Abstract
A prominent feature of von Wright’s action theory is its study of the logical grammar of determinism. Its general outcome is the emancipation of the discussion about human freedom from traditional epistemological and ontological approaches. I would like to show here that William James’s defence of free will reflects a similar aspect, notwithstanding the different theoretical and methodological frameworks of his own and von Wright’s thought.
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Notes
W. James: The Principles of Psychology (henceforth PP), 2 vols., Holt, New York 1890; Dover, New York 1950; 3 vols., Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1981. References and quotations in the text will be from the Dover edition.
W. James: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (henceforth WB), Longmans, Green Co, New York 1897; Dover, New York 1956; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.-London 1979. References and quotations in the text will be from the latter edition.
In these cases — James mantains — avoiding taking a decision and living open the question for the fear of incurring in error, is itself a “passional decision — just like deciding yes or no — and it is attended with the same risk of losing the truth” (WB, p. 20). The argument was intended to contrast a typical positivistic contention, namely that it is always wrong to believe anything upon insufficient evidence; however he clearly states that ‘In concreto the freedom to believe can only cover living options which the intellect of the individual cannot by itself resolve“ (WB, pp. 29–33). Misinterpretations of the essays were probabily due to the ”luckless title which should have been ‘Right to Believe’ “, as James wrote to F. H. Bradley (cfr. R. B. Perry: The Thought and Character of William James: Briefer Version, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1948, p. 208 ).
See for instance ‘Remarks on Spencers’s “Definition of Mind as Correspondence” (1878); ‘Brute and Human Intellect“ (1878); ‘Are we Automata?” (1879), in Collected Essays and Reviews, Longmans, Green Co, New York 1920; Russell Russell, New York 1969. It is also worth mentioning Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Enviroment, in WB, pp. 163–89, where he applies his elaboration of darwinism to historical-social field.
On that topic Ch. S. Peirce’s position is paradigmatic: he rejected very clearly the logical validity of introspection, but also the possibility of identifying, by introspective method, all those events we are accustomed to ascribe to the so called ‘inner world“, including the assumed acts of will. We should also mention G. H. Mead, who described the entire dimension of ”Self“ as the result of social processes.
Mind, n. 9, pp. 1–26. Reprinted in W. James: Collected Essays and Reviews, cit.
W. James: Psychology: Briefer Course (henceforth PBC), Holt, New York 1892; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1984.
Pragmatism was officially announced by James almost a decade after the publication of the Principles, but there is a general agreement about its unofficial presence throughout this work.
G. H. von Wright, Freedom and Determinism, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam 1980, p. 67.
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Calcaterra, R.M. (1999). W. James’ Defence of Free Will: A Step Toward a Paradigm Shift. In: Egidi, R. (eds) In Search of a New Humanism. Synthese Library, vol 282. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1852-3_15
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