Abstract
Chisholm re-formulates Brentano’s intentionality thesis in the following way:
We may now re-express Brentano’s thesis — or a thesis resembling that of Brentano — by reference to intentional sentences. Let us say (1) that we do not need to use intentional sentences when we describe non-psychological phenomena; we can express our beliefs about what is merely ‘physical’ in sentences which are not intentional. But (2) when we wish to describe perceiving, assuming, believing, knowing, wanting, hoping, and other such attitudes, then either (a) we must use sentences which are intentional or (b) we must use terms we do not need to use when we describe non-psychological phenomena.1
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© 1984 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Harney, M.J. (1984). Intentionality, Relations and Objects I: The Relational Theory. In: Intentionality, Sense and the Mind. Phaenomenologica, vol 94. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1905-6_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1905-6_4
Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht
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