Abstract
In recent years, economists have devoted considerable attention to mechanisms through which firms can cooperate, particularly in the conduct of R&D. This literature had tended to focus on cooperation’s effects in output markets. In contrast, the present analysis examines the effects of cooperation on input markets. In particular, joint ventures are often said to be motivated by the desire to assemble complementary assets into a package needed to conduct a successful project. Some of the ways in which joint ventures may faciliate the acquisition of needed inputs are explored.
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Katz, M.L. (1995). Joint Ventures as a Means of Assembling Complementary Inputs. In: Chatterjee, K., Gray, B. (eds) International Joint Ventures: Economic and Organizational Perspectives. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1944-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1944-5_2
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