Abstract
It is a striking fact that different solutions (such as Walrasian, core and value allocations) become equivalent in perfectly competitive economies (see, e.g., [1], [2], [3], [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [19], [20]). We attempt to understand this phenomenon by making explicit certain crucial properties that are common across these solutions and on which — at bottom — the equivalence depends.
This is a synopsis of our paper “An Equivalence Principle for Perfectly Competitive Economies,” Technical Report #34, Institute for Decision Sciences, Stony Brook (November 1993), to which we refer the reader for full details.
Support by the US-Israel Binational Science Foundation Grant No. 8500123 and by the US National Science Foundation Grant DMS-8705294 is gratefully acknowledged.
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Dubey, P., Neyman, A. (1994). An Axiomatic Approach to the Equivalence Phenomenon. In: Mertens, JF., Sorin, S. (eds) Game-Theoretic Methods in General Equilibrium Analysis. NATO ASI Series, vol 77. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1656-7_13
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