
“Civilization,” London and Westminster Review, April, 1836 (Collected Works XVIII, p. 135). See also Mill’s speech “On the Present State of Literature” (1827), in The Adelphi, 1:8, Jan., 1924 (Collected Works XXVI).
The Spirit of the Age, p. 16 (Collected Works XXII, p. 234). See text above, corresponding to endnote 17.
Logic, Bk. VI, ch. x, s. 7, p. 926. See above, footnote 38.
Ibid., Bk. VI, ch. x, s. 2, p. 913.
Ibid.
Ibid., Bk. VI, ch. ii, s. 3, p. 840. See also Mill’s essay on “Civilization,” where he writes of “the astonishing pliability of our nature” (Collected Works XVIII, p. 145.); and, Mill’s essay on “Nature” (Collected Works X, p. 397).
The letter is dated Sept. 26, 1849. (Collected Works XIV, p. 37.) See also Mill’s Morning Chronicle article, “The Condition of Ireland” (Dec. 11, 1846). He salutes the Swiss political economist Sismondi for recognizing human happiness and improvement (rather than wealth and production) to be the ends of political economy (Collected Works XXIV, p. 989).
The quotations in this paragraph are from Principles of Political Economy, Bk. IV, ch. vi, s. 2 (Collected Works III, pp. 753–77). A good discussion on the Stationary State is found in Jonathan Riley’s “J. S. Mill’s Liberal Utilitarian Assessment of Capitalism Versus Socialism,” Utilitas,8:1 (March, 1996), esp. pp. 51–53.
“Newman’s Political Economy” was originally published unsigned in the Westminster Review, LVI (Oct., 1851). See Collected Works V, pp. 441–57. It was a review of Francis William Newman’s Lectures on Political Economy (London: Chapman, 1851). The quotations in this paragraph concern the final lectures in Newman’s book, and are found in volume V of the Collected Works, pp. 454–56.
On Liberty (Collected Works XVIII, p. 264).
Ibid., p. 267. Similarly, in “DeTocqueville on Democracy in America (II),” Mill writes: “The unlikeness of one person to another is not only a principle of improvement, but would seem almost to be the only principle.” (Collected Works XVIII, p. 197.) At no point in his writings does Mill offer a clear explanation on the meaning of ‘individuality.’ For a detailed discussion of Mill’s ideas on individuality, see Garforth, Educative Democracy, chapter five.
On Liberty, pp. 266, 270.
Ibid., p. 263. Some critics of utilitarianism, such as Robert Nozick, charge that the over-emphasis on hedonism would lead a utilitarian to prefer short-cuts to feeling pleasure rather than a less pleasurable life of active experience. In this passage, Mill makes clear that such criticism would not apply to him. Also see “On Genius” (Collected Works I, p. 330). See Nozick’s discussion on utilitarianism and the “experience machine,” in Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), chapter 3, esp. pp. 42ff.
Ibid., p. 266.
Ibid., p. 265.
Ibid., chapter IV, p. 279.
Ibid. Mill writes: “What are called duties to ourselves are not socially obligatory unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to others.”
Ibid.
Utilitarianism (Collected Works X, p. 212). See also Mill’s diary entry for March 23, 1854 (Collected Works XXVII, p. 663).
Ibid., pp. 213–14.
Collected Works XIX, p. 390. He makes the same point more forcefully in a letter to D’Eichthal, dated October 8, 1829 (Collected Works XII, p. 36).
Ibid., p. 403.
Ibid., p. 388. See also Mill’s “Attack on Literature,” Examiner, June 12, 1831 (Collected Works XXII, p. 322).
Ibid. See also Mill’s speech “Political Progress,” delivered to the Manchester Reform Club, Feb. 4, 1867 (Collected Works XXVIII, p. 128).
Ibid., p 394.
Collected Works IX, pp. 465–66. See also Logic, Bk. VI, esp. chapters two and three.
The Subjection of Women, p. 1 (Collected Works, XXI, p. 261 [also see pp. 272ff, p. 326]). See also Mill’s letter to James Johnston Shaw from the spring of 1869, in Additional Letters of John Stuart Mill (Collected Works XXXII, p. 207, also cited in The Mill News Letter, 20:2 [Summer, 1985], p. 15); Mill’s letter to Josephine Butler (March 22, 1869); and, Mill’s speech on “Women’s Suffrage,” Jan. 12, 1871 (Collected Works XXIX, p. 405). The same view is expressed in the “Rejected Leaves of the Early Draft of the Autobiography” (Collected Works I, Appendix G, p. 621).
Ibid., p. 176 (Collected Works XXI, p. 335).
Ibid., p. 177 (Collected Works XXI, p. 336). See also “On Marriage” (Collected Works XXI, pp. 37–49); and, “Enfranchisement of Women” (Collected Works XXI, p. 412).
Autobiography of John Stuart Mill, p. 129 (Collected Works I, p. 193).
Essays on Equality, Law, and Education (Collected Works XXI, p. xxxv).
See J. S. Mill’s introduction to James Mill’s Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1869), v. I, p. xiii (Collected Works XXXI, p. 99). I do not wish to imply that Mill “inherited” a faith in progress from his father (as Shirley Robin Letwin seems to think in The Pursuit of Certainty [Cambridge University Press, 1965], p. 247). Although James Mill was certainly a source, John Mill’s conception of human growth differs greatly from his father’s. One can point to many partial sources of John Stuart Mill’s ideas on growth. Among them are the ancient Greeks, Jesus, Turgot, the French Positivists, William Godwin, Coleridge, and Goethe, plus many Romantic and Victorian thinkers. (See also the opening paragraph of this chapter.)
“Self-Reform as Political Reform in the writings of John Stuart Mill,” Utilitas, 1:2 (Nov., 1989), p. 249.
See R. P. Anschutz, The Philosophy of J. S. Mill, p. 22; John Plamenatz, The English Utilitarians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1966), p. 149; Alan Ryan, J. S. Mill (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 104; F. W. Garforth, Educative Democracy, p. 4.
Specifically, Jacobs criticizes Mill’s theory of progress as inadequately defined and indefinable without resorting to value judgments. Therefore, Jacobs concludes, ‘nothing can be said for it.’ Rechtsphilosophie und Politische Philosophie be John Stuart Mill (Bonn: H. Bouvier u. Co. Verlag, 1965), p. 173.
John Stuart Mill and French Thought (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1968), pp. 229–30. In fairness to Mueller, I must point out that she does not treat the topic of growth as meaningless, and that she does recognize the importance of growth, self-development, self-fulfillment, and self-realization for understanding Mill’s ideas in O n Liberty and Representative Government.
For instance, ‘freedom’ (On Liberty, pp. 226, 294) or ’happiness’ (Utilitarianism, p. 210). I shall have more to say on this in the following chapters.
John Gray, Mill on Liberty: A Defence (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), p. 7 (also see p. 119). Among the leading liberal theorists supporting this position on neutrality are: Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality (Oxford University Press, 1995); Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (Oxford University Press, 1969); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978), and A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press, 1985); Charles Larmore, Patterns of Moral Complexity (Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice; and, Bernard Williams, “Introduction” in H. Hardy. ed., Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays of Isaiah Berlin (Oxford University Press, 1981), and Moral Luck: Philosophical Essays 1973–1981 (Cambridge University Press, 1981). On this topic, see my article “Discrimination and Liberal Neutrality,” Studies in Philosophy and Education, 11:4 (1993).
Logic, Bk. VI, ch. v, s. 2, p. 864.
J. S. Mill (op. cit., endnote 75), p. 130.
Collected Works XIX, pp. 461–62.
Collected Works XII, p. 37 (8 October 1829). Mill makes a similar point in his next letter to D’Eichthal (7 November 1829). See Collected Works XII, p. 43. See also Auguste Comte and Positivism (Collected Works X, p. 306).
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Habibi, D.A. (2001). Mill’s Conception of Human Growth. In: John Stuart Mill and the Ethic of Human Growth. Philosophical Studies Series, vol 85. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2010-6_2
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