Abstract
The end of the East-West confrontation has by no means put an end to the possibility of war in Central Europe. The outbreak of ethno-religious hostilities in former Yugoslavia made it clear that the previous formation of the Eastern and Western blocks contained a Pandora’s box of ethno-religious conflicts which opened up after the end of the Cold War.
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Kern, L. (1998). A Game-Theoretic Model of the War in Chechnya. In: Leinfellner, W., Köhler, E. (eds) Game Theory, Experience, Rationality. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook [1997], vol 5. Springer, Dordrecht. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_27
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1654-3_27
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