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Attractions to and Repulsions from Chance

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Game Theory, Experience, Rationality

Part of the book series: Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997] ((VCIY,volume 5))

Abstract

This paper is concerned with the discussion of the phenomenon sometimes described as “the utility and disutility of chance” both from the descriptive and the prescriptive point of view Emphasis is not on axioms and formal properties but on the psychological content of decision theoretic constructs.

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Pope, R. (1998). Attractions to and Repulsions from Chance. In: Leinfellner, W., Köhler, E. (eds) Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997], vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Dordrecht

  • Print ISBN: 978-90-481-4992-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-94-017-1654-3

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