The Basis for Holism in Quantum Physics

  • Michael Esfeld
Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 298)


What does holism in the philosophy of quantum theory mean? On which features of quantum physics is it based? In this chapter, the latter question is tackled. To start with, I sketch out the new conceptual features of quantum theory that are pertinent to quantum holism [7.1]. I then take up the distinction between the principles of separability and local action. Quantum theory violates separability. Einstein’s argument for the incompleteness of quantum theory is reconstructed [7.2]. Going into Bell’s theorem and its philosophical implications, I point out that the discussion on Einstein’s objections to quantum theory can be comprehended along the lines of the Duhem-Quine thesis [7.3].


Quantum Theory Local Action Singlet State Hide Variable Local Observable 
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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Esfeld
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of KonstanzGermany
  2. 2.University of HertfordshireEngland

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